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Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and Antipoverty Policy During the Carter Administration

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Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and Antipoverty Policy During the Carter Administration

by

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Dedication

To my wife, Kristen,

whose true-love-ways move and sustain me.

To the boys, Taber and Milo,

whose smiles give me courage.

To my parents, Ben and Judy,

whose support, kindness, and love taught me what was important.

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Interpreting the Policy Past: The Relationship Between Education and Antipoverty Policy During the Carter Administration

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Given the present demand for greater accountability in public education and the call to close the achievement gap between the haves and have-nots, scholars have renewed advocacy for policy frameworks that combine education and antipoverty policies. This study historicizes the possibilities for such connections at the federal level by focusing on how people during the Carter Administration explained the relationship between the policies. Toward this end, this study examined how the coconstructions of context and meaning of the late 1970s made certain explanations of the relationship between education and anti-poverty policy more possible than others.

This study is a critical policy analysis employing historical methods. A historical narrative was constructed through the collection of oral history and archival data. Through this history, explanations of the relationships between the policies by the Carter Administration are situated within the social regularities of the day.

Specifically, in the late 1970s, as people became dismayed by the persistence of equality issues, despite equal protection under the law, they looked for other ways to work toward equality. The elevation of education as a national priority became a visible strategy to the power structure at the time because it did not require a necessary redistribution of privilege and would allow a concomitant strategy to invest in other identities. At the same time, as people searched for greater personal freedom through education. A growing neo-liberal sentiment asserted that education policies had to be disconnected from the antipoverty policies that were supported by groups, whose demands for conformity were seen as standing in the way of social well-being predicated on the pursuit of self-interest.

Thus, in the late 1970s education and antipoverty policy were separated at the federal level, not only bureaucratically, but also in the rhetoric of national priorities. As a result, education policy became more greatly aligned with human capital development and further detached from more redistributive policy frameworks. The rearticulation in the social regularities regarding race, property, individualism, and domestic stability remade the possible in domestic social policy.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

> So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
> –F. Scott Fitzgerald

The purpose of this study was to research the ways in which people explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 1975–1981. I undertook this task to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. This demonstration can provide insight into how the social regularities (see the appendix for definitions) during the Carter Administration shaped the possibilities of U.S. education and antipoverty policies. Such a study would help me and others interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events of a specific historical moment with its own possibilities and contradictions. In doing so, we can begin to engage in more creative policy making, which may help us in our struggle to improve the well-being of our children inside and outside of school.

My choice of this research problem has been shaped by my own history as well as by the time and place in which I am currently working. Because this work cannot be seen as separate from my own subjectivities, I use the "I" pronoun. Wilinsky (1989) advised, "Researchers must find ways of stepping from behind the disembodied voice" (p. 249). However, this does not mean that one should assume that this is the work of an autonomous consciousness. Instead, my experience should

be read as a snapshot of my subjectivity, which is always "within the context of a fluid, changeable social setting, in motion via the interaction of a plurality of multiply-sited, diffused agents" (Lather, 1991, p. 42).

The subject matter of my dissertation was strategically chosen based on my desires to improve schooling and the quality of life of many children of poverty today. These desires developed out of the contradictions of our time, brought into sharp relief during my years as a middle school social studies teacher in a high-poverty school. In my school, I worked with teachers who heroically employed progressive and culturally specific pedagogies to support students' ability to construct and interact with knowledge as their experiences dictated. In my own classroom, I hoped to create a community of learners where a sense of the self could be developed through a critical engagement with history. Most of the time I failed.

Although some teachers had moderate levels of success, we felt that most of our attempts for this type of education were systematically undermined by the very structure of schooling. These structures, which included working with over 150 students a day, seemed to be validated only by tradition and economy and had little relationship to a child's ability to learn. Systems, which were reflected in the schedule of the day, forced students to compartmentalize their learning and created student loads for teachers that were too large to develop relationships of trust between students and teachers. Many of the children I taught struggled at home as well. Whether the struggle emerged from neighborhood gang activity, an extra job after school, or being in charge of their siblings while their parents worked in the evenings,

most students had much more to worry about than the standards set by their teachers or the state. Reflecting on the struggles, I began to feel that if we were serious about helping children learn, then as a society we should invest more in their well-being and their schools.

My experiences, while anecdotal, were not isolated. A number of publications, such as Kozol's (1991) *Savage Inequalities,* resonated with my experience and showed me how much worse it could be. My teaching experiences also took place within a policy context of standards-based reform, which negatively impacted the interpretation of the purpose of public education in many schools. Indeed, the federal No Child Left Behind Act (2002) and state-mandated testing, regardless of their intent, shifted the focus in most schools from teaching and learning to measuring achievement. Rhetorically, the shift was intended to hold teachers and administrators accountable for providing all students with a high-quality educational experience. In practice, however, the shift drew increased attention to improving test scores and away from the authentic learning experiences my colleagues and I were hoping to provide.

The dissonance I experienced activated two desires. First, I developed a strong desire to investigate how we can continue to create environments that fail our students and their families, despite the best intentions of numerous professionals who work in schools. Second, through this understanding, I wanted to find a better way to advocate for fulfilling that promise. An avenue to realize these goals was the study of policy. Through policy work, that I might find ways to influence the agenda.

Purpose of Chapter 1

In this chapter, I lay a foundation for my dissertation research. I begin by reviewing what other researchers and policy leaders have said about the contradictions and promises that plague the U.S. education system. Within this review, I highlight how others have understood the relationship between poverty and schooling and the possibilities of addressing these two issues through policy. I then offer historical research on past policy precedents and the politics of realignment that have influenced what we consider possible in education policy. Subsequently, I argue that in order to effectively address the intertwined issues of poverty and education through policy, we must understand how education policy came to be thought of as separate from other forms of social policy.

Structure of the Chapter

Chapter 1 consists of two major sections. In the first section, I describe the policy issue under examination. In this description, I first establish the rationale for examining the connection between poverty and education. Then, I describe how the two policy streams were, at one time, considered in tandem. I end this section by entertaining the question of how the U.S. pursued a policy approach that ended up isolating education policy at the federal level as separate from other social programs. In the second major section, I present my rationale for undertaking this project and for the research approach I plan to employ.

Explication of the Policy Issue

There always has been a relationship between the goals of public schooling and the condition of the poor (Spring, 1996). The purpose of this dissertation was to offer an interpretation of how this relationship was reflected in the policy ideas during the Carter Administration. I wanted to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. Through this demonstration, I could expand our understandings of our current policy options as we attempt to work for social justice in our schools. In this section, I explain the current policy problem posed by our desires to make sure that all students have equal opportunity in our society and the conditions of poverty that prevent that possibility.

The Connection Between Poverty and Education

According to Horace Mann (as quoted in Mosteller & Moynihan, 1972, p. 3) public schools would be "the balance wheel of the social machinery." At the time Mann was writing, it was assumed that schooling provided the means to elevate oneself out of conditions of poverty and to afford one a place in the social order. However, recent research has confirmed what educators have long known: Poverty matters. The instability and deprivations caused by poverty suffocate the abilities of children to learn in schools.

Given the present demand for greater accountability in public education and the urgent siren call to close the achievement gaps between the haves and have-nots, scholars again have started to ask serious questions about the connections between poverty and education. Although it is important to ask the best of our educators in the schools, it is also important to remember that our schools are socially imbedded institutions. Berliner (2005) stated it this way:

> Although the power of schools and educators to influence individual students is never to be underestimated, the out-of-school factors associated with poverty play both a powerful and a limiting role in what can actually be achieved. … It seems to me that in the rush to improve student achievement through accountability systems relying on high-stakes tests, our policy makers and citizens forgot, or cannot understand, or deliberately avoid the fact, that our children live nested lives. (p. 2)

When we approach education policy, we must remember that a child's chance for success in school is partly determined by the neighborhood in which the school is located. Due to centuries of discriminatory laws and practices, the conditions of these neighborhoods are not equal (M. Orfield, 2002). We know that "our neighborhoods are highly segregated by social class, and thus, also segregated by race and ethnicity" (Berliner, 2005, p. 2). Yet, what does this mean? How does this segregation limit the possibilities in schools?

Before I address such questions, it is important to make some qualifying statements. The concepts of poverty and education are not monolithic. There is a wide dispersion of experiences and narrations of the experience of education and poverty. There is always dispute among scholars about how we construct the categories of poverty (Ravallion 1998; Rector, Johnson, & Youseff, 1999; Short, 2001), how we

define a community (M. Orfield, 2002; Wilson, 1999), or how we measure achievement in schools (Finn & Hess, 2004; Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Tunstall, 2001). Yet, in practice we still manage to have common enough understanding of these concepts to engage in discussions. Also, I address here neither the complicated question of what counts as achievement in school nor the role schooling plays in the creation of docile subjects (Fairclough, 1992). However, I explain the policy issue based on what I believe to be the "common understanding" (Berliner, 2005, p. 3). Moreover, research also should facilitate an understanding of how this understanding became solidified as common knowledge. Thus, at this point, I do not tease out what is considered tolerable poverty or where we should draw the poverty line. The suffering of one child is too much in my opinion, especially if it is the result of greed on the part of others.

Opportunity, Poverty, and the Complexities of Segregation

Currently, people in the United States value equal opportunity. In fact, at the turn of this century survey results revealed that 90% percent of Americans agreed that "our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed" (Hoschschild & Scovronick, 2003, p. 13). In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that it was necessary for U.S. society to desegregate schools to make sure that everyone had an equal opportunity to succeed. Despite this court order, there has been little headway in the desegregation of U.S. schools. G. Orfield and Lee (2005) explained,

> Socioeconomic segregation is a stubborn, multidimensional and deeply important cause of educational inequality. U.S. schools are now 41 percent nonwhite and the great majority of the nonwhite students attend schools which now show substantial segregation. Levels of segregation for black and Latino students have been steadily increasing since the l980s. (p. 5)

Although most frame desegregation as simply a racial issue, it is important to remember that the desegregation cases always have been about inequality of resources and opportunity. According to G. Orfield and Lee, racial segregation has been intertwined with other "forms of segregation, including segregation by socioeconomic status, by residential location, and increasingly by language" (p. 14).

Often these modes of segregation isolate and concentrate poverty to one geographic spot, which is often the inner city (Wilson, 1996). As wealth leaves the area and the concentration of poverty increases, the infrastructure and services in these areas often decline. Schools in the area and the students who attend them must overcome multiple barriers to provide the same chance at opportunity through academic achievement as schools in wealthier areas. Due to the historic White privileging practices (especially in housing and hiring practices) it is disproportionably non-Whites who live in these areas of concentrated poverty (Massey, 2006; Wilson, 1999). The public schools in these areas reflect this racial difference in wealth. For example, G. Orfield and Lee, (2005) observed, "More than 60 percent of black and Latino students attend high poverty schools (>50% poor), compared to 30 percent of Asians and 18 percent of whites" (p. 10).

The power of the social forces in high poverty schools is reflected in achievement. Socioeconomic status and zip codes explain most of the variability

between the aggregate scores of schools (Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Mosteller & Moynihan, 1972). This means that on the average it is unlikely that a school will overcome the effects of socioeconomic segregation. A recent study of school-level data (D. Harris, 2007) showed that "schools serving student populations that are both low poverty and low minority are 89 times more likely to be consistently high performing compared with high-poverty, high-minority schools" (p. 387). In other words, the schools at the heart of these high-poverty neighborhoods do not have a very good chance of having success with a great majority of their students. Statistically, it is not likely that these schools will be able to provide students with an equal opportunity for achievement in life.

Thus, segregation is more than the separation of people into separate housing areas based on race. Segregation is also the process by which we stratify opportunity. The concentration of poverty in these neighborhoods also impoverishes the institutions such as the schools that are trying to help students achieve.

Relationship Between Poverty and Educational Achievement

If the categories by which we segregate the haves from the have-nots are multidimensional, then the effects of this segregation are equally complex. Children who live in these areas often lack health and proper nutrition, experience violence in the form of crime and gangs, and endure unstable home environments. Each of these affects what is possible for students in school.

Income. One of the most basic elements of poverty is the lack of income. Researchers have attempted to understand how each of the aspects of poverty

contributes to the gap in achievement at the school level. One of the characteristics of these areas is a lack of quality high-paying jobs (Wilson, 1999). The general lack of wealth makes all aspects of life more difficult, including success in school. The correlation is obvious. Using data from Move to Opportunity experiments, and controlling for neighborhood, health, and parental background effects, Duncan and Magnuson (2005) concluded that reducing the racial and ethnic differences in family income by several thousand dollars would reduce achievement gaps between minority students and White students. In another example, a study conducted by Manpower Development Research Corporation, researchers (Morris, Huston, Duncan, Crosby, & Bos, 2001) synthesized available research on how welfare and work policies affect the children of single mothers. The study found that even a "relatively small amount of income supplements to working parents—(amounting to about $4,000 a year) improved children's elementary school achievement by about 10% to 15% of the average variation of the control group" (Anyon, 2005a, p. 201).

Housing. Another important element of poverty is the lack of quality, stable housing. Over the past 25 years, urban rents have risen faster than working-class incomes (Iceland, 2003; Picketty & Saez, 2003; Wilson, 1996). As rents go up, those whose income has relatively decreased are forced to move to find cheaper housing (J. E. Rosenbaum, Reynolds, & DeLuca, 2002). Children of these families must change schools. This not only disturbs the children's education, as they have to learn a whole new set of teacher expectations and reconcile their prior learning with the curriculum of the new school, but also disrupts the receiving school (Kerbow, 1996). Rothstein

(2004) cited a 1994 government report that one third of the poorest children (defined as being in families with a reported annual income of less that $10,000) "had attended at least three different schools by the 3rd grade" (p. 46). Rothstein (2004) noted that reducing the mobility of "low-income students (those eligible for lunch subsidies) to that of other students would eliminate 7% of the test score gap by income" (p. 46)

Health care. The quality of the health care in a community is another important factor in the well-being of children and hence their achievement at school. For example, hearing and vision problems are greater among students from high-poverty areas. Berliner (2005) cited a news report:

> Two different vision screening tests, one among the urban poor in Boston and one among the urban poor in New York, each found that over 50% of the children tested had some easily correctable vision deficiency, but most such cases were not followed up and corrected. (p. 35)

Researchers also have pointed out that ear infections are much more prevalent in low-income families (Egbuonu & Starfield, 1982). Although ear infections are easily treatable with access to pediatric care, those without quality health care often incur hearing loss. Classroom interactions such as learning to read are highly dependent on being able to see and hear correctly.

Maternal health also has significant implications for the well-being of a child. Women who are unhealthy are more likely to have premature babies. Riechman (2005) pointed out, "Women of low socioeconomic status are at increased risk for delivering low birth weight babies, whether socioeconomic status is defined by income, occupation, or education" (p. 100). Reichman continued, "Children born

preterm have greater difficulty completing tasks involving reading, spelling, and math than their full-term peers, though math scores are more consistently related to preterm birth or very low birth weight than are reading achievement scores" (p. 8).

There has also been recognition of the greater occurrence of asthma and lead poisoning for the children of the poor (Currie, 2005). The buildings (including the homes and schools) in segregated, high-poverty neighborhoods are often older and in disrepair. The building materials used in these buildings have been linked to lead poisoning that can cause symptoms such as irritability and problems of concentration. Students arrive at school with mental health issues related to the neurotoxins that they have absorbed from their environments. Currie maintained that health conditions such as these, as well as deficits in nutrition, can explain up to a quarter of the school readiness gap.

Neighborhood effects. In neighborhoods where there is a great amount of instability, the search for security and love leads to random associations and delicate relationships (DeParle, 2004; LeBlanc, 2003). These relationships can lead to love and security but also to unwanted pregnancies, trouble with the law, violence, or drug use, according to DeParle. All of these consequences limit the amount of school a child can attend. For this reason, Berliner (2005) concluded that the neighborhood as a collective can have an effect on achievement in school: "Independent of the other factors, neighborhood deprivation showed powerful effects on its own. Tragically, good parents too frequently lose their children to the streets: neighborhood effects are strong" (p. 40). Parents with the financial and social means move out of dangerous

neighborhoods. However, many families are not able to relocate. The bad neighborhoods, in and of themselves, affect the children's achievement separately from the effects of home and school.

Some may wonder what percentage of our students these conditions affect. It is estimated that around 20% of American children live in poverty (Blank, 1997; Iceland, 2003). Of the 26 wealthiest countries, the United States has the second highest percentage of children in poverty (Berliner, 2005). Since the 1970s, there has been an increase in the number of people living in the high-poverty areas described above. In 1990 about half those in high-poverty areas were African American, despite the fact they represented only 12% of the entire population. Latino/a populations also have seen a greater growth of poverty. Between 1990 and 2000, there was a reversal of decades of increasingly concentrated poverty. Many of the poor moved to an inner ring of suburbs, as city centers went through gentrification and revitalization (M. Orfield, 2002). Unfortunately, the recent economic downturn and the weakening state of many older suburbs underscore that the trend may reverse as poverty becomes concentrated in the inner suburbs (Jargowsky, 2003).

In summary, segregation along racial and socioeconomic lines has been a hallmark of U.S. life, especially in urban centers. Students living in poverty suffer more illness, with less access to health care than wealthier students. The neighborhoods they walk through to get to their school (most likely a different school than the previous year) are fraught with dangerous opportunities. All of these factors impact a student's chances of being successful in school. The problem is not a small

one. As this section has shown, poverty is an important policy issue in our struggle to make sure that there is equal opportunity for all of our children to learn.

Poverty and the Discourse of Excuses

As I relate these arguments that poverty matters, I am conscious of two dangers. First, there is the danger that the arguments above will be read as an indictment of the people who are struggling to make it in these neighborhoods. It is important to state here that I am not blaming the children or the families who arrive on the doorsteps of the schools with great gifts and problems. Second, I run the risk that people will claim that I am just making excuses for the soft bigotry practiced by generations of educators—that I am lowering expectations. In fact, some researchers claim that attempting to understand the connection between poverty and education is just a platform to make excuses.

Some see the problems described above as unrelated to the real job of schools. They believe that the citizens of this country have made an important choice to emphasize schools as the dominant social policy (Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). In doing so, we have chosen to value hard work and competition rather than other redistributive policies. Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003) noted that some are quick to point out that "terrific schools that serve highly disadvantaged minority kids do exist. … These schools are not waiting until the day social and economic disparities disappear. 'No Excuses' is their relentless message" (p. 12).

Research has shown that there are a handful of great schools; it is possible to "beat the odds." Researchers often have highlighted the success of the Knowledge Is

Power Program (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). Knowledge is Power Program schools are public charter schools that work to provide a different option to motivated parents and children. According to Thernstrom and Thernstrom, they require an application process intended to "discourage families unlikely to cooperate with the school" (p. 47). The school day is longer for the students and the teachers. Thernstrom and Thernstrom described one teacher who

> opens his classroom doors at 6:30 every morning, and most students are working by 7:00. He also has a program of after-school activities that keeps the students who want to stay until 6:00. He gives guitar lessons at recess and lunchtime for those who wish to remain in the room. Saturday mornings he works with some of his former students in grades 6–10 on algebra, Shakespeare and SAT preparation. (p. 47)

It is obvious that this teacher's dedication has a large effect on the children who were lucky enough to have cooperative parents. The teachers work hard but also expect the children to work hard and conform to expectations that they speak politely to authority figures and dress neatly. According to Zoch (2004), it is only in schools like these, where the responsibility to meet standards is pushed ultimately down to the student, that we can even think about closing the achievement gap. Zoch claimed that we must level with the student and tell them the only person that can help you is you.

Based on these examples, these authors (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003; Zoch, 2004) have concluded that the only real problem with education today is that there are not enough of these schools. They have recommended policies that they believe would increase the number of these schools. They may believe that the teachers we have in the schools today are not "very smart

people" (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003, p. 124) and that the collective action of these people is not good for the children. In general, they believe that rigidly egalitarian public school bureaucracy fails to provide incentives for the few in the profession who do care enough. They advocate for the elimination of neighborhood schools in favor of choice-based systems, the elimination of teacher unions, and the implementation of pay for performance policies (S. Carter, 2000; Education Trust, 1999; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003).

Although it is important to laud the incredible efforts of the educators, parents, and students in these schools, we also must ask, "Are these examples a realistic way to approach policy construction?" The economist Rothstein (2004) has not agreed. He noted,

> Americans have come to the conclusion that the achievement gap is the fault of the failing schools because it makes no commonsense that it could be otherwise. This commonsense perspective, however, is misleading and dangerous. It ignores how social class characteristics in a stratified society like ours may actually influence learning in schools (pp. 9–10)

Rothstein went on to point out that the examples of the few outstanding schools used by the Heritage Foundation team (Carter, 2000) are far from typical when it comes to being high-poverty schools. Many of the schools have parents who qualify as impoverished yet have other background characteristics that are exceptional. For example, one of the schools highlighted by Carter had mostly impoverished students, but according to Rothstein (2004), "30% had parents with college degrees and 12% had parents with graduate degrees" (p. 73). Rothstein (2004) faulted the Heritage report for falsely suggesting that "because schools with such children produce high

scores, schools whose children have more serious problems can do so as well" (p. 73). A more honest approach would recognize that whereas there are exceptional teachers and outstanding schools, public schools are responsible for educating everyone, and policy solutions should reflect this responsibility. Rothstein (2004) summed up his position as follows:

> There is nothing illogical about a belief that schools, if well operated, can raise lower-class achievement without investing in health, social, early childhood, after-school, and summer programs. But while the belief is not illogical, it is implausible, and the many claims made about instructional heroes or methods that close the gap are, upon examination unfounded. (p. 83)

Rothstein maintained that if we are going to close the achievement gap and truly provide equal opportunity, we not only must improve our schools, but also must pay attention to other social factors

In summary, while some may claim that the school's job is ultimately unrelated to the social conditions that surround it, this position is implausible. The surroundings of the school have a large influence on what is possible in the school. It appears that a more astute policy approach will have to deal with the connections between poverty and education.

"A New Educational Policy Paradigm" Connecting Poverty and Education

Positions such as Rothstein's (2004) make the point that we cannot rely solely on education to make sure everyone has an equal opportunity. Relying only on schools would ignore that schools and education policy are situated in a complex matrix of stratification and government action. Policies are always related to other policies (Ball, 1994). We must recognize that we are asking our schools to provide

students with a chance at opportunity while we create policies that seem to work against that goal.

In her book, *Radical Possibilities*, Anyon (2005a) contended, "Failing public schools in cities are a logical consequence of the U.S. macro economy—and the federal and regional policies and practices that support it" (p. 2). Specifically, Anyon (2005a) established that federal polices regulating the minimum wage, job creation, tax brackets, transportation, and affordable housing create conditions of inequity "that no existing educational policy or urban school reform can transcend city-wide" (p. 2). This observation is based on research and on three decades of experience in urban school reform where she saw little improvement.

Anyon (2005a) argued that what is needed, in addition to better schools, is social policy that allows children to have a fighting chance at a stable home. Anyon (2005a) argued, "If, as I am suggesting, the macro economy deeply affects the quality of urban education, then perhaps we should rethink what 'counts' as educational policy" (p. 3). She suggested a new educational policy paradigm that fosters a seamless approach to socioeducational policy making, where economic well-being and opportunities for quality education intertwine. For example, Anyon (2005a) asked us to imagine the following policy approach:

> Education funding reform would include the companion need for financing neighborhood jobs and decent wages. … Vocational offerings in high school would link to living-wage campaigns and employers who support them. College graduation would be understood as a continuation of government's financial responsibility for public education. (p. 200)

Rothstein (2004) agreed, writing that while we most often look to our schools to achieve equal educational outcomes for children of all social classes, it may be a good idea to remember that "in reality, for lower class families, low wages for working parents with children, poor healthcare, inadequate housing, and lack of opportunity for high-quality early childhood, after school and summer activities are all educational problems" (p. 130). The current policy trajectory of accountability and standards is being built on a foundation that cannot produce the desired results and may even increase inequitable educational outcomes (Valenzuela, 2005). G. Orfield and Lee (2005) argued that if we do move forward with testing regimes, "housing and land use policies should be designed on a regional basis to foster access for all students to strong schools and educational diversity" (p. 43).

Therefore, as I have explained, we are faced with a policy choice. Do we continue on our current policy trajectory, or do we make policy that recognizes the relationship between poverty and educational achievement? In our struggle to make sure that all U.S. residents have an equal opportunity, should we find a way to coordinate antipoverty and education policies? Should we consider antipoverty and education policy as reciprocal? Rothstein (2004), Anyon (2005a, 2005b), Berliner (2005), G. Orfield and Lee (2005), and others have assembled a great deal of research that argues strongly that we should. They have maintained that if we are serious about affording all of our children an equal opportunity for learning, we must write policy that does not rely solely on schools to provide this chance. There should be an

investment in family supports with the goal of improving children's chances at school.

My own experiences in the schools and the research presented above have led me to agree with the approach. Most of the teachers I knew were not making excuses or lowering expectations. Our daily experiences in the school were the result of complex relationships between our sense of stability and physical well-being. Ignoring those factors was not an option. The value of this approach would be that it does ignore that context but instead works to help children feel safer, see better, hear better, and be healthier. This approach in turn would allow schools to help students learn better. According to Anyon (2005a), the end goal is not only an alignment of policies at the federal level, but also a fit between "neighborhood, family and student needs and the potential of education policies to contribute to their fulfillment" (p. 200). Anyon (2005a) claimed that we can change the odds for our children.

If we do not attempt to change the odds, the disconnect between the promise and the daily experience of many students and teachers in U.S. schools will damage morale. Children will lose faith in the value of education as an important factor in their personal success. Many teachers will leave the profession. If from our policy framework we continue to shriek, "No Excuses!" then, according to Rothstein (2004), "the nation risks abandoning public education only to those willing to pander to political fashion by promising to achieve in schools what they know, in their hearts, is not possible" (p. 147).

The research presented above has argued strongly that we should take seriously the question of what counts as education policy (Anyon, 2005b). Policy researchers have asserted that if we do this, we will have the chance to create coordinated policies that may offer a greater equality of opportunity than ever has existed in U.S. history. If we do not do this, it could mean the delegitimization of the public school project. An issue with such moral force requires that we be thoughtful in our attempts to realize these desires. It may be wise to look to historical precedents.

Is it a New Policy Paradigm?

While the description of the education and poverty relationship presented above has grown out of recent debates, it is important to remember that "for nearly half a century, the association of social and economic disadvantage with a student achievement gap has been well known to economists, sociologists and educators" (Rothstein, 2004, p. 10). Thus, it is important to learn from any historical precedents for such an approach. Below I provide a brief account of a few concerted policy efforts simultaneously to improve the quality of life for the poor and to improve schools. One was President Johnson's War on Poverty and Great Society programs. I also point to the time when most scholars believed this policy approach disappeared: the Reagan presidency.

The assertion that education policy is independent from other social policy seems to be a phenomenon of recent U.S. history. The establishment of state-run schools through the common school movements between 1830 and 1850 was

modeled on the charity schools, which were designed to use "education to solve social problems and build political community" (Spring, 1996, p. 129). Most of the time, though, this connection was framed as the expansion of education to improve other social problems. Spring noted that most people of the time believed that government policies supporting common schools were "the best means of controlling crime, social unrest, and political disruptions" (p. 130). We must look to the 20th century to find an approach that recognizes the reciprocal relationship between poverty and education.

The Ford Foundation in the 1950s

The policy framework articulated by Anyon (2005a, 2005b), Rothstein (2004), M. Orfield (2002), and others most closely matches the work that came out of the Ford Foundation's attempt to improve the inner cities in the 1950s. Silver and Silver (1991) noted that the Ford Foundation in the early 1950s started various independent programs to deal with social problems in growing U.S. cities. Some of these were educational projects designed "essentially to modernize the system," like develop teacher education, library resources, and spread medical education (Silver & Silver, p. 40). One program dealt with city planning and focused on metropolitan area studies. Toward the end of the 1950s, the two programs came together under the title Great Cities Schools Program, which, according to Silver and Silver, resulted in the launching of an "educational anti-poverty program" (p. 53).

The Great Cities Schools Program reflected a belief in the power of community action. As the programs developed, the Ford Foundation sought a bolder

and more comprehensive approach to the salient issues of the inner city. Kravitz (1965) noted that the "Ford Foundation provided large development funds to coordinate programs in such areas as employment, education, and social services, under the auspices of a new community agency" (p. 41). In Philadelphia this developed into the establishment of school–community coordinating teams. The goal of these programs was to provide a range of strategies to bring the schools, the parents, and the community "more effectively into action on behalf of the child" (Silver & Silver, 1991, p. xx). This work would become the template for federal policy.

The Connection as the Framework for National Policy

As Trattner (1999) stated, "President Johnson's declaration of war on poverty in 1964 only put the highest official sanction on what had already become a vogue, or at least a significant national issue" (p. 310). Harrington's (1963) book *The Other America* spurred many task forces in the Kennedy Administration. These task forces brought together people from the Ford Foundation and senior policy writers within the administration, according to Silver and Silver.

Lyndon B. Johnson (1965) declared, "Our task is to make the national purpose serve the human purpose: that every person shall have the opportunity to become all that he or she is capable of becoming." This general understanding of the role of government grew out of a 30-year-old tradition initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt's response to the savage results of the stock market crash. However, Johnson was not responding to an economic crash but to the loud dissonance created by the paradox of

extreme poverty within a very wealthy nation that claimed to be the land of opportunity. As it still is today in the United States, the extreme poverty of the 1960s was mostly divided along racial lines.

Johnson felt that the nation's future was dependent on a full-scale response this injustice. His policy programs, the War on Poverty and the Great Society, addressed the growing racial tensions that were most visible in the greatly expanding urban centers. Berube (1991) wrote, "Essentially, Johnson wove a comprehensive set of innovative programs that addressed the problem of poverty and the concerns of the civil rights movement. These programs were chiefly in three areas: education, social welfare and civil rights" (p. 60). According to Katz (1996), the civil rights movement added

> a new element: for the first time, social welfare policy became one strategy for attacking the consequences of racism in America. As racial tensions worsened in the North as well as the South, the civil rights movement transformed the historic links between race, poverty and opportunity into a national disgrace. (p. 268)

According to Katz, this social welfare policy can be sorted into "programs with four *overlapping* purposes: to promote opportunities, stimulate community action, introduce new services, and expand transfer payments" (p. 266).

One of the key elements in promoting opportunities was the education policy. Johnson (as cited in Kaplan, 1984, p. 7) is remembered as telling his staffers, "This is going to be an education program. We are going to eliminate poverty with education. … People are going to learn their way out of poverty." Berube (1991) pointed out, "Johnson's involvement in the education policy process was twofold. First, he set

broad policy. … Second, he personally applied pressure on members of Congress" (p. 75). In terms of education policy, Johnson pushed through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965(ESEA), the Higher Education Act of 1965, and the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (as cited in Silver, 1981). Each of these programs was targeted at populations with the least amount of opportunity in America. The resulting policy represented a revolution in terms of federal intervention into education, especially for students with the greatest need for assistance: the disadvantaged poor. According to Silver, these policies were "part of a wide-ranging attack on the 'root causes of poverty in the midst of plenty'" (p. 18).

As noted above, education was not used in isolation to attack the problems of racism and poverty. On January 8, 1964, in his State of the Union address, Johnson (1965) stated, "Our aim is not only to relieve the symptom of poverty, but to cure it and, above all, to prevent it. No single piece of legislation, however, is going to suffice". Education policies were passed along with the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which established the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Office of Economic Opportunity was charged with the development of a variety of community-based antipoverty programs, such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, Volunteers in Service to America, the Model Cities Program, Upward Bound, Food Stamps program, the Community Action Program, and Project Head Start.

These programs were meant to work in concert. This was considered to be the "high water mark" of the welfare state in the United States (Hodgson, 2000, p. 151) Although there has been a great deal of debate about how to measure the success of

the programs (Gans, 1995), it is clear that in the mid-1960s antipoverty and educaiton policy were linked in the hope of creating more equitable chances of opportunity for children.

Public schooling in America always has been related to social problems that are the result of inequality. The work of the Ford Foundation set an important precedent because it grew out of pragmatic attempts to deal with poverty in the contexts of American cities. By the mid-1960s, a social policy framework had been refined to recognize the reciprocal nature of poverty and education. Yet, today a similar approach is described as "new" (Anyon, 2005b). When did such an approach disappear?

Reagan's Realignment

There is overwhelming recognition that the election of Reagan signaled a change in political attitudes of the United States (T. Bell, 1988; Lekachman, 1987; Muir, 1992; O'Connor, 1998). The realignment in American politics that began with Richard Nixon's quest for a new majority culminated in the Reagan presidency (Mason, 2004). Reagan's election victories in 1980 and 1984 were both landslides.

As he came into office 1981, Reagan (as cited in Troy, 2005, p. 1) declared that it was "morning in America again." He hoped to reestablish order by reframing the U.S. mission in the world along his interpretation of its Judeo-Christian roots, according to Troy. In the same way that Nixon had targeted lower income neighborhoods as places of "permissiveness," the Reagan Administration claimed that they would protect the taxpayers from the "cheats" who abused the welfare system

(Trattner, 1999, p. 364). Reagan (as cited in Trattner, 1999, p. 8) declared, "My friends, some years ago, the federal government declared war on poverty, and poverty won." George Gilder, a mentor of Reagan, stated, "In order to succeed, the poor need most of all the spur of poverty" (as cited in Trattner, 1999, p. 364). The Reagan Administration held that the world was unfathomably complex, and that social engineering such as the War on Poverty was not only doomed to failure, but also likely to do harm (Trattner, 1999).

When Reagan took office, many Americans seemed ready for such pronouncements. The years prior had seen oil shortages, inflation, and rising unemployment, all during an economic down-turn that resulted from the closure of many U.S. manufacturing sites. The first fired were the last hired; in most places these were women and other marginalized groups. Between 1970 and 1978 the number of "women family heads beneath the official poverty line rose 38.7 percent" (Katz, 1996, p. 284). Many people in the United States started to believe that welfare programs inflated wages and therefore reduced the wealthy's ability to accumulate capital and invest in innovation. Starting in the mid-1970s, determining that the rising number of welfare recipients was the problem, according to Katz (1996): "City-governments slashed services and state legislature attacked general assistance" (p. 283). By the 1980s the federal government began to cut social welfare funding and "used tax policy to widen the income gap between the rich and poor" (Katz, 1996, p. 283).

Federal education spending was also considered part of the drain on the accumulation of capital. In his 1980 campaign Reagan promised to eliminate the "huge new bureaucracies [who had] misspent our taxes" (McGuinn, 2006, p. 41). Yet, as we will see, this did not come to pass; Carter's Department of Education became the centerpiece of Reagan's domestic policy.

Repercussions of the Reagan Realignment

Clearly, the Reagan Administration viewed the War on Poverty as a failure. The repercussions of this stance are seen in how almost unthinkable the approach it claimed a failure is considered today. By unthinkable, I mean that the suggestion of such an approach is almost immediately discredited through a few vague tropes such as, "Oh that is just making excuses," or "that seems politically impossible." Even those who are the strongest advocates for a neo-War-on-Poverty approach feel that general acceptance would require a major change.

For example, Rothstein (2004) wrote that we must fight this battle incrementally, because there is "little practical hope that Americans will make a realistic commitment to close the achievement gap between lower and middle class children in the present political environment" (p. 132). Anyon (2005a) devoted the last chapter to her book to "Building a New Social Movement." Anyon (2005a) argued that to develop such a new and radical policy paradigm, we first must "mobilize the underlying rage, and channel the energy that is released" (p. 154). This, she advised, should be done through community organizing, where a revolutionary spirit can be unleashed.

What Rothstein (2004) and Anyon (2005b) both have recognized is that for many people, the ways in which we approach educational policy making are natural or self-evident. It is assumed that the dominant policy levers that we lean on, such as standardization, mass testing, and aggregate accountability measures, are rooted in a response to human nature and therefore are indispensable. Also, there is a sense that the naturalness of the current policy regime is predicated on "proof" that past policy levers, such as the ones described above, failed. Such self-evidence claims tend to stabilize the dominant approach and make other options almost unthinkable to the point that they must be reintroduced slowly or result from a radical groundswell.

To what should we attribute this unthinkableness? The most common explanation is that the rise of the coalition of the right has created conditions where progressive politics is out of favor (McGuinn, 2006; Spring, 1997). These explanations show that education issues have been central to partisan politics, so the education policy cannot be understood apart "from the broader developments in U.S. politics" (McGuinn, 2006, p. 4). These explanations are unsatisfactory because they approach the problem from the point of view of a zero-sum game: a battle of interest groups in which one group has the electoral trump cards (Mansbridge, 1990). The central question in these investigations focuses on who is in charge and how they define education policy. Whereas interest groups and coalition building are certainly important aspects of any political story, they do not help us understand how so many people began to see the connection between education and other social policy as

unnecessary to the development of equal opportunity. It does not help us understand how people today see this approach as almost impossible.

Others have pointed out that in addition to the building of conservative coalitions acting as lobbyists, there has been a coordinated effort to push a conservative ideology on the public. For example, DeBray (2006) described how No Child Left Behind was the result of ideological battles that changed over the 1990s. She highlighted how the growth of conservative ideology increased the polarization between the two parties. This ideological battle set the ground for a major shift in education policy making, in which practitioners were largely left out of the discussions.

Explanations like DeBray's (2006) are useful for explaining what ideological conditions were necessary for a certain policy approach to be accepted. They are informative in explaining how conservative coalitions developed its hegemony, but do not offer an analysis of how the technical aspects of governing (i.e., bureaucratic structures, accountability systems, and state devolution) worked to produce our current understanding of the problem. This approach also tends to mark the ideology as the prime factor in social change. An analysis of the interplay between multiple forces, such as the technical aspects, their relationship to the discourses that framed them, and their relationship to modes of authority, would help us see the polymorphic nature of social change.

It is important to remember that these modes of power are productive and not simply a negative political responses to the welfare policy or Federalism of previous

decades (Berry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996). If we look at it this way, we can understand that the current policy approach is not a shrinking of the state but instead a new approach to how to use the technologies of the state. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2, this new approach rewrites what types of governing are possible.

Therefore, what is needed is research that helps us grasp how certain practices came to be understood as the common-sense approach and how these approaches fit into the particular regimes of authority, or social regulation and economy, of a given historical moment. This combination of common-sense practices and power can be understood as generating social regularities that were continually enacted and invoked in social interactions (Foucault, 1972; Fraser, 1989; Scheurich, 1997). In any moment in history, multiple historical processes (such as the development of fiscal policies; accountability regimes; and discourses on the individual, race, opportunity, and equity, among others) become the emergent rules by which social interactions are made regular. If we pay attention to these grids that constitute the social regularities of a time, we can begin to understand how some things are thinkable while others are not (Foucault, 1991a, 1991b).

In doing so we can begin to explore how power operates through the policy agendas of liberals and conservatives to make some approaches self-evident and others almost unthinkable. More specifically, we can explore how through these social regularities, people of a given time drew lines around the dispersion of various policy approaches and decided that some were education policies and some were not.

Maybe then we can see how the views as voiced by Reagan were seen as self-evident, as they still are today.

Rationale for the Study

The description above reveals that the idea of coordinating education and antipoverty policies is seen as almost unthinkable, despite research, historical precedents, and a strong moral argument for such a policy approach. We also have seen that most scholars recognize that Reagan's election signaled a realignment in American politics and policy making. This realignment reflected a transition in how people framed U.S. policy options. I also have established that if we are going to understand this transformation, we not only must know how Reagan came to power, but also must understand how different historical processes came together to develop social regularities that constituted what was possible through human interaction, including policy making.

For example, during the Reagan presidency, while the rest of the domestic policy budgets were being slashed, the education budget was insulated from the supply-side fiscal policy. By then, the superdepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had been separated into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Not only were they separate, but they also competed against each other for survival. Many attributed the visibility of the new Education Department as the reason that Reagan, despite campaign promises to abolish it, chose to feature his domestic policy through the Department of

Education (T. Bell, 1988; Stockman, 1986). The Reagan domestic policy, as explained by the report, *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), focused on individual achievement and the pursuit of excellence in a geo-political context. In this case, the rise of supply-side discourses intersected with bureaucratic budgeting practices, discourses about individualism and efficiency, and U.S. economic competitiveness in the world. The Department of Education, formed just prior to Reagan's election, was an important factor in the establishment of Reagan's educational policy practices and therefore in the erasure of the War on Poverty approach.

Therefore, if we are going to understand how education policy came to be understood as independent from other social policies at the federal level, it is important to study how people understood the relationship between the policies in the era just prior to Reagan's ascension. I believe that a historical study of the Carter Administration is fruitful for two reasons. First, Reagan's victory was in large part due to his ability to deliver a message that resonated with the majority of U.S. voters. Looking at the years just before his victory can help us understand how the discourses of equity, opportunity, and efficiency coalesced at that time and how he was able to articulate them. A look at the tensions within the Carter Administration over the relationship between these policies can help us grasp this transformation. Second, the development of the Department of Education by the Carter Administration allowed for the bureaucratic separation of the goals, administration, and funding for education from health and welfare.

Thus, during the Carter Administration, education policy at the federal level was created as a "historic individuality" (Foucault, 1972, p. 22). This research was designed to grasp the shape of the transitions in discourses and practices that began to appear regularly in social interactions. This helps us explore how Reagan's vision was so quickly made natural. Also, investigating the ways in which people understood the relationship between the policies and the larger social context in which these ideas were articulated during the Carter Administration provides insight into our current desires to see the policies as related once again.

One work, *The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S. Department of Education* (Radin & Hawley, 1988), already addressed these years and the creation of the Department of Education in great detail. It is a traditional work of institutional political science. Radin and Hawley described their work as a case study of federal-level decision making. In this case study Radin and Hawley analyzed

> the positions and roles of the actors involved in the policy process; the functions that are built into the institutional setting in which the decisions were made; the bases of power and uses of political resources; the attributes and demands of the policy environment and the specific goals and objectives attached to the issue. (p. 2)

Their investigation was detailed and complex. One of Radin and Hawley's goals was to show the policy process as both "predictable and chaotic. It is linear yet circular. Informal sources of power define most relationships, yet formal authority is essential" (p. 219).

Radin and Hawley's (1988) investigation revealed a great deal about the people involved in the decision making and the actors who were present. However,

the subject of study was ultimately the act of reorganization. Radin and Hawley ended their book with this statement: “There is much that reorganization cannot do. The grander the scheme, the less likelihood there will be of it achieving success” (p. 234) Radin and Hawley’s book is an invaluable secondary source that carefully mapped out the dynamics of the time, but they did not give significant attention to how the relationship between the polices was understood and did not deal with how it was constituted by the social regularities of the time.

Purpose of the Study

In this chapter, I have shared the research and conceptual work of scholars who specialize in educational and social policy as well as historical research on past policy precedents and the politics of realignment. This review raised the question of why an approach that connects education and antipoverty policy is almost unthinkable today. In order to answer that question, I needed to explore the development and transformation of various social regularities (intersections of practices and discourses) that allowed the education policy to appear to be self-evidently independent by the time of Reagan’s election. Therefore, as articulated above, the purpose of this dissertation as to identify the ways in which people explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 1975–1981.

In my work, I wanted to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle where policy is made and negotiated and to point to the ways in

which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. Through this demonstration, I wanted to provide insight into how social regularities of the time shaped American education and antipoverty policies in order to help interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events within a historical moment.

Most of the time, these policies are studied as separate independent phenomena. In order to observe how people have *understood their relationship,* I strategically have chosen a time period where the relationship was made explicit and debated. Although I will situate the years 1975–1981 within longer historical trends, the bulk of my examples will come from this time period.

Research Questions

Research Question 1: How did people during the Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy?

Research Question 2: What social regularities can be identified during the Carter Administration, and how did these regularities impact antipoverty and educational policies?

Research Question 3: What lessons can be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy?

Research Plan

This study was framed as a critical policy analysis. The purpose of this study was to use the history of the Carter Administration, specifically the separation of the Health, Education, and Welfare Department (HEW) into HHS and the Department of Education, to help us identify the ways in which political actors in Washington, D.C., 1976–1981 explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policy. Through this history, I have explored the multiple ways in which the policies were understood and how their relationship to each other was negotiated in order to help interpret the impact of the social regularities of the time on policy making. This exploration can help us understand how the policy approach advocated for today is, despite historical precedent, almost unthinkable to many.

As discussed in chapter 2, the analytical framework that guided this investigation forced me to look for the ways in which the actors constructed their contested conceptualizations of the relationship between the policies. It highlighted that the ways in which people constructed these understandings were not the result of a single moving force but were instead shaped by the nests of the social regularities.

In order to produce such a study I used both the methods of critical policy analysis and historical research. In order to answer Research Questions 1 and 2, I first accumulated primary and secondary sources. Next, I ordered these sources by chronology and theme. Finally, I cross-examined the sources in order to produce a historical interpretation. Then, in order to answer Research Question 3, I have offered an interpretation of the present policy situation based on my historical interpretation

Conclusion

As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, my research emerged from the dissonance between a promise and experience. This dissonance animated two desires. First, I felt a strong urge to investigate how we can continue to create environments that fail our students and their families, despite the best intentions of a great deal of professionals who work in schools. Second, through this understanding, I wanted to find a better way to advocate for fulfilling that promise. Both of these desires are undergirded by an assumption of infinite possibilities for human life. There is no single story of how our world will unfold. Instead, all we have is our present, in which we occupy only partially our own consciousness and many subject positions simultaneously (Lather, 1991). Therefore, this work is not an attempt to "seize 'history' and bend it readily to our collective purposes" (Giddens, 1991, p. 153). I hope the interpretations offered in this work do not render the social world more transparent; instead, I hope for this work to disrupt our social interactions and allow us to spin off in other directions.

Accordingly, my attraction to the question, "What counts as education policy?" is not because I have the final answer but because it asks us to consider all of the infinite possibilities. In a time when there seems to be a natural answer, the job of the social researcher is to shake this false self-evidence and point to the historical contingency of our approaches. Therefore, I developed a study to explore how it came to be that education policy is thought of as naturally separate from other social policy.

This study benefited from recent theoretical and methodological developments in education policy analysis. These are further explained in chapters 2 and 3.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITRATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As described in chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to research the ways in which people explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 1975–1981. I undertook this task to demonstrate the complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and to point to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. Through this demonstration, I wanted to provide insight into how the social regularities during the Carter Administration shaped the possibilities of U.S. education and antipoverty policies. Such a study would help me and others interpret the present policy options and our desires for social justice as events of a specific historical moment with its own possibilities and contradictions. In doing so, we can begin to engage in more creative policy making, which may help us in our struggle to improve the well-being of children inside and outside of school.

Accordingly, this chapter has two purposes. First, through a review of the literature, I have shown a gap in current policy studies with regards to the relationship between education and antipoverty policies. My second purpose was to build a poststructural theoretical framework to help me understand how people during the Carter Administration explained the relationship between the policies.

Structure of the Chapter

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a review of the literature. This section is concluded with a discussion of what can be learned from previous explanations of policy change in U.S. federal education and antipoverty policies. In the second section, I have developed an explanation of my theoretical framework. This section consists of two main parts. In the first part, I have explained the general tenets of the poststructural policy theoretical perspective. This is followed by a description of the framework that guided me as I answered my research questions.

Current Explanations

The fact that this goal of coordinating social policies reached such a high status in U.S. policy 50 years prior, during the War on Poverty, is intriguing. However, even more startling is the fact that the coordination is now so absent, that it is being rediscovered as a new policy paradigm. Unfortunately, there is no single study that has addressed the history of this transformation. Studies have dealt with the general historical shift in U.S. politics and their implications for various policy areas. Studies also have situated education within the larger context of U.S. culture during the second half of the 20th century. Below, I explain what insights they have provided and how their limits helped shaped the proposed study.

In general, the shift in U.S. politics and its repercussions for education and antipoverty policy have been approached from two perspectives. One perspective

traces what happened to antipoverty and other social programs when U.S. politics went through realignment (Blank, 1997; Ellwood, 1996; Katz, 1996; Trattner, 1999). Essentially, such researchers have described the shift as a retreat from past moral obligations that spurred past antipoverty legislation. Although these histories are valuable secondary sources, none of them consistently addressed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. They often framed education policy as a separate enterprise.

There are also several quality studies of the development of educational policy during this time (Berube, 1991; C. Cross, 2004; DeBray, 2006; Kaplan, 1984; Kosar, 2005; McGuinn, 2006; Miller, 1981; Wong & Nicotera, 2004). These works have described in detail the shifts in education policy over the 20th century. They have provided a strong understanding of how education policy has changed over time; however, their focus on education as the object of study prevented them from addressing in any detail how actors in the policy arena understood the relationship between education policy and the other social programs. Below, I provide a description of a few of the important works from each approach and summarize how they influenced the current study.

Examples of Historical Treatments of Antipoverty Policy

I review two of the most expansive and influential books that address the history of antipoverty policy in U.S. history (Katz, 1996; Trattner, 1999). Both of these works are instructive in that they have treated the development of policy as a

historically and socially situated polymorphous process. However, as we shall see, neither history addressed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. They also gave little attention to the Carter Administration.

Katz (1996) started his book with the statement, "Nobody likes welfare" (p. ix). He noted that in the current political context, conservatives worry that it erodes the work ethic and rewards the lazy. In contrast, many liberals view the system as incomplete, inadequate, and punitive. Katz also pointed out that the poor, who rely on welfare to get by, find it "degrading, demoralizing and mean" (p. ix). Yet, welfare persists. Katz asserted that welfare policy has been a consistent element in U.S. history because its strength is derived from "its symbiosis with [U.S.] social structure and political economy" (p. ix). The purpose of Katz's book was to sketch this social history and make sure the reader understood two things:

> First, [U.S.] public welfare has a very old history. Public funds have always relieved more people that private ones. … Second, welfare policy results from choices among alternative possibilities. We have the resources, competence and ideas to transform social welfare in America. (p. xvi)

Katz (1996) then offered a thorough historicizing of antipoverty policy. He showed how the policy choices in early U.S. history, such as the development of the poor house, were just as much a product of their time as the current "workfare" options are today. Katz described his book as

> a tale of transformation, of how social policy responded to the great shifts in America's social and economic structure from the nascent capitalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, through the nation's industrialization and the great era of corporate capital in the early twentieth century, to the current period of deindustrialization and the emergence of the service economy. (p. xii)

Such a study is invaluable for helping us understand how people viewed welfare, but it ultimately fails to answer our questions because Katz never seriously addressed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Although he did a great job of explaining how education was interwoven into the War on Poverty, his singular focus on welfare policy makes education's separation a nonissue. Also, Katz did not spend any time on the Carter Administration. His book jumps from a chapter that describes the War on Poverty to a chapter that describes Reagan's policies.

Trattner (1999) has offered another comprehensive look at the development of antipoverty policy in the United States. Trattner agreed with Katz (1996) that U.S. social policy has been the product of a wide variety of overlapping and conflicting factors, including paternalism, capitalist self-interest, good intentions, economic forces, religious beliefs, cultural values, demographic changes, nationalization of politics, and bureaucratic expansion. He claimed that the tension between these factors helps create our response to the social problem of poverty.

Trattner (1999) differs from Katz (1996) in that he did give some treatment to the Carter Administration. In a chapter titled "A Transitional Era," Trattner explained how the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations dealt little with welfare policy, due to their attention to rising inflation and foreign politics. However, Trattner did describe a welfare proposal that would significantly expand benefits and allow the federal government to create more jobs for the unemployed. Carter was also committed to phasing in a workable health care insurance program. However, none of these programs made it through Congress. Trattner noted that rising inflation rates,

the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left many people in the United States feeling "angry, frustrated, impotent and disillusioned with the government's ability to resolve important problems"(p. 358).

Although Trattner (1999) offered some important details about antipoverty policy in the Carter Administration and the multiple factors interacting at the time, he has provided no real discussion of how Carter viewed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. This is probably also because his object of study was the stable singular concept of welfare policy. We need research that recognizes that welfare policy and education policy are both enacted through and in relationship to other policies.

Neither study addressed the central question of how people explained the relationship between education and antipoverty policy during the Carter Administration. What they have offered instead are examples of detailed historical treatments of the many factors that combine and contradict each other to create policy. These insights were important in the design of my study of the historical relationship between the policies.

Examples of Historical Treatments of Educational Policy

Education policy literature approaches the problem in a similar way. There is, by definition, a singular focus on education policy as an independent phenomenon. Interestingly, there is little attention given to the Carter Administration. However, the

literature often provides insights into the historical contexts that produced federal education policy.

Unfortunately, as highlighted in chapter 1, there is a great deal of attention to the Reagan presidency but little to Carter, who preceded him. This is unfortunate because it prevents us from understanding how Reagan's ideas were so self-evident to so many people. For example, Berube (1991) offered a description of presidential politics and education in his book, *American Presidents and Education*. Berube's goal with the book was to

> analyze presidential involvement in education and the reasons for it and correlate it with an assessment of national educational outcomes. I shall examine presidential efforts in education that have been successful and also had considerable impact as well as some that were not so successful but had significance either ideologically or as forerunners of future policies. (p. 2)

The presidents studied included Lyndon B. Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush. Berube failed to address Carter and did not give a reason for doing so. We must assume that the creation of the Department of Education in 1991 had little or no impact on the educational outcomes Berube chose to evaluate. Berube did offer insight into how three other presidents addressed education among their other agenda items. He noted that historically presidents have paid little attention to education and pointed out that over the past 50 years, they have made stronger links between public education and the economy.

Whereas Berube's (1991) book was narrow in focus, examining only the executive branch, others have attempted to trace the entire evolution of education policy. In his book, *No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal*

Education Policy, 1965–2005, McGuinn (2006) has offered a long-term look at the development of education policy at the federal level. In this book, he has claimed that there have been few studies of federal education policy making. He stated that these studies describe the changes but do not point to the theoretical significance of the historical and political context in which the changes occurred. He asserted that his book would not do the same but instead would rely on policy regime theory to help him explain how federal education changed. He defined a policy regime as a concept that frames the role of ideas, interests, and institutions in generating major policy change in a specific issue area over time. Thus, policy regimes consist of three dimensions, according to McGuinn: "a policy paradigm, a power alignment and a policy making arrangement" (p. 17). These combine to produce a distinctive pattern of policy making.

McGuinn's (2006) work is important in that he did not try to describe the transformation in education policy as the result of one sweeping change. Instead, McGuinn explained that the history of federal education policy making is characterized as a "gradual regime construction, maintenance, enervation, and reconstruction that unfold in fits and starts over time" (p. 209). He noted that the first regime can be termed the "equity" regime, as established by the War on Poverty legislation. The second can be termed the "accountability" regime, as signaled by the passage and implementation of No Child Left Behind.

Although McGuinn's (2006) book describes how education policy changed due to shifts in ideas, interest groups, and administrative decision-making processes,

he failed to give much attention to this process during the Carter Administration. In fact, he moved directly from a description of the 1965 policies to a description of the 1988 Bush plan. Although McGuinn, like others, has done a good job of pointing to how policy is historically and socially situated, he has treated ideas as stable consistent objects that have force. This approach, which I discuss in greater detail later, fails to acknowledge how the historical and social contingency that applies to policy production also applies to production of all knowledge. Finally, the book remains focused on education policy as a stable individual unity. By this, I mean that McGuinn treated the unity of education policy as self-evident; thus, there was little in his account to help us understand how people have explained the relationship between the policies over time.

Cross, former assistant secretary of education, released his book *Political Education: National Policy Comes of Age* in 2004. This book presents a history of federal education policy since the end of World War II. Cross wanted to show how "federal policy has been—for better or worse—a constant influence on what states and local districts do, especially with respect to students most at risk" (p. ix). Unlike McGuinn (2006), Cross did not seek theoretical analysis of this phenomenon. Instead, he seemed content with his assumed "realist" description. Cross studied the development of federal policy primarily through "the various iterations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and, to a lesser extent, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)" (p. x). More importantly for my

purposes, Cross paid attention to the Carter years and the creation of the Department of Education.

Cross (2004) offered a description of the move to create the Department of Education that focuses on the relationship between Califano and Carter. Cross wrote that Califano was trying to "pull every string he could to derail the dismantling of his agency—antics that would be among the major reasons that would lead Carter to fire him in the summer of 1979" (p. 59). Although this type of information is important, it is also insufficient. Cross provided no record of Califano's reasoning and no discussions about the implications of creating a separate department for the antipoverty programs. Like the others, Cross's focus on education policy development did not explain how people understood the relationship between the policies.

What We Have Learned From These Examples

Both the education and the antipoverty perspectives offer important insights into the historical study of U.S. policy. First and foremost, all of the authors recognized that policy production is a historically and socially situated activity, subject to many factors of influence. Second, they all noted that the large shift in U.S. politics between 1965 and the present had a large effect on the types of policies that were produced. However, none of the works dealt directly with how people understood the relationship between the policies. Furthermore, in each of these accounts the Carter Administration was either glossed over or ignored. Finally, these authors seemed to accept that although the policies are historically situated and

inconsistent, there is a lack of disruption of the concepts that inform the production of policy.

Situating Education Policy

Some studies in education not only have described how education changed, but also have situated education policy within the larger U.S. cultural framework. For example, Spring's (1996) monumental work traced how the history of U.S. schools are the result of, and productive factors in, cultural domination, the management of the distribution of ideas across society, and persistent racism and inequality. His interpretative framework is important because it is through these aspects of schooling that we see social forces or discourses operating with the power to link or separate poverty and education policies. However, the object of study was still the American school. He focused on this subject from 1642–2000, a time span that greatly exceeded my research questions.

Another example of a work that situated education policy within the larger U.S. cultural framework is *The American Dream and the Public Schools* by Hochschild and Scovronick (2003). The purpose of this book was to bring together disparate education policy topics, such as vouchers, afro-centric schooling, inclusion classes, school finance, and school desegregation, and to review them through a framework that viewed the public school as the institution by which we should operationalize the "American dream." Hochschild and Scovronick defined the American dream as a fair chance at mobility:

> Our understanding of the American dream is the common one, described by President Clinton in this way: "The American Dream that we were all raised on is a simple but powerful one—if you work hard and play by the rules you should be given a chance to go as far as your God-given ability will take you." (p. 9)

Hochschild and Scovronick claimed that schools should be treated as public sites of democracy and used the American dream as their guide in local decision making. Here we again see a linking of education to dominant discourses of opportunity and equity. Although their study is important in that it relates school policy to the wider project of social policy in U.S. society, Hochschild and Scovronick de-emphasized the historical contingency and socially imbeddedness of a concept like the American dream and the discourses of opportunity and equity. Such an approach ignores the ways in which knowledge is continually constructed. Additionally, although they provided a great deal of history, they did not focus specifically on how we came to understand federal education policy as separate from antipoverty legislation.

Both of these studies provide insight into how education is interpenetrated by multiple social processes that are part of the experience of U.S. residents. They have shown how education is always in relationship with other aspects of our society but did not focus on the relationship between education and antipoverty policy during the Carter Administration.

A Focus on the Relationship

Only Silver and Silver (1991; also Silver, 1981) consistently have addressed the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Their work identified how

education policy was linked to antipoverty legislation in both the United States and Great Britain from roughly the 1950s to the mid-1970s. In both countries, they looked at the important interest groups and research foundations that contributed to the joining of education and antipoverty. Silver and Silver's comparative work gives great insight into the different articulations of equity and opportunity in the United States and Great Britain. Although this work is invaluable in helping us understand the growth of the War on Poverty in the United States, its time frame prevents any clear understanding of the uncoupling of the policies. Finally, Silver and Silver did not devote any attention to the Carter Administration.

Summary

The insights and the limits revealed through the review of some of the literature provide guidance for answering my research questions. The most important insight gained from the readings highlighted, as well as from the others that were cited, is that policy production is a historically and socially situated activity that is subject to many factors of influence. The authors all noted that the large shift in U.S. politics between 1965 and the present had a large effect on the types of policies that were produced. Reviews of federal social policy and education policy showed a change in approach beginning in about 1981; however, none of the works accounted for how these changes might have been visible during the Carter Administration. Only Silver and Silver (1991; also Silver, 1981) consistently have dealt with how people understood the relationship between the policies. Finally, although these

authors seemed to accept that the policies are historically situated and inconsistent, the implications of this were undeveloped in their approaches.

If we are going to understand how the socioeducational policy paradigm described above became unthinkable, we must be able to understand how people constructed their knowledge at the time when education policy became independent from other social policies. As shown in chapter 1, this requires a focus on the Carter Administration. We also must bring education and antipoverty policy into the same view. The studies above, through the researchers' choice of either education or antipoverty policy, failed to provide us with an understanding of the relationship of the time. Education policy cannot be understood as an independent or stable concept. A theoretical framework that continually acknowledges the implications of social construction of knowledge was needed to guide my investigation.

The Theoretical Framework

In this study I looked at the utterances and interactions of historical figures that allowed me to interpret how the various understandings of the relationship between education and antipoverty policies were articulated during the Carter Administration. I chose this object to help me understand how education policy became thought of as independent from antipoverty policy and to help me explain how we have reached a point where the rejoining of them is almost unthinkable.

If my object of study was the social regularities that make certain words and interactions possible, then my theoretical framework must help me understand a

person's capacity to speak as it is related to the moment's social interactions. It also must give guidance to how I could understand these relationships in historical figures. It must help me understand how the historical social context made certain explanations and practices become intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, whereas others become discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). Finally, given that the ultimate end goal of this work was policy analysis, the framework must help us understand what this means for the policy issues that surround the relationship between education and poverty.

The Theoretical Frames in Critical, Poststructural Policy Analysis

Research into policy should not be understood as solely an attempt to find answers to some research questions on a policy issue or social problem. Instead, it should be considered "interpretational forays into the dynamic complexities of high modern society" (Ball, 2005, p. 1). These forays should be guided by a framework or "theoretically informed sets of linked concepts" (Ball, 2005, p. 1). However, these frameworks should not be treated as a "perceptual straight jacket but a set of possibilities for thinking with" (Ball, 2005, p. 1). Frameworks should help us try to see coherence in the social situation and allow a writer to be deliberative about how we treat our object of study. At the same time, our theories should help us recognize that the set of concepts that we lean on are always "polymorphic, supple and adaptable" (Ball, 2005, p. 2). The complexity of the world does not lend itself to

grand narratives that can act as an "off-the-shelf interpretational kit" for all social situations, including policymaking (Ball, 2005, p. 2).

Such an approach to theory reflects the reflexive turn that has characterized much of the academic work of the 20th century (Crotty, 2003). This turn is part of the paradigmatic shifts in which people began to question their epistemological and eventually ontological assumptions in the production of research (Kuhn, 1962). Through these shifts, the objectivity of the world was questioned. People began to realize that the meaning of the object was conditional on its observation. They also began to notice that these observations were not the product of one consciousness but instead were always already conditioned by the social environment. In this environment there are always power differences. This has implications for not only how we attempted to understand the world, but also for our attempts to represent the world. If all knowledge is already socially constructed, "representation is always in crisis, knowledge is constitutive of power, and agency is the constitutive effect, and not the originator, of situated practices and histories" (Britzman, 2003, p. 245).

Below, I describe how the theoretical frames used to study politics and policy making have reflected this shift. First, I explain and critique the assumptions of the objectivist theoretical framework in the study of politics in the 20th century. Second, I specifically review some theoretical approaches to the study of policy that attempted to address these critiques. These descriptions allow me to situate and describe the more recent, critical, poststructural theories.

A Critique of Objectivist Theories

The seismic shift in the social sciences also influenced how policy research was performed and represented. Fischer (2003) described how this epistemological crisis played out in the study of politics and policy making. Fischer noted that over the course of the 20th century, political science and policy development have pursued an "empirically based causal theory of political behavior" (p. 21). However, in this pursuit, researchers made some common epistemological and ontological assumptions. Epistemologically, they assumed that it was possible to know reality through empirical studies. Systemized observation in empirical studies would allow researchers to provide a more accurate description of objective realities, and this knowledge therefore could accumulate. Ontologically, it was assumed that all humans were by nature self-interested actors. This approach to human behavior was theoretically developed by Homans (1974), Becker (1978), and more recently Coleman (1990).

Today, in political research this approach is termed *rational choice theory*. Researchers from this paradigm attempt to explain all social phenomena, including policy making, in terms of the rational calculations made by self-interested individuals. Researchers who use this lens see social interaction as social exchange modelled on economic action. People are motivated by the rewards and costs of actions and by the profits they can exact. The goal of this approach is to explain, generalize, and predict human behaviour through mathematical modelling of the available resources and the rational choices actors will make in their attempt to

maximize their own interests. Through statistical inference practices, a model is judged for its value to describe the objective behaviour of individuals.

Fischer (2003) noted that the logic behind this approach "has been partly methodological and partly political" (p. 22). Methodologically, there is an assumption that focusing on the objective available resources in the study of policy making can control for nonempirical normative factors, such as ideas or faiths. According to this approach, the objective reality is needed to explain behaviour rather than a subjective discussion of values. Politically, this allows researchers to privilege their ideas as reality. Some rational-choice researchers, though, have noted that ideas do operate to guide the self-interested actors to their objective goals (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993).

This approach has a fundamental epistemological problem: The objective resources in the world only have meaning based on our perceptions of that resource. For example, it is not necessary that we choose to value gold over an equally rare item. It is the social meaning given to gold that determines its interest to an actor (Norton, 2004). Ideas, then, do not just act as guides, but also frame our possible choices. From this perspective, politicians and policy makers are engaged in the manipulation of ideas that shape the way we see, understand, and value various resources.

Ideas in Policy-Making Theories

There have been various attempts to deal with the role of ideas in the policy process. Some emphasize how the institutional constraints of an environment shape how we view the resources around us. For example, Hall and Taylor (1996) noted that

institutions work to combine and change group preferences over time. The goal, then, is to compare how the difference in institutional structures can generate different configurations of preferences over time. The works of Skopol and Margaret (1980) and of Pierson (2000) are important examples of this.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) made another attempt to show how ideas matter. They attempted to merge the notions of the rational actor with the importance of ideas. This approach, according to Fischer (2003), may set "the field on firmer scientific foundations" (p. 94).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) emphasized the "significance of relationships within policy sectors for understanding how policy decision-making functions" (p. 130). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's theoretical framework, named *advocacy coalition framework*, assumes that the most useful way to think about policy change overtime is through a focus on "policy subsystems, i.e. the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area" (p. 131). It also assumes that public policies can be treated "in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them" (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The framework thus helps the analyst track how different policy subsystems compete and pursue their interests based on their values. The advocacy coalition framework has been very influential (Fischer, 2003). Its influence can be seen in the policy regime framework that was described in McGuinn's (2006) work.

However, such an approach is not sufficient. As alluded to above, this approach treats ideas as one of the many factors that influence politics. Ideas can be held by people and are stable entities or objects that have causal force. This approach ignores many of the developments in the sociology of knowledge that show that the consciousness of the individual is not an empty container in which ideas are held, if it exists at all (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Instead, the social construction of knowledge points to how our ideas, personality, preferences, and desires are historically and socially situated. To put it another way, it is only through social interaction that our subjectivity is constituted. This insight shifts our tracking of ideas as stable factors that can influence the policy process to one that asks how the social interactions within the policy process make some ideas possible and others not.

Recent Poststructural Theoretical Developments in Policy Studies

Policy theorists recently have tried to deal with the important challenges to the objectivist stance. Fischer (2003) noted that responding to that challenge requires an approach that stresses

> the subjective foundations of social reality [and] seek[s] to overcome the objective-subjective dualism imposed by positivist or neopositivist epistemological doctrines, principles that spelled out the traditional scientific principles long serving to rule out or downplay the subjective foundations of social understanding. (p. 12)

Due to this emphasis, there is a rejection of the possibility of a neutral observational vocabulary from which to prove the answer to any policy question. Instead, according to Fischer, poststructural policy theory is attuned to the "theoretical constitution of

facticity" (p. 14). This directs our investigation into the ways in which people's (including the researchers) interests are constructed through their social relationships.

Policy theory from a poststructural stance also recognizes that policies are not stable, fixed, abstract documents but instead are open, awkward, incomplete, and unstable texts that may be read an infinite number of ways (Ball, 2005). This breaks down the dualism of object (policy) and subject (reader, implementer, analyst). Instead, as Lather (1991) noted,

> Context and meaning in everyday life are posited as co-constructions, multiple, complex, open and changing, neither pre-given nor explainable by large scale causal theories, but made and re-made across a multiplicity of minor scattered practices. (p. 42)

This unrelenting recognition of complexity and difference then destabilizes ideas that hold the policy is solely the result of a dominant ideology or the rational choices of autonomous actors. Meaning, then, is always in the process of becoming and replicating.

Poststructural policy theory not only addresses the importance of symbolic social aspects of policy making, it also attempts to understand how some symbols are more possible than others (Scheurich, 1997). That is, the theoretical position does not ask us to explain a policy issue but instead asks us to try to be clear about how the social relationships of the time made the naming of a policy problem possible. The theory should help us see the complexity of the ways in which our world is socially constructed rather than help us model a causal factor.

A poststructural approach also tries to suspend foundational categories. There is a resistance to judge the knowledge explained in the policy issue of a given time as true or untrue, warranted or unwarranted, or adequate or distorted, for we have no point outside of history from which to make that judgment. Instead, the goal is to offer a theoretical framework that helps us explain "the knowledge production procedures, practices, apparatuses, and institutions" (Fraser, 1989, p. 21). A poststructural approach thus asks us to recognize the ways in which our understandings of schools or poverty are part of the social patterns of a time and how the unity or disunity of the policy approaches are the product of knowledge production procedures.

However, any attempt to establish how systems of meaning are stabilized and replicated obscures the "active side of social processes, the ways in which even the most routinized practice of social agents involves the active construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of social meanings" (Fraser, 1989, p. 157). From this perspective, the poststructural policy analyst is always looking for the ways in which the individual events irrupt to complicate and resist the stabilized practices of knowledge production. The analyst is also looking for ways in which more voices can be added to the policy process. Since there are no foundational ethics, it is only through interaction and disruption that we can attempt to struggle for a better present.

To sum up, a poststructural approach to policy theory rejects the objectivist stance and tries to recognize that the world and its meaning are coconstructed. This recognition then helps us conceptualize policy studies as a project whose goal is the

explanation of the practices and procedures by which knowledge is produced in a given time. In doing so we can show how some policy problems appeared while others did not, or why some solutions were unimaginable while others were seen as self-evident. It also encourages the researcher to disrupt the violence of categories, deconstruct things that seem unitary, and bring disparate phenomena into relationship (Foucault, 1991b). In doing so, we are able to expose the unfinished nature of policy and open it up for critique and betterment.

In the next section, I translate these general impressions into a more developed theoretical approach. I explain my assumptions, the concept of social regularities, and a framework for understanding a speaking person, from a poststructural point of view. This approach serves as a jumping off point from which to begin interpreting historical utterances or interactions in the Carter Administration.

A Framework for Understanding how it is Possible That "One Particular Statement Appeared Rather Than Another"

Given the flexibility of theory, I explain a framework that helped me answer my research questions. As a bricoleur, I have assembled various elements from other theorists and made them understandable according to my metaphors (Scheurich, 1997). I begin this section with an explanation of some of my most important assumptions.

The purpose of this study was to understand how people explained the connections between poverty and education during the Carter Administration. In doing so, I could offer an interpretation of how possibilities for U.S. education and

social policy were transformed during this time. This means that I am interested in how people chose one explanation over another and thus enacted one possibility over another.

First, I explain my three key assumptions: (a) the intersubjective condition of humanity, (b) the historical contingency of all knowledge and experience, and (c) ideas related to the dominant mode of power relations. Second, I describe and provide the idea of social regularities that helps explain some emergent patterns amid this contingency. Then, I explain the capacities from which we speak as social historical figures.

Intersubjective Condition of Humanity

The object–subject dualism is one of the dominant categories of modernity. This dualism assumes that the object has meaning innate to it and the subject must work to read its innate meaning if the subject is to know the truth. As described above, this approach ignores the social nature of knowledge. An approach that recognizes the social nature of knowledge must recognize not only that the object's meaning is constituted by the subject, but also that we are never isolated subjects. Meaning is always made through social meanings. Thus, our knowing is not based on our intersubjectivity; that is, meaning can be made only through social relationships. Habermas (1987) has done the most extensive theorizing on intersubjectivity. Below I describe his arrival at the human condition as primarily intersubjective; then, I qualify the utility of this idea to my approach.

*Habermas's intersubjectivity***.** Habermas (1987) relied on the work of George Herbert Mead, because in Mead he saw a move away from the philosophy of consciousness that he claimed tripped up the "Marxist reception of Weber's theory of rationalization, from Lukacs to Adorno" (p. 1). According to Habermas, in Mead's incorporation of a "nonreductionist concept of language into behaviorism, we find combined in him the two approaches critical of consciousness" (p. 4). Another benefit cited by Habermas is that Mead's theory of communication focuses on action. Through a critique of Mead's description of the transition from subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interaction, Habermas has developed an approach that places communicative action at the threshold of the origin of humans.

Habermas (1987) paid attention to Mead's description of the transition from subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interactions in order to critique the assumptions inherent in the philosophy of consciousness's response to Weber's theory of rationalization. The main assumption Habermas wished to thwart is that human action is ultimately initiated by a need for self-sufficiency. As mentioned above, this assumption implies that all human action is rooted in an instrumental approach to action that treats the world as objects that are to be manipulated to reach the given end of self-sufficiency. A focus on Mead's communicative nature of human action allows for a primacy of communicative action rather than solely instrumental action.

According to Habermas (1987), Mead's description of the transition from subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interactions begins by way of the example of two dogs squaring off. In this case the animals interact through gestures that are part of an innate stimulus-response behavior pattern. According to Mead (as cited in Habermas), this type of interaction may lead to the emergence of language through the "fact that semantic potential residing in gesture-mediated interaction becomes symbolically available to participants through an internalization of the language of gestures" (p. 8). This internalization of the symbolic possibilities in the gestures can be employed only if the organism is able to take the attitude of the other. Through taking the attitude of the other, an identical meaning is possible. This transition takes place in three stages. In the first stage, the innate gestures are transformed into symbols through a replacement of the individual meaning with meaning that is the same for both individuals. Next, the previous stimulus–response interaction is replaced with an interpersonal relation between a speaker and a listener. Finally, Habermas stated, there is a transformation in "the structure of interaction, in that the participants learn to distinguish between acts of reaching understanding and actions oriented to success" (p. 9). Habermas noted that unfortunately Mead did address how the same meaning is reached

Habermas (1987) augmented Mead's description with a reference to Wittengenstein's discussion of rule. Habermas noted that the sameness of meaning of gesture for both individuals is secured only through the "intersubjective validity of a rule that 'conventionally' fixes the meaning of a symbol" (p. 16). This rule agreement

is contingent on rule competence, which refers to "the ability to produce symbolic expressions with communicative intent and to understand them" (Habermas, 1987, p. 17).

Through Mead and Wittengenstein, Habermas (1987) established the philogenetic nature of communicative action. At this point, we have organisms who attempt to communicate by using symbols rather than gestures. These organisms are able to judge the validity of the symbol based on the intersubjective rule competence. This is prior to institutions of society that generate norms. Habermas noted that Mead's failure to include a description of the transition from basic symbolically mediated interactions to more advanced uses of grammatical language leaves a gap in the role of communicative action in the development of human society. This then requires a development of Durkheim's theory of religion to explain how the shift to symbolic interaction reshapes all forms of interaction and thus the development of norms.

Habermas (1987) noted that the attention to Durkheim is necessary because "Mead makes no effort to explain how this normatively integrated 'social organism' could have developed out of the sociative forms of symbolically mediated interaction" (p. 43). In Durkheim's theory of religion, Habermas found an explanation of normatively guided action that is prelinguistic in nature.

Habermas (1987) noted that the core of Durkheim's collective consciousness "is a normative consensus established and regenerated in the ritual practices of a community of believers" (p. 60). These ritual practices focus on religious symbols to

bring about intersubjective unity. This intersubjective unity allows for those practicing the ritual then to define themselves as "we." Habermas maintained this fills the gap left by Mead, because in this "we" that develops, the normative validity of institutions tied to religious symbols and the personal identity of a subject defined by the collective consciousness are expressed by the religious symbols. Thus, between coordination based on symbolically mediated interaction and the development grammatical language is the development of normative behavior through religious symbols. Habermas noted that only through communicative action can the "energies of social solidarity attached to religious symbolism branch out and be imparted, in the form of moral authority, both to institutions and to persons" (p. 61). This approach satisfied Habermas to make his claim that communicative action is key, not only to the beginning of the human species, but also to the development of the institutions of society.

Habermas (1987) therefore posited that communicative rationality allows for society to exist and so human individuals. So, only through communication for understanding can we continue to thrive. Habermas wrote,

> If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication—and in certain central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement—then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action. (p. 397)

Thus, this reaching an understanding, communicative rationality, rather than a formal means-to-an-end rationality, takes primacy in the reproduction of society. Humans

may need to obtain food to survive but they specifically do this through coordinated action that is based on coming to an understanding.

Learning from Habermas. Habermas's (1987) notion of intersubjectivity helps us understand many major issues of modern thought. First, his conceptualization helps us remove our foundational assumptions that the ego or individual consciousness is the site of our knowing the world. This allows us to deny the charge that human rationality is ultimately an instrumental and therefore destructive rationality. Second, his conceptualization allows us to give primacy to the act of attempting to understand. In Habermas's framework, our existence as a species is based on coordinated action that developed out of a communicative rationality that built and sustains the intelligibility of the world.

I take these two assumptions to be very important to how we should understand humans. It reminds us that all meaning is socially constructed and that coordination of activities is a very important part of our world. It also reminds us to decenter the subject. The part of Habermas's (1987) work that I question is the phylogenetic aspect of his explanation. I do not believe we can make a claim about the intersubjective nature of humanity as Habermas does. However, I think his insights can be used in a pragmatic way.

Historical Contingency

In addition to my assumption about intersubjectivity, I also assume that our world is never totally determined or totally understandable. We continually must look

at how people made meaning out of the world in their time. In the same way that we must decenter the subject, we also must pay attention to the historical moment.

My recognition of the historical moment is also recognition of the impossibility of knowing an order that exists outside of human socialization. As Rorty (1989) pointed out, from this point of view "there is nothing 'beneath' socialization or prior to history which is definatory of the humans" (p. xiii). Thus, there is no final vocabulary. Instead, all ways of naming the world are historically contingent. *Contingency* used here is meant to capture the ways in which our social interactions are devoid of any immanent nature or logic and thus are always open to innovation, transformation, and redescription. According to Topper (1995), contingency represents "the abundent possiblites inherent in the recognition of historicity: because our inherited practices and forms of life are not ontologically fixed but are culturally and historically constituted, they can (although never all at once) be questioned, transformed, and re-described" (p. 955).

A nonfoundational approach imagines a world that cannot be fullfilled. Ljunggren (2003) wrote that Dewey also imagined the world as open and unfinished. It is a world without foundations:

> a universe in which there is real uncertainty and contingency, a world which is not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that according as men judge, prize, love and labor. (Dewey, as quoted in Ljunggren, 2003, p. 355)

Modern Power Relationships

While I believe our world is contingent and has meaning based only communicative action, I also believe it is continually marked by power struggles. Anything is possible, but the possibilities are shaped by power relationships. One cannot hold power. It can exist only in a relationship, and the relationships of one time are different from those of another. If all knowledge is based on relationships, and all relationships involve an imbalance of power, then the understanding of a time is determined by how knowledge is created through those relationships of power (Foucault, 1980). As the story I am telling is of the Carter Administration, it is important that we have a sketch of the way power is exercised in modern relationships. Foucault's discussion of governmentality provides a scaffold from which to understand this approach.

Governmentality. In a lecture titled "Governmentality," Foucault (1991a) attempted to outline how power has changed. He showed how the idea of sovereignty changed from the practice of ruling, as was familiar to princes of medieval Europe, to the practice of the art of government that started in the 1700s in the emerging nation states of Europe. In the art of government, ruling no longer had the single goal of maintenance of the prince's power; instead, the new goal focused on the management of the population. The state is no longer territory but a population. Foucault (1991a) defined this practice of population management as *governmentality*, an

> ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has at its target population, as its principal

> form of knowledge political economy, and as it essential technical means apparatuses of security. (p. 102)

This ensemble forms a triangle in which political economy, sovereignty (security), and discipline work all at once to generate a reality that manages a population. This triangle works to develop people into subjects who are framed to act, know, and remember in certain ways. Below are the three aspects of the triangle and a brief explanation of their technologies and their consequences.

Political economy. According to Foucault (1991a), political economy became the dominant way of understanding the world through the problems engendered by a growing population. The population problems of epidemics and famine as well as the generation of greater productive power could be addressed by the ideas of economy better than by the military logics that had dominated ideas of government. Foucault (1991a) wrote, "The problem of government finally came to be thought, reflected and calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty" (p. 104). Instead, ruling was a technical problem of population management. Adam Smith (1776/1904) defined political economy as a "branch of the science of a statesman or legislator" concerned with the twofold objective of "providing a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people … and [supplying] the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public service" (p. #). From this framework, the population represents more of an end of government. Foucault (1991a) wrote, "The population is the subject of needs of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-à-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what

is being done to it" (p. 104). This shift was important because in the regime of truth presented by political economy a person's personhood was folded into the development of the population.

Discipline. Under the logics of political economy, the government's goal is the growth of a population. However, it is a certain type of population, one that will not challenge the sovereignty or the economic order. In order to maintain the dominant social order, modern society relies not only on violence or ideology, but also on disciplining technologies. Foucault (1991a) wrote,

> Discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population: the managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its depths and its details. (p. 102)

Power (2005) addressed this by rephrasing it as follows:

> Liberalism depends on the "unfreedom" of some to ensure that the rest will consent to be governed in and through freedom. While some members of society are judged to be capable of properly governing themselves through freedom, others are *not yet.* Those who are not, or not yet, ready for freedom must be governed through older disciplinary methods, with the goal of instilling enough *self*-discipline and self-responsibility that they will one day be able to properly exercise their freedom and be governed accordingly. (p 644, emphasize in original)

Schools, prisons (debtor and criminal), and poor houses are all institutions in which discipline has been enforced to develop subjects who can one day rule themselves. In each of these places, needs of a person are defined and worked on through disciplinary mechanisms. The students, deviants, and poor must define their needs as

the institutions do; in the politics of this definition of needs, the dominant order can be replicated or contested (Fraser, 1989).

Sovereignty. One of the keys to the new way of governing was that it hid the operation of power in securing the economic order. The rule was no longer at the end of the sovereign's stick but instead operated through law. In doing so, the law "must appear to be a necessity of things, and power must act while concealing itself beneath the gentle force of nature" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 106). Once the people learned the feeling of respect for private property or for wealth, the order would be a natural order in which rational decisions would lead to a natural defense of the capitalist economic order that continued the violence of inequality. The system was based on the assumption that human nature was first and foremost self-interested.

To sum up, according to Foucault (1991a), the exercise of power in modern society is practiced through governmentality. Governmentality refers to an ensemble of practices and institutions that generate ways of knowing in which people subject themselves to and are subjects of the dominant social order. Specifically, power works through the supposed natural course of government to support disciplining mechanisms that will grow a population that will abide by the dominant mode of life. Power of this type continually works upon people. A person's subjectivity is continually constructed through the social interactions that constitute society. Schools, poverty programs, therapy, global banking institutions, and political debates develop within the common-sense framework that is generated through governmentality technologies. This is markedly different from past forms of power

that were at the end of a club or sword and were occasional, such as whenever the majesty's army was present.

Learning from Foucault. Foucault's (1991a) assertion helps us understand that power in the modern world operates throughout the social order. Groups of technologies shape our subjectivities. We replicate these power differences through our narration of events in all of our social actions. Many take this description of the operation of power to be too totalizing or inescapable, but in reality it is nonfoundational. The disciplining technologies we choose (e.g., schools, prisons, therapy) are always in the process of being enacted. Thus, resistance is always possible. So as we look at the Carter Administration, we can use Foucault's description of governmentality to guide our understanding and as a frame from which to judge resistance.

A Summary of my Assumptions

As I began this project, I assumed first that all meaning is generated intersubjectively. Therefore, it is important to decenter the subject. In other words, we should not look for the speaking ego to understand how people explained the relationship between education and antipoverty policy but instead should look at the social interactions to find meaning. Second, I believe that all social interactions are historically contingent. Possible meanings are directly related to the time and place in which social interactions occurred. Finally, I believe that all social interactions are impacted by power differences. These operate differently at different times. The form of power described in Foucault's (1991a) governmentality is a good starting point.

Although these assumptions directed my interpretive eye toward certain aspects of the past, they did not offer me a structure from which to understand continuities and patterns that might arise out the study of the social interactions. My assumptions also did not fully help me conceptualize a historical actor who can speak yet at the same time is subject to the power relationships of the time. The next section will help with both of these tasks, as I describe the idea of social regularities as well as the capacities from which people can speak during a social interaction.

Social Regularities

If all meaning is created intersubjectively through social interaction, we require a concept that helps us understand patterns that arise out of social interaction. These patterns are sometimes referred to as *culture*. However, culture as it is usually invoked acts as a holding tank of resources for social interaction (Chartier, 1988). We tend to place it outside or hovering just above daily life. Recognition of a historically contingent world dispels the notion of anything existing outside of our daily interactions. Therefore, it is important to see these patterns as only possible inside social interactions. A phrase that captures such an understanding is *social regularities* (Scheurich, 1997).

The social regularities that we enact in our daily practices constitute what is possible in a given time (Norton, 2004; Scheurich, 1997; Wuthnow, 2006). Building off of Foucault, Scheurich held that social regularities can be understood as a catch-all phrase for the discourses, practices, procedures, and narratives that we enact in our

daily interactions. According to Scheurich, an investigation into the development of policy requires that we "investigate the intersection or, better, the constitutive grid of conditions, assumptions, forces which make the emergence of a social problem, and its strands and traces, possible—to investigate how a social problem becomes visible as a social problem" (p. 97). Scheurich continued that this grid of

> social regularities (thoughts, statements, actions that arise continually out of interactions between people in a given place and time; a kind of grammar or economy) makes possible a production and reproduction of social orders. The social regularities then, constitute both categories of thought and ways of thinking. (p. 99)

It is important to remember that, due to our recognition of intersubjectivity, we should understand that no one individual or group has conscious control over the creation of these social regularities. Because they are always constituted by social interaction, replication does not require the actions of a self-conscious subject.

For example, in our society, categories of thought, such as White supremacy, private property, meritocracy, rule of law, individualism, equality, opportunity, and efficiency (along with others), all occur regularly in our daily interactions. In our interactions, we engage in practices and procedures that support these categories of thought, such as grading students or invoking property rights. Out of the regularity of these practices and discourses emerge patterns of relationships that come to represent our common sense. Scheurich (1997) noted that it is important to remember that these categories and ways of thinking are historically situated. They emerge out of our interactions, made possible and limited by our social and historical context.

Scheurich (1997) built these ideas mainly from his readings of Foucault (1972; 1991b). In both of these works, Foucault was trying to explicate how historical explanation is possible, without relying on the centered consciousness or deep structural explanations. Typically, when Foucault described social interaction he referred the social regularities as discourses. In his description of the historical contingency of these regularities, Foucault (1972) warned,

> We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in the temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs. (p. 25)

In other words, we act out and enact these regularities in our daily interactions in this particular culture at this particular time. The regularities of another place and time might produce different ways of knowing and making sense of the world.

Of course, the repetition or erasure of a social regularity is not random or the product of natural events. Instead, it is a combination of emergent rules that privilege some people over others. Although the grids or intersections of these social regularities represent the dominant modes of life, they are also always interruptible, because there are always other ways of thinking. These marginalized ways of thinking often become regularized in communities that are cut off from social interaction with the majority (Scheurich, 1997).

How the Concept of Social Regularities is Helpful

The purpose of this theoretical framework was to help me make sense of how people during the Carter Administration were able to explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy and specifically to clarify why one explanation was more possible than the others. Given my assumption that all meaning is intersubjective, historically contingent, and constituted by power relationships, I needed a concept that addressed how certain statements were possible, given the social nature and contingency of knowledge. Social regularities provided that basis. Use of this concept directed my attention to the patterns that arise out social interactions. The identification of these patterns and their intersections enabled understanding how in a given time certain statements were more legitimate than others. It also removed the explanations provided from the location of individual consciousness. The next section deals with the issue of personhood in a framework that denies the importance of the individual consciousness.

The Concept of Ambiguous Personhood: There are People who are Speaking, Right?

The goal of this framework was to help me make sense out of how various explanations were made during the Carter Administration. Those statements were made by historical figures. However, as we just saw, social interactions were important in determining what types of explanations could be made. However, to leave it at that would de-emphasize that disruption and difference are possible in any social interaction. In this section I explain that it is not the consciousness of the individual that makes this disruption possible but the interaction of the different

capacities of personhood that are constituted by social interactions. First, I outline these capacities as Trouillot (1995) explained them and then recapture them for my poststructural framework.

As Norton (2004) stated, "Politics is a vocation in the fullest sense. Political institutions convoke, provoke and evoke collective and individual identities" (p. 55). The continuity of this identity is directly related to the continuity of the group. Norton stated,

> The construction of identity in and through community has readily recognized dimensions of time and space. It is on this collective dimension of identity that one most easily sees the link between identity and historicity. … One is bound in and to histories held in common. (p. 54)

Our identity or personhood, then, is always produced in social interactions that are framed as collective experiences, such as being part of a family, team, or faculty. It is important to remember that social interactions are always produced in a specific historical context. "Historical actors are also narrators, and vice versa" (Trouillot, 1995, p. 23). This is the ambiguity of personhood. We are always at the same time narrators and participants.

Any social situation (which may be all situations, including the process of policy making) involves people in three distinct capacities (Trouillot, 1995): (a) "agents, or occupants of structural positions"; (b) "actors in constant interface with a context"; and (c) "as subjects, that is, as voices aware of their vocality" (p. 23). According to Trouillot, each of these capacities is animated by the social conditions of the time. By agents, Trouillot means the strata or sets to which people belong, such

as class, role, or status positions. In these positions, they perform the role that is circumscribed by political, ideological, economic, and sociocultural structures. Just as important, people are actors. That is, they only perform their agenthood in a particular place and time. Trouillot defined the actor capacity as "a bundle of capacities that are specific in time and space in ways that both their existence and their understanding rest fundamentally on historic particulars" (p. 23) An example offers an easy distinction between these capacities. An analysis of motherhood as an agent position can explore the sociocultural, political, economic, and ideological structures that define such positions as mothers and daughters, whereas a comparative study of mothers in lower class India and upper east side Manhattan would have to address how people act as actors to deal with particular situations. For Trouillot, the site of this ambiguity in our personhood is found in the subjective capacity of people. The idea that people are voices aware of their vocality allows them to display not only intent, but also the ability to narrate their intentions. All at once, a person has the capacity to be an agent, actor, and subject. According to Trouillot, the subjective capacity ensures confusion because it engages people "simultaneously in the socio-historical process and in narrative constructions about that process" (p. 24).

Trouillot (1995) noted that faced with this ambiguity, those trying to understand historical figures often make one of two choices. People who approach the past in realist terms tend to describe humans as only agents and actors who are part of material social processes. Others, termed extreme constructivists by Trouillot, focus solely on the subjectivity of people and conflate the historical process and historical

narrative until everything is fiction. This approach privileges the consciousness as the seat of all knowledge. If we resist the need to deny this ambiguity, according to Trouillot, we realize that "peoples are not always subjects constantly confronting history … but the capacity upon which they can act to become subjects is always part of their condition" (p. 24).

The Value of Linking the Social Regularity Concept to the Ambiguous Personhood Concept

Although contrary to Trouillot's (1995) purposes, this heuristic of ambiguous personhood is useful for helping us frame historical figures in a more poststructural way. If we remove the substance that Trouillot attributed to these capacities, as positions within a structural framework, they can be reframed as modes of social regularity that operate on different time scales. That is, instead of seeing these capacities as inherent to the person, we can see these capacities as measures of stability for the various social regularities of a given time. The poststructural point of view recognizes that our intersubjectivity is primary and sees these capacities as constituted through our social interactions. The social regularities with the longest occurrence, such as White supremacy, thus constitute our agenthood capacity. Social regularities of shorter occurrences, such as those that occur in an institutional setting, constitute our actorhood. The shortest occurrence of regularity can be thought of as our subjectivity, because it is limited to our lifespan. A few examples might prove helpful.

Agenthood

As mentioned above, if we understand the agenthood capacity as not residing within the person, but as a portion of a personhood that is constituted through social interactions, then we can begin to see how the aspects of structural thought can be reframed in way that resists objectivist tendencies. For example, classic structuralism asserts that class structures are social facts that determine our consciousness and lot in life. In this framework the object of the class structure is taken to be a reality that determines our subjectivity. However, the social construction of class structures long has been recognized. Giddens (1973) noted that while there are an infinite number of economic positions within a given society, there are usually only a few classes that are self-identified. In other words, while every person may have different amounts in their bank accounts, they all can place themselves and others in just a few class categories. These class categories are the result of the intersection of practices and discourses that are enacted in social relationships.

Massey (2006) provided an important example of the constitution of the agenthood capacity. In his description of the development of the U.S. stratification system over the past 50 years, he showed that stratification operates on what he termed a *stereotype model*. Although he invested his model with psychological metaphors, the model is useful to help us make agenthood thinkable. Massey asserted, "Stratification begins psychologically with the creation of cognitive boundaries that allocate people to social categories" (p. 10). He claimed these social categories yield subconscious dispositions toward people and objects and act as guides by which an

individual makes judgments. Some people fit into categories that are considered an out-group because of their perceived danger our lack of warmth, whereas others are considered part of an in-group that is considered likable and helpful. According to decisions about the distribution of resources, people fall back on these categories. Out-groups are denied access or opportunity, whereas in-groups are secured and rewarded.

While Massey's (2006) description is laden with psychological theory that privileges a realist interpretation of the human brain as an autonomous object, his discussion of categorical rule sorting is helpful. If we reframe it in a poststructural way, we begin to see that those categories are not developed first in the mind of an individual but instead are constituted by the social interactions. The constitution of these categories allows a simple meaning-making rule that can be enacted in more social interactions and so becomes a social regularity. The stability of these regularities, such as the continual out-group status of African Americans in U.S. history, allows people to be constituted as agents of those positions (e.g., White oppressor or exploited African American). Unlike Massey's claim that humans are hard-wired to think categorically, in the poststructural reframe these social regularities are just that: products of intersubjective meaning making, which always produces a text that is open, unfinished, and multidimensional.

Actorhood

The capacity of actorhood is generated through the social regularities that are enacted within a certain time and place. For example, an agenthood might be a slave,

but the actorhood capacity might grow out of the social interactions of a slave on a plantation in the salt peat of the Caribbean. A person's actorhood comes from the institutional scripts that are continually enacted in a certain institutional setting (Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Rusch, 2005). Examples of this can be found in educational reform literature that has noted the institutional expectations of social interactions have a large effect on the fidelity to reform (Hanson, 2001). For example, Rusch noted that change in schools requires organizational learning and that organizational learning is dependent on "complex professional talk" (p. 85). Schools where social interaction engenders actors to speak about local issues in a certain way create the mostly likely conditions for reform.

Subjecthood

The reflexive nature of subjecthood adds ambiguity to our ability to understand historical figures. The social regularities of their time always force them to enact agenthood (e.g., class position or race) and their actorhood (e.g., welfare kid in this school). At the same time, within the social interaction, they can narrate those capacities. Social interactions allow people either to contest their agenthood or to support it. It is possible to narrate the unfairness of a position or an institutional practice, but this is only done among social regularities that create one as an agent of a class and actor in an institution.

This ambiguity is a site of crisis for those who desire a truthful voice, because these capacities to speak are always constituted by the social regularities of the time. According to Britzman (2003), social regularities

> authorize what can and cannot be said; they produce relations of power and communities of consent and dissent, and thus discursive boundaries are always being redrawn around what constitutes the desirable and the undesirable and around what it is that makes possible particular structures of intelligibility and unintelligently. (p. 252)

Summary of the Framework and its Value

The theoretical framework I have laid out is based on three assumptions. First, I assume that all meaning is intersubjective. In other words, there is no meaning in the object except when it is part of a social interaction. The second assumption is that all social interactions are historically contingent. By this, I mean that there are no foundational aspects of human knowledge or experience. The third assumption is that power relationships in modern times operate along a certain mode, termed governmentality by Foucault (1991a).

These three assumptions helped me theoretically link two concepts. The first concept is social regularities, by which I mean the regular patterns that can be identified in social interactions. Since all meaning is generated through social interactions, these patterns shape our meanings; they determine what is thinkable and unthinkable. The second concept is the ambiguous personhood. I conceptualized that people, through social interactions, are constituted in three ways: as (a) agents, (b) actors, and (c) subjects. I then linked the two concepts to show that as agents, people enact and are products of social regularities that are long term and stable, like class positions. As actors, people enact and are products of social regularities that last for shorter spans of time and are more dependent on local institutional settings. Finally, as subjects, people enact regularities that allow them to narrate their other two

constituted capacities. Through a review of the purposes of this study, I explain how this will guide my research.

This study revolved around the following puzzle: Why is an approach that connects education and antipoverty policy almost unthinkable today? In order to answer that question I needed to explore the development and transformation of various social regularities (intersections of practices and discourses) that allowed education policy to appear be self-evidently independent by the time of Reagan's election. My theoretical framework offered me vistas from which to understand these social regularities. By linking a personhood to social regularities, I could see that these social regularities can operate on different time scales and emerge out of different dimensions of a social interaction. However, my road to the discovery of these social regularities must wind through examples of social interactions in which historical figures speak. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to identify the ways in which people explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies from 1975–1981. My framework directed me, as I investigated these explanations, to make sure I embrace the ambiguity rather than attribute statements to deeper conditions. In doing so I did not trace what was said, but instead traced why one particular statement appeared rather than another. Therefore, this theoretical framework guided me as I answered Research Questions 1 and 2.

What This Means for the Researcher

Research Question 3 asked the following: What lessons can be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy? The theoretical framework I have laid out helped me create my historical deconstruction of the issue. However, in order to answer my final research question I must investigate what is possible given such a framework.

First, it is important to note that the same three assumptions also apply to myself and the production of my interpretation. Whatever representation I create, it always will be a partial coconstruction of the context and the intersubjective meanings that I enact. So how does a researcher conduct policy studies from such a free-floating position?

The first step is to let go of the desire to hold "truth and justice in the same vision" (Rorty, 1999. p. 12). In other words, just because we are "children of time and place, without any significant metaphysical or biological limits on plasticity" does not mean that our moral obligation to sympathize with the pain of others is lessened (Rorty, 1999, p. 15). Even if it cannot *all* hang together, there are still important relationships in our time. Thus, a poststructural approach does not attempt to show the truth of the policy situation. It attempts to identify important contextual relationships for the sake of betterment. As we create our interpretations, we produce "a weave of knowing and not-knowing which is what knowing is" (Lather, 1991, p. 49). According to some pragmatists, such as Ljunggren (2003), that recognition of not knowing might be the most important element of democracy:

> My conclusion, stemming from Dewey, is that a radical democracy and a radical conception of the Public, as well as the meaning of community, requires a non-foundational attitude. That is my message, and by this I mean an attitude where the limits between philosophy and politics disappear when theorising on body/mind, individual/collective, private/public, and where a contingency in thinking/acting is the very condition for being. Then, this is an attitude of willingness—a willingness to give up any foundation for the sake of better arguments. (p. 352)

Therefore in my opinion the goal of policy studies from a poststructural position is neither the diagnosis of the entire liberal order nor the search for justice. Instead, the goal is to engage in a struggle for betterment and work for disruption. Both of these concepts, fairness and disruption, hinge upon the recognition that life is contingent on our historical moment. The concept of fairness involves assumptions about the moment; this is in contrast to justice, which claims some foundational condition. Fairness is always related to a process of a negotiation. Disruption is also a relational concept. One who disrupts does not desire to set things straight but only to point to the possibility of difference.

Accordingly, my answer to Research Question 3 was framed along the lines of fairness and disruption. The lessons we learn have to do with our abilities to disrupt the present and to think of more fair possibilities for the future. Although these are meager claims, they may be all we have.

Conclusion

In choosing my object, I purposefully avoided the question, "What is education policy?" or, "What is the purpose of education policy?" Instead, I am interested in *how* people drew the lines around education policy during the Carter

Administration. I was interested in how they made use of the dominant practices and discourses around them to regularize these boundaries. I have written a history of how this way of "doing" education policy came to be accepted as "altogether natural, self-evident and indispensable" (Foucault, 1991b, p. 74). In doing so, I attempted to shake the false self-evidence of education policy's independence and demonstrate its precariousness, "making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes" (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76).

The theoretical framework I have provided above guided my methodological approach to the subject. In the next chapter I describe my methodology and research design. Each of these is tied to my purpose.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methodology that was employed in this dissertation project. In this study, I have provided an interpretation of the historical sociopolitical forces that constituted how actors at the federal level from 1975–1981 explained the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies. I also seek to demonstrate the importance of the process of historicizing in policy analysis. In carrying out this project, I have designed a strategy that emerged from the theoretical orientations described in chapter 2 and my methodological commitments. This chapter delineates that strategy and its theoretical and methodological components.

I begin the chapter with a discussion of critical policy analysis and its methodological underpinnings. Subsequently, I demonstrate the appropriateness of using this approach for my particular research study. This is followed by a description of the research design of the study, in which I discuss methods of data collection, analysis procedures, and the ethical considerations of researcher positionality and trustworthiness.

Critical Policy Analysis

The overarching methodology for this study is critical policy analysis. Critical policy analysis is a set of strategies for researching the development and the effects of policy that highlights how power operates in specific historical and social contexts.

Critical policy analysts typically define policy in a broad sense and recognize that policy can be analyzed as a text, a discourse, and the effects of power (Ball, 1994). This approach to policy analysis arose out of the poststructural and feminist critique of traditional, rational policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Fraser, 1989; Forrester, 1993; Yanow, 1996). In educational policy studies specifically, policy analysis developed as an attempt to apply insights from political sociology, critical leadership studies, and qualitative evaluative studies to the study of education policy (Ball, 1987, 1994, 2005; Lather, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1989; J. Marshall & Peters, 1999; Scheurich, 1997; Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Miriam, 1997; Young, 1999). I begin this section with a brief summary of this critique, which leads into a discussion of the main tenets of critical policy analysis. Next, I explain the relevance of these tenets to the purposes of this study. Then, I again emphasize and elaborate on the importance of historicizing in this type of research.

Early policy studies were rooted in Laswell's (1951) work, *The Policy Orientation*, which asserted that policy inquiry should be an applied social science that provides objective solutions to social problems. There was a desire within this framework for a policy science that would act as a mediator between academics, government decision makers, and ordinary citizens, with the goal of minimizing, if not eliminating, the need for unproductive political debate over the pressing policy issues on the agenda. At its best, as Fischer (2003) pointed out, "policy analysis, in this model, strives to translate political and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means" (p. 4). At its worst, Laswell's

technocratic, managerialist understanding of policy studies privileges "truth" over democracy (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 28).

Traditional policy analysts long have avoided recognition that power is an important part of policy analysis (Ball, 1994). Power itself is a slippery concept. Traditionally, political scientists have been concerned with the location of the seat of power within the state and the political and economic elites who control that seat (Fischer, 2003). As Dye (1987) pointed out, the irony of American government is that the masses do not control the democracy of America. In liberal democracies of late modernity, looking for the seat of power fails to explain how, despite a change in political parties and increasing volume of citizens who have access to the political system, a hegemonic group remains whose interests are served over others (Giddens, 1973). A search for the controlling elites or puppeteers is often fruitless. In fact, such a search distracts us from understanding that power is a relational phenomenon. It is only between people that power exists; one cannot hold power (Foucault, 1980; Nyberg, 1981). Power is an intersubjective phenomenon that is dispersed throughout the social order. Power is the ability not only to constrain, such as in the limits of possible actions in a certain relationship, also to produce systems of knowledge, regimes of truth, and economies of desire (Foucault, 1972; Norton, 2004).

Some authors have argued that who exercises power is not nearly as important as how power is exercised (Foucault, 1980; Nyberg, 1981; Trouillot, 1995). A researcher with a critical perspective recognizes that policy is part of how power operates. A policy not only may constrain our action and what we view as possible,

but also may constitute new ways of speaking and acting that privilege the position of some over others. Policy analysis from a critical perspective is to clarify the relationship between the ways in which people's interests are constructed through historically situated systems of knowledge or economies of desire and the process of policy production.

In the critical analysis of policy, analysis of how power is exercised must be attempted in all stages of the policy process. Critical policy analysts have tended to make use of the traditional policy stages (Dunn, 1994), not to describe a linear process of policy production, but as spaces in which a researcher can identify the sites of political struggle. Scheurich (1997) argued that we must analyze the ways in which problems are constructed, what solutions are perceived as available, and the systems of knowledge that are available for our evaluation of the policy implementation in a given time. Taylor et al. (1997) argued we must study the contexts in which the policy is developed, the places in which the texts are produced and interpreted, and the consequences of the policies. Ball (1994) has outlined that critical policy analysis must attempt to expose the politics of five different contexts: (a) the context of influence, (b) the context of policy text production, (c) the contexts of practice, (d) the context of outcomes, and (e) the context of political struggle. According to Ball (1994),

> Each context consists of a number of areas of action—some private and some public. Each context involves struggles and compromise and ad hocery. They are loosely coupled and there is not one simple direction of flow of information between them. (p. 26)

I would add that each of these contexts can occur simultaneously or separated by expanses of time. They can be disjointed and separated culturally and geographically and yet still be interpenetrated by common discourses and practices. In each space policy is constructed through and constructs relationships of power.

Tracking power through these various moments simply helps emphasize the fundamentally processual character of policy production and to insist that what policy is matters less than how policy works, that power itself works through policies, and that the policy makers' claimed political preferences have little influence on most of the actual practices of power (Trouillot, 1995). The different solutions or *policy levers* that are perceived as available in a historical moment are shaped by power relations of that time. The practices that are the responses to the available policy levers are the result of relationships of power; our understandings and descriptions of the effects of the deployment of given policy levers are also a result of power relationships.

Critical Policy Research Methods

The traditional model of policy of analysis has encouraged research methods that attempt to find the true cause of the social problem as well as the most logical and efficient solution. Researchers employing this approach assume that they can separate facts from values by relying on rigors of objective empirical analysis (Dunn, 1994). Social problems are treated as self-evident objects that need to be explained and described, preferably in economic terms. Researchers in this vein also have assumed that because these facts are value free, they are therefore generalizable. They

assume that social problems eventually can be overcome through the accumulation of the truth (Fischer, 2003).

Those practicing a more critical form of policy analysis recognize that the dominant policy science "misses the point of politics" (Stone, 1988, p. 5). Truth, rational analysis, and generalizablity do not exist without politics. The study of politics and policy requires recognition of the political nature of truth. As observed in the past it is usually the dominant group's interests that are rationally accepted as truth. With this understanding, many have asserted that a policy analyst with a critical perspective must reveal how interests are socially constructed rather than search for the truth. A critical policy analyst heeds Foucault's (1980) warning:

> It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. (p. 133)

Therefore, a prominent strategy within critical policy analysis is to reveal policy issues as historically contingent events. In a critical policy analysis, the social dynamics that shape the practices of problem definition and policy making are exposed through a detailed portrait of the sociohistorical context (Ball, 1994). A single policy is not considered an independent event but is instead seen in relation to the other practices of policy within a state or state subsystem. However, the state is not a single monolithic entity, but rather one node within a complex matrix of social regularities (Scheurich, 1997). A critical policy analyst must paint a large enough picture to reveal not only what people in a given context identify as a policy issue and

policy solution, but also what problems and solutions are unthinkable at a given moment (Scheurich, 1997).

In order to paint such a picture, critical policy analysis must employ historicizing methods. The goal of historicizing is to contextualize the policy issues with specific attention to how policy development operates though time. Neustadt and May (1986) argued that those who produce, administrate, or advocate for policy must know how to use history; officials must be "thinking in time" so as to continually compare the present to the future to the past and back again (p. 251). Neustadt and May wrote, "For the essence of thinking in time-streams is imagining the future as it may be when it becomes the past—with *some* intelligible continuity but richly complex and able to surprise" (pp. 253-254, emphasis in original). Policy analysis approached in this way asks us to interpret the relationships between our resources and our desires, not only in the present, but also as related to our past resources and goals. The analyst then must attempt to interpret the past availability of resources and desires in their original complexity, not as the pared tropes that reach us today. One strategy for developing our understanding of these relationships is the production of microhistories.

The emphasis on a detailed contextual picture found in critical policy analysis requires a certain type of historicizing, one that consciously deals with the problem of the macro–micro divide (Taylor et al., 1997). The historical narratives that are produced must be able to reveal patterns of long-term social interactions and domination while showing how agency is possible in a given situation. The analysis

must reveal how the policy issues are part of a richly complex historical moment that is situated among social processes that unfold on multiple time scales.

Historicizing in this way allows the critical policy analyst to see policy as an interpretative event that can happen in multiple contexts. A critical analysis of any policy must unpack the complexity of its production and interpretation "via exploration of the ambiguity, fragmentation, undecidabilities, fluidities, hyperrealities and incoherencies of a world in process" (Lather, 2006, p. 789). One must attempt to track how power is exercised in the different complicated contexts of policy production and interpretation.

Whereas critical policy analysis is a set of research strategies, it is also a political position that advocates for social justice or—as I have framed it—fairness. Critical policy analysts recognize that the veneer of objectivity often hides the bias and privileges of the researcher. Instead of claiming objectivity, critical policy analysts seek to perform research that is simultaneously sociological, historical, political, and philosophical (Flyvbjerg, 2001). As Ball (1994) pointed out, the critical policy analyst desires to disrupt the workings of institutions that appear to be neutral and independent. At the same time, the critical policy analyst seeks to identify political and social activities that help in the struggle to become a more fair society.

In summary, I have identified four important tenets of critical policy analysis:

1. First, critical policy analysis is a set of strategies that recognizes the production of policy as a sociopolitical practice that is historically situated. The utilization of this approach requires the researcher to portray a detailed picture of the

historical landscape of the context in order to situate the policy issue among the other policies operating concurrently, as well as the larger matrix of social regularities that are continually experienced by actors in that time and place. This strategy allows us to understand how interests are constructed in a given time period.

2. Analysts with a critical perspective investigate the different contexts of policy in order to expose how power operates in the ways we define problems and their solutions. This helps us see how the lines of stratification are replicated or disrupted through policy.

3. Critical policy analysts also attempt to understand the disjointed consequences of policies in the manifolds of social relationships that make up our society.

4. Finally, I would argue that critical policy analysis is performed to disrupt our common practices and help us construct different practices. It is also done to strengthen political positions that advocate for practices that are fairer and come closer to the dream of becoming an equitable democracy.

Historical Research Methods

Given the emphasis on the historical context in critical policy analysis and the purposes of my study, it is important clarify the methods of historical research. Historians do not discuss method very often (Barrera, 2001). Within the culture of that discipline, there is a sense that it is better to write a book about a historical topic than to comment on how a book was produced. In this sense historians tend to believe

that "true" historians are those who produce great historiographic works, leaving reflection on history to marginal areas, such as books on "thoughts about history that some historians write as they reach maturity" (Barrera, 2001, p. 190). Recognizing the drawbacks of such an attitude some scholars from interdisciplinary schools, Campbell (1988) and Lugg (2006a, 2006b), have offered important advice to those new to historical methods.

In general, the art of historical research involves bringing together and identifying many sources of information, interpreting them, and combining these interpretations into a narrative. Campbell (1988) explained that archival research is a "set of operations that one performs on observational data in written documents to achieve definition, description and chronological ordering" of human relationships (p. 157). The written documents can include *primary* documents as well as *secondary* sources. As Lugg (2006a) pointed out historians use

> artifacts or *primary sources* such as diaries; personal and professional correspondence; newspaper accounts; government documents, including memos, minutes of meetings, arrest reports and criminal complaints, health and safety data, public health records, and court decisions; church, synagogue, and mosque records; as well as unedited sound and video recordings. (p. 176, emphasis in original)

However, historians also make use of secondary sources produced by other scholars, such as, according to Lugg (2006a), "biographies; political, social, and/or legal histories; film and audio documentaries; but also autobiographies and memoirs" as important sources of understanding (p. 177).

Most important to a historian, however, is how these sources of information are related to one another and communicated to the reader. As Lugg (2006a) explained, "Doing historical research involves sifting and sorting through these literatures using both *primary* and *secondary* sources, shifting back and forth between the two large sets of materials" (p. 177, emphasis in original). A historian is always thinking about the ways that they can weave these disparate sources "together to build a coherent story" (Lugg, 2006a, p. 177).

Historical and Critical Policy Research Methods as Complementary

I assert that for the critical policy analysis to be effective, the researcher must pay close attention to the temporal context. Combining the methods of historical research and critical policy analysis helps in our attempts to make research meaningful (Flyvbjerg, 2001). There is a possibility for a kinship in the approach to these methods that support similar theoretical and strategic aims.

First, both methods can be used as a hermeneutical approach to knowledge. In critical policy analysis the assertions of the various positions in the policy struggle are seen as theory laden. The job of the analyst is to go back and forth between the assertions and the social situations that make the assertions possible. The methods of historical research can be approached in a hermeneutical way. The secondary and primary sources are continually compared to each other. Historical research is an interpretative act in which the theory-laden, secondary sources are compared to the assertions and interpretations in primary documents.

On a more practical level, the methods offer strategies by which the contexts of policy analysis can be explicated. Taylor et al. (1997) noted that for critical policy analysis to be

> strategically and politically useful, it is important that such fine grained analysis [such as critical discourse analysis] are located within a broader context including a historical context. This seems to be a crucial feature of critical policy analysis, that is, the notion of thinking relationally—where theoretical frameworks are used to place cultural forms within broad patterns of social inequality and relations of domination. (p. 32)

Historical methods offer the tools to go about the strategic work of understanding the broad patterns of domination. Ultimately, the combination of these methods allows for a detailed understanding of the ways in which power is exercised through the production of policy.

Rationale for Using Critical Policy Analysis

Critical policy analysis offers an overarching strategy to help me investigate and interpret the policy issues that are at the forefront of today's education policy. It confirms that we must expand our knowledge of the historical context in which our understandings of the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies developed. Through the practice of critical policy analysis we are pushed to bring this historical perspective to bear on our current desires for fairness. Below I explain how the main tenets identified above framed my investigation.

First and foremost, critical policy analysis reminds us that education policies are not independent but instead operate within a matrix of other polices and governmental inactions. My analysis must situate the policy issue within the larger

network of social relationships in order to disrupt the ways in which we accept federal education policy as a historic individuality (Foucault, 1972). In this study, it was my goal to expose how people during the Carter Administration explained the relationships between federal education and antipoverty policies. In doing so, I created a detailed portrait of the social and political context. The identification of peoples' explanations did not rely solely on the texts of the policies or the intentions of the policy makers. Instead, I used sources that would help us comprehend how their explanations were socially and historically situated. For example, I explored the ways in which the social regularities of the time constituted their understanding of the relationship. Specifically, as a starting point, I investigated the discourses of race, meritocracy, and individualism. I also provided a picture of the practices and physical resources that were perceived as available at the time.

Second, critical policy analysis encourages us to explain how power operates through policy. In this study, as I attempted to understand how people at different times explained the relationship between the policies, I looked for the ways in which these constructions were the product of and helped construct different relationships of power. I explored the ways in which actors related these policy streams to the dominant systems of knowledge and economies of desire. This required a widened focus to capture the exigencies of the social interactions at that time and the ways in which the stratification system was developing.

Also, given that policy development is not linear but is rather "a messy bricolage of unevenly-implemented imperatives and trends" mediated by various

historically situated policy texts, actors, and social processes, this study was designed not to simplify but to unpack the polymorphous disjointed processes of policy development (Davidson-Harden, as cited in Ball, 1987). The Carter Administration's reorganization of the executive branch offers a place from which to observe the complex ways in which the federal policies were interpreted and reinterpreted. Through reorganization questions, discussions of purpose and goals of policy were animated. Some of the people involved in these debates were also major players in the production of the original policy texts and influential in the administration of that policy. It was important to observe how they rearticulated the relationships between the policies at different times and different contexts. I examined how their changing understandings of the policies were situated within and against the dominant practices and systems of knowledge of the historical moment.

Finally, I believed that a demonstration of how the relationship between the policies was understood in the past would help us as we interpret the present policy options. A destabilization of the unity of the education policy would help brush history against the grain to reveal the relationships, the possibilities, and the desires of another time (Benjamin, 1969). Studying policy in this way allows us to call into question our current desires and perceived possibilities, while allowing me to "contribute to society's practical rationality in clarifying where we are and where we want to be" (Lather, 2006, p. 788).

Importance of Historicizing

Besides my own affinity for the use of history to situate my perspectives, I also assert that it is important to emphasize the role historicizing plays in critical policy analysis. As noted above, historical research allows us to understand how the current policy situation can be situated among broader patterns of domination. In this study, I place the current calls for linking antipoverty and education policy in a historical context that is attentive to the social regularities through which our society was stratified in the 20th century. In order to do so, I agree with Pierson's (2005) claim that it is important to recognize that "understanding the sources of policy often requires that we pay attention to processes that play out over considerable periods of time" (p. 34). I also recognize, like Pierson, that in general, "the social world is marked by processes that unfold over time," and the exploration of these social processes over long periods "can lead us to assess prominent areas of inquiry and conventional practices in new and fertile ways" (Pierson, 2005, p. 35). When analysts study policy in this way, it allows us to treat the present policy option "as but a specific moment within a larger dynamic process" (Pierson, 2005, p. 48). The focus of my study is on the second half of the 1970s, but the social processes that characterized the majority of the 20th century are brought into relief to help us understand the social regularities through which people of that time understood the relationship between the policies.

Research Design and Method

Critical policy analysis requires that rather than simplify, the researcher should reveal the complexity of the policy-making process. I advocate for a critical policy analysis that uses the techniques of historical production that were crafted for the understanding of the Middle Ages and Renaissance Europe—a past far removed. I am claiming the adaptation of the same techniques for the investigation of recent history with a purpose of providing understanding of policy issues for our own time. In their study of the relationship between antipoverty and education policy, Silver and Silver (1991) noted, "Perspectives on the recent past change rapidly" (p. 8). Silver and Silver further advised that any historical work include an implicit or explicit "unrelenting question of what governs historical attention" (p. 9). Given the heightened recognition of the instability of the historical narrative of recent events and a belief in the necessity of reflexive research, I must make my research plan explicit. This dissertation study was guided by three research questions:

Research Question 1: How did people during the Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy?

Research Question 2: What social regularities can be identified during the Carter Administration, and how did these regularities impact antipoverty and educational policies?

Research Question 3: What lessons can be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy?

In this section, I relate how my methods served the purposes outlined above. I am clear about my choice of sources and questions I asked of those sources. Also, building off the insights of critical policy analysis described above, I explicate the modes of analysis and interpretation that I drew on to meet my purposes.

Critical Policy Analysis That Uses Historical Methods

In order to develop a critical policy analysis of the policy issue described above, I have constructed a history to help us examine how policy elites during the Carter Administration understood the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policy. This history was constructed by interweaving primary and secondary sources. This interweaving was guided by my theoretical framework that recognizes that historical figures are constituted by the social regularizes of their time. The way the historical narrative has been constructed had important implications for my investigation of the policy. Therefore, I explain the methods I used to collect, order, and interpret my sources.

Methods for Collecting Sources

Following the dictums of historical research, in this dissertation study I sifted and sorted secondary and primary sources. I began locating secondary sources through the readings of book reviews as well as through discussions with staff at the Carter Presidential Library. The primary sources were acquired mostly through archival research, although if possible I conducted oral histories.

Archival research. Through my ongoing review of secondary sources on the decision to divide the HEW into HHS and the Department of Education specifically (Radin & Hawley, 1988), the Carter Administration at large (Hargrove, 1988; H. Rosenbaum & Ugrinski, 1994), and other histories of the culture within the United States of that time, I identified important initial primary sources within the references. I gathered primary sources from presidential and congressional archives (I discuss this in greater detail in the next section) in order to connect them with and read them against previously written secondary sources. Through this process I constructed a narrative that reflected my interpretation of the primary and secondary sources. Although it is described here as linear, the process of course was more overlapping. The secondary sources and the archives always were encountered together and read in light of each other, and the writing was ongoing throughout. The ethical aspects of this process are discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Oral history interviews. If possible, I planned to collect oral histories from relevant policy actors. This required that before the interview I develop a questioning protocol based on the information gathered from secondary sources. The protocol must be attentive to the positionality of the interviewee. In his classic work, Thompson (2000) described the oral history interview process. He maintained, "To interview successfully requires the skill of being a respectful listener" (p. 222). He advised that the interviewer carefully to think about how the questions are constructed. Thompson cautioned, "Avoid asking questions which make informants think in your way rather than theirs" (p. 230). He also explained that interviewers

must have a clear understanding of the degree to which they would like to steer the interview. A more focused interview may provide useful information but will miss stories that have the "potential to connect up different spheres of life" (Thompson, 2000, p. 231). That is why Thompson advocated for an approach that is semistructured and that, whenever possible, allows a person's life story to be recorded.

Sources of Data

The first research question was the following: How did people during the Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? In order to answer Research Question 1, I had to construct a history of the separation of the HEW into HHS and the Department of Education that would help us identify the ways in which political actors in Washington, DC, at that historical moment understood the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policy. Therefore, it was important to find sources in which the question of federal reorganization was directly debated. For example, my scan of the secondary literature initially revealed that President Carter's relationship with Joseph Califano was an important area to research. In his memoir, Califano (1981) explained how as HEW's last Secretary he made a case against the creation of the Department of Education. He sent a memo on April 25, 1977, and then attended a meeting on the subject 2 days later. Some of the primary sources about these meetings are located in the Carter Presidential Library. Interactions such as these were carefully researched among the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and other presidential papers

available at the library. Archived oral histories, such as exit interviews, also were investigated.

Majchrzak (1984) pointed out, “Policy is not made; it accumulates” (p. 14). Given that the understandings verbalized in the interactions described above are, in part, based on the interpretation of the accumulation of policy texts, I also analyzed the texts of the policy. In addition to the policy texts, I planned to analyze agency white paper documents and policy briefs produced at the time. These read in concert with the policy texts themselves would lead to understanding how the actors of the time read the policy texts. Such an approach would help me paint a more nuanced picture of how the actors understood the relationship between the policies.

Research Question 2 considered how these understandings were generated through the social regularities of the time. Research Question 2 was the following: What social regularities can be identified during the Carter Administration, and how did these regularities impact antipoverty and educational policies? The people of the time did not just generate their understandings out of thin air. They were living in a tangle of political, social, and economic contradictions. They were agents of the play of forces that were silently conditioning their existence. Specifically, my second purpose was to understand how the articulation and rearticulation of equity, opportunity, and efficiency discourses shaped interpretations of American education and antipoverty policies at that time (1975–1981). In order to meet this goal, I needed to develop a picture of the time that would allow the reader to discern the social regularities that were enacted and constituted the different mental constructions of the

relationship between the policy streams. One data collection strategy was to use the entertainment and news media of the time to get a sense of the multiple discourses that were present in American culture at the time (Troy, 2005). This included a review of the most popular books, television shows, and magazines of the time. It also included investigations of newspapers and magazines that were available to the actors in Washington, DC. The Library of Congress is an important archive of this type of material.

Collection of this archival data on popular culture allowed me to develop a clearer picture of the symbolic world that surrounded the actors. These were read in concert with the secondary sources that provided a picture of the trends in public opinion around ideas of race, wealth, and attitudes toward government (e.g., Carmines & Stinson, 1989). Also, secondary sources as well as historical statistics helped me identify trends in resources and infrastructure. These data allowed me to develop a picture of the way the actors of the time interpreted the material resources available to them. This also situated the years of 1975–1981 among the longer trends of the 20th century.

My final research question then asked me to offer my interpretation of the present policy issue. Research Question 3 was the following: What lessons can be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy? In order to represent this policy issue, I collected data from current policy texts, scholarly writings on these texts, the white papers produced by

various policy centers, and government-issued statements and speeches. These were contextualized with secondary sources to help situate desires and goals.

The Ordering of Data and Interpretation

As noted above, a strategy within critical policy analysis is the portrayal of a detailed picture of the historical context to situate a policy issue among the other policies operating concurrently as well as the larger matrix of social regularities that are continually experienced and enacted by actors in that time and place. This strategy must rely on the construction of a historical narrative that explicitly relates this interpretation of the context. My job as the author of such a narrative was to produce an interpretive interweaving of secondary and primary sources. Historical research is ultimately an interpretive act (Lugg, 2006a).

Wolcott (1994) noted that qualitative data in general can be related to the reader as a description, an analysis, or an interpretation. Most, though, are a combination of all three, with an emphasis in a certain area. According to Wolcott, works that claim an emphasis of description attempt to "stay close to the data as originally recorded [and let] … the data speak for themselves" (p. 10). When the emphasis is on the analysis, the works tend to report the results of a method that "proceeds in some careful, systematic way to identify key factors and relationships among them" (Wolcott, 1994, p. 10). However, like historical research, research pieces can emphasize interpretation. Wolcott pointed out that interpretation

> does not claim to be as convincingly or compulsively "scientific" as the [analysis], being neither as loyal to nor as restricted by observational data only. The goal is to make sense of what goes on, to reach out for

> understanding or explanation beyond the limits of what can be explained with the degree of certainty usually associated with analysis. (p. 10)

Interpretive work thus privileges the subjectivity of its author. As discussed below, my own subjectivity and the theoretical framework that I brought to the project shaped my interpretations. Like a specialized lens, subjectivity and the framework would bring some aspects of the situation into sharp focus while blurring others. Yet, unlike analysis, interpretation of the situation was not bound to tenets of the theory but instead was informed by and acted as a launching pad for my own creative construction of a narrative. Although this approach might not bring us closer to a stable truth, I hoped to learn about the categories of the present by engaging in this effort (Tierney, 2000).

As Campbell (1988) succinctly stated, historical research "involves difficult feats of information retrieval, study of refractory and often incomplete data, and eventually involves cross-examination of the ordered data to arrive at interpretive and explanatory statements about the human interactions" (p. 157). In what follows I describe the methods I used to order the data collected from primary and secondary sources. I then explain how I cross-examined these data to arrive at an interpretation.

According to Ryan and Bernard (2000), "Coding is the heart and soul" of text analysis for the purposes of understanding experiences (p. 780). Ryan and Bernard noted that creating the categories that will bring order to the large amounts of data collected forces the "researcher to make judgments about the meanings of contiguous blocks of text" (p. 780). The categories bring order to the dispersion of utterances and

allow the researcher to begin to describe various relationships between the utterances. In line with historical methods, in my study I first ordered my data along chronological categories (Campbell, 1988). Then, I developed categories that fit each of my purposes.

Ordering of data chronologically. One of the purposes of this study was to use the construction of a microhistory to help interpret the ways in which policy actors in the late 1970s understood the relationship between antipoverty and federal education policy. In doing so, I highlighted the temporal dimension of the context. Therefore, the data were organized first along a chronological order. First, utterances, speeches or conversations that speak directly to the policy relationship were placed on a timeline bounded by the Carter presidency. Second, I placed the cultural resources from which the actors constructed their understandings on a timeline that expanded further into the past. In doing so, the understandings as well as their constituent elements could be understood through an interpretation of their temporal relationships.

Ordering of data by purpose. I also ordered my data according to my purposes. First, I grouped all data together that provided insight into how the political actors understood this relationship. Codes were developed that reflected the emergent categories that classified the various ways in which people spoke about the relationship. Second, I grouped all of the information on each discourse that helped constitute these opinions. For example, I planned to group together data related to the

efficiency discourse and to highlight the ways in which this group of statements related to others within the group as well as outside of the group.

The Cross-Examination of Sources for Interpretive Purposes

The sifting and sorting of the data allow the researcher to cross-examine the data and to ask questions across and within data categories. These questions were framed by my theoretical and methodological framework, which asked the researcher to understand policy as interpretations of a text that is historically contingent. The goal, then, was to understand how certain utterances about the relationship between education and antipoverty were possible at that time.

For example, as I tried to interpret how people understood the relationship, I would compare the statements of one actor (say, Carter) to other actors (such as Califano). I might examine of each of these statements for how they compared to the texts of the policies as well as for how they compared to the dominant discourses that were found in the culture at large. I must ask questions such as, "How did this actor, as he or she tried to relate their views to others, isolate words and phrases, within policies and sometimes distort them or juxtapose them against different policies compared to the other actors?" or, "In what ways were metaphors used in their explanations?" The understandings of policy then become not translations of an agenda but the encounter between the printed page and the social regularities of the time and the intersubjective interactions between actors that form an explosive mixture (C. Ginzburg, 1980). It is a mixture that not only changes reality, but also replicates past social formations. Comparisons such as these ask us to explore people

not only as policy actors who deal directly with the finite details and political exigencies of the time, but also as subjects who narrate and reconcile their activities and as agents of social formations.

It was also important to do the same kind of cross-examination across the arbitrary chronological timeframes that I developed. For example, Carter's understanding of the relationship in 1971 might have more elements of equity than later Carter statements. These types of comparisons helped me see the "messy bricolage of unevenly-implemented imperatives and trends" that is the policy process (Davidson-Harden, as cited in Ball, 1987). Such comparisons emphasized the ambiguous relationship between the agency of the subject and the stability of the actor-agent.

Finally, it was important that I cross-examine the primary sources with stories from secondary sources and, conversely, cross-examine the secondary sources with information gleaned from the primary sources. I must examine the primary sources for logical support theses of previous authors. At the same time, I must disrupt the narratives of past authors with the statements found in the primary documents.

Of course, the final product is not only a reporting of these comparisons. Instead, these comparisons were brought together to help me construct a narrative. My story, then, is an interpretive act that is more than a list of utterances. It must be a story of experience and not just of thoughts. It must clarify the practices that produced and contained those thoughts, to become a story that connects the micro practices of individuals with the macro processes of the time.

Ethical Considerations

Researchers practicing critical policy analysis by definition strive for more just social interactions. The practice of research itself is a social activity that is fraught with struggles and acts of domination (Lather, 1991). The injunction of the critical policy analysts to paint the messy, complex picture not only pertains to the subjects of study, but also includes the practices of the researcher and their relationship to the subjects of study.

In this spirit what I present in this section is not only my own subjective positionality, but also recognition of the ethical considerations of my research practices. I first describe the ethics of doing historical work from a poststructural stance. Then, I describe my own positionality and conclude with issues of trustworthiness.

Ethical Considerations of Doing Historical Research

A great historiography seems to transport the reader in to another temporal location, but this gold standard of the practice is itself fools' gold. For it is important to remember that we, like the characters in our histories, do not have complete autonomy over our consciousness. We cannot just transport our consciousness back, to given time, by will, careful research, or great storytelling. The categories of today are always present in our interpretations of the past.

Marx (as cited in C. Ginzberg, 1980, p. xxv) noted, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness." This reminder is helpful in two ways. First, it helps

us remember that if we are to tell a story of how someone lived, we must be able to elucidate as much of their social milieu as possible. Second, it reminds us to be reflexive in our choices of sources and methods, because our own social existence is informing those choices. The stories of the relationship between federal education and antipoverty policies are stories of recent history. However, these stories are also dispersed fragments of a time and place that are shadowed by present categories and commitments. We must remember "how we choose to name other people and groups—how we categorize them—often tells more about us, than it does about any truth of who they are. It tells more about that which is true to the namer" (Rinehart, as cited in Tierney, 2000, p. 544). Yet, this warning should not paralyze our attempts to understand. All we will ever have is the present, and from it we must attempt to reconstruct past categories and commitments by an arbitrary act of research (C. Ginzburg, 1980).

I present the historical narrative that I have constructed as an interpretive work. I do not claim any reconnoiter or reflection of a past reality. The only thing I can claim is a better understandings of the present categories from which we construct our past and our present.

The majority of the primary sources used in this project were gathered from the Carter Presidential Archive and the Congressional Archives. These sources were read against and with secondary sources as interpretations of these primary documents. Yet, it is important to remember that archives, in and of themselves, are acts of interpretation (Bieseker, 2006). When the researcher arrives, the sources that

are present and available for viewing are the result of interpretation. Working backward, the layers of interpretation become clear. The box that the researcher opens is a collection of artifacts, mostly textual, that have been grouped by an archivist. This grouping is systematic but is interpretative. For example, in a box in the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library a number of artifacts relating to a speech given at the Howard University commencement on June 4, 1965. There are teleprompter roles, drafts of the speech, and invitations from the university. There is also a letter from Patrick Moynihan. This letter seems a bit out of place because it asks for the president to side with him on the backlash the release of his report was receiving. This letter is some months removed from the speech and does not mention the speech. This act alone, this grouping of this letter with the artifacts of this speech, is an interpretation of the relationship between that speech and Moynihan's stance.

Moving back another level, there are the categories in which the boxes of artifacts are placed. This is especially pertinent to my research, because often there are separate categories for education policy and social policy. These categories are interpretations that are based on the categories of the archivists.

Another step back reveals another interpretive decision made in what to donate to the archive and, in the case of national archives, what can be declassified. This is especially obvious of state-run archives that have federal guidelines that determine the level of access a researcher may have. For example, in the Jimmy Carter Library, a great deal is available for viewing on his domestic policy, but his

foreign policy, especially with regards to the Middle East, is still not available for researchers.

The allure of the archive is that the researcher feels as if there is some hidden truth that can be liberated from the dusty, rarely opened boxes and volumes. Researchers must be continuously aware that this allure can blind us to the interpretive acts that have shaped the artifacts that are available. This is especially true for archives that are connected to the state. These archives serve the purposes of the state, and the interpretations generated from these archives are subject to these purposes.

Biesecker (2006) pointed out,

> Whatever else the archive may be—say, an historical space, a political space, or a sacred space; a site of preservation, interpretation, or commemoration—it always already is the provisionally settled scene of our collective invention, of our collective invention of us and of it. (p. 124)

In this settled scene, the ethical work of historians is to situate their work and their desires within and against this collective invention. The story that is ultimately told is the result of the many layers of interpretation, of which the historian is just one. This is especially true for my project, which was research on recent political history. Most of my work used the archives of the state, which bear its stamp.

Positionality

As I have commented many times before, this work is my interpretation of primary and secondary sources. It privileges my own subjectivity, and therefore it is

important to describe myself not as a way of creating legitimacy, but as a way of making explicit my relationship to the categories I employed.

I am a White male who grew up in a middle-class, suburban home in Texas. Some of my most formative years were spent as a teacher in a high-poverty, predominantly Latino/a school. In my early adulthood I was politically agnostic. Now, I go through political mood swings between a progressive left that still believes in the United States' ability to emphasize hope and compassion (Rorty, 1999) and a more despondent, further left position that wonders about the sustainability and ethical resources available in our patriarchal, homophobic, inequitable, capitalist society that consistently supports White privilege or the ultrarich. Most of the time, especially now that I have kids, I leave the nihilist worries at the library and try to practice a mode of life that embodies hope, or so I tell myself.

Credibility

In critical policy analysis the goal of the research is to retain an acceptable amount of credibility rather than validity. The concept of creditability recognizes that the act of policy analysis is an imbedded social activity, and it is only through social interaction can the work be deemed acceptable. Fisher (2003) pointed out that the chief requirement is that other people involved in the policy struggle should be able to "follow (not necessarily agree with) the decision procedures of the individual providing the assessment" of the policy situation. (p. 154). The decisions that were made in this study are related to historical research methods.

In historical research the citation is the key to creditability. Given that every historical work is act of interpretation, the only real check is whether or not an author has overrun his or her sources. By this I mean that we must ask a question of every historical work: Can others go to all the same sources and attempt their own interpretation? This approach to creditability is similar to the ideas expressed by Richardson (1994), who chose to forego the idea of triangulation for the metaphor of crystallization. Janesick (2000) summarized the concept as follows:

> The image of the crystal replaces that of the land surveyor and the triangle. … The crystal combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, and alter, but are not amorphous. (p. 392)

Yet, it is also important to point out that the writing of history is not an act of a single consciousness. The impact or the value of its refraction can be judged only by how the readers invoke the interpretations. In my project I had a group of peer readers who provided continual feedback and evaluation of my drafts as I progressed. They also were privy to my audit trail, whereby I documented my process of inquiry through a journal that explained documents I encountered, the interviews I performed, and the readings I undertook (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993). These peer readers' insights, interpretations, and questions about presentation and method were utilized to improve my work—to make sure that I did not run over my sources.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I first summarize the goals of my study and the approach I brought to this study. Then, I point to the steps I took to meet those goals. Finally, I situate the project in its historical moment.

I have proposed a critical policy analysis that helps us understand how people in the past have made meaning out of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy at the federal level. Specifically, I chose a critical juncture in the history of U.S. politics, the Carter years, which I believed would be fruitful in helping interpret how education policy came to be thought of as independent from other social policy. In doing so I was interested in how people drew the lines around education policy during the Carter Administration. I planned to shake the false self-evidence of education policy's independence and demonstrate its precariousness, "making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes" (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76).

Critical policy analysis helped me frame this study as a demonstration of the complexity of the multiple sites of political struggle, where policy is made and negotiated, and point to the ways in which education policies are always in circulation with and enacted among other polices. Through this demonstration, I provide insight into how situated social regularities, race, property, individualism, and stability were performed in the production of education and antipoverty policies. Such a study would help me and others interpret the present policy options and our desires for

social justice as events of a specific historical moment with its own possibilities and contradictions.

In order to produce such a study I used both the methods of critical policy analysis and historical research. My research design description noted that first I accumulated primary and secondary sources. Next, I ordered these sources by chronology and theme. Then, I cross-examined the sources in order to produce a historical interpretation. Finally, I offered an interpretation of the present policy situation based on my historical interpretation.

The research project described above is a hybrid of many things. It is a hybrid of my desires to understand my teaching experiences and my desire to hope for a better life experience of future children. It is also a hybrid of my love of the historical narrative and my commitment to produce research that is useful in the policy world. Finally, it is a hybrid of my desires for large research projects and the restraints in my life. I hoped these hybrids would produce a novel piece of research that is useful, focused, and creditable.

CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTING NEW WAYS OF LIFE: EIGHT-TRACKS, THE SUNBELT, DROPPING OUT, AND DOING THE BEST WE CAN

The purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter Administration. In doing so, I offer an interpretation of how the possibilities for U.S. education and social policy were transformed during the late 1970s. By possibilities, I mean that, given the infinite number of actions a group could take, how is it that some were designated as more possible than others? I am interested in how people chose one explanation over another and thus enacted one possibility over another.

Specifically, I am interested in the ways in which the policy configurations that linked education and antipoverty policies, which grew out of the national priorities articulated during the Great Society, were devalued during the 1970s. Therefore, in this study I have looked at how the Carter Administration developed their vision of our national priorities during the late 1970s. This investigation allows me to historicize our current policy debates around the connections between education and antipoverty policy. A prominent strategy within critical policy analysis is to represent policy issues as historically contingent events. In critical policy analysis, the social dynamics that shape the practices of problem definition and policymaking are exposed through a detailed portrait of the sociohistorical context (Ball, 1994).

Purpose of Chapter

In order to understand how people during the Carter Administration explained the relationship between education and antipoverty policy, I first must try to capture a vision of the social and historical context in which they were speaking. In this chapter, I situate the Carter Administration and priorities articulated during the inauguration among the multiple changes that the nation experienced during the 1970s. In this chapter I broadly describe a particular time—the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. It does not deal with education or antipoverty directly; instead, the chapter offers a picture of the complexity of social development during that time.

I begin this task by highlighting the difference in tone and content of the speeches delivered by Johnson and Carter at the outset of their terms. Then, I trace the complex, uneven social changes that occurred across many areas of U.S. life. In doing so, I hope to situate Carter's grasping for a new approach within the multiple changes in many areas of U.S. life. My representation of Carter's attempts to establish new national priorities is not meant to infer that the new goals were attempts to give meaning to outside structural changes. I am assuming that context and meaning in everyday life are "co-constructions, multiple, complex, open and changing" (Lather, 1991, p. 42). Thus, the context and meaning making occurring at a given time should not be thought of as separate spheres, in which one is the function of the large-scale patterns within another. Instead, the coconstruction of meaning and context are "made and re-made across a multiplicity of minor scattered practices" (Lather, 1991, p. 42). The possibilities in the development of national goals therefore should be understood

as part of the general dispersion of dominant practices and discourses (Foucault, 1972).

In this chapter, I explain some of those coconstructions, such as changes in the economy, in technology, and in gender roles and politics. These changes were uneven and interrelated. In other words, we are not simply obtaining "a plurality of histories juxtaposed and independent of one another" (Foucault, 1972, p. 10). My purpose was not just to have the history of the economy beside that of technology, gender roles, demographics, and electoral politics, but instead to consider the ways in which the multiple and uneven changes during this time reference a historically contingent, complex dispersion of the possible. The development of new national goals offers one example of the ways in which possibilities were being constructed during the 1970s.

An Inauguration of a New Vocabulary

Many in the Democratic Party saw the election of James E. Carter to the presidency as a chance to get the American core domestic agenda back on track (E. Emerson, personal communication, October 31, 2007). Following the tragedies of Vietnam and the divisive politics of the Nixon Administration, Democrats hailed Carter's victory as an opportunity to fulfill the agenda that was initiated by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It was an opportunity to continue the domestic work of fighting poverty and fulfilling of the promise of equality that invigorated the civil rights movement.

As Barbara Jordan pointed out in the keynote address of the Democratic Convention in 1976, the Democratic Party believed it was the Democrats' "obligation to actively—underscore *actively*—seek to remove those obstacles which would block individual achievement—obstacles emanating from race, sex, economic condition" (B. Jordan, 1976). Along with this commitment to the core values, Jordan also mentioned that the Democratic Party had to change and do a better job of listening to the people. She recognized that the plurality, claimed as a value of the Democratic Party, still had yet to be dealt with as the party created a national agenda. It had been 8 years since the Democrats had held the Presidency, and the Democratic platform would be placed in front of a different America, one that was shifting, socially, politically, geographically, and economically (Frum, 2000; Killen, 2006; Schulman, 2001). Carter's election would reflect that he connected with the people and articulated goals and possibilities that reverberated throughout the manifolds of grievances, struggles, dissatisfactions, pride, and achievements.

The Moralist Technocrat

The Carter campaign team continually pointed to Carter's interactions with the people as his inspiration for his attempt at the Presidency (Carter, 1978a). He asserted that he had spent time listening to the people. What Carter believed he heard from the people was that amid the changing factors of U.S. life they wanted a leader who could bring a common focus to the growing number of perspectives, identities, and problems. Carter had announced his candidacy on December 12, 1974, and spent

the next 2 years on the campaign trail full time. He was an outsider to the power circle of the Democratic Party and virtually unknown to most people in the United States. In order to win the various primary contests, he had to spend a great deal of time with the people of each state.

In those years the team worked to craft his image as a Washington outsider who promised to listen and represent the people's concerns. He also continually mentioned the number of different personas he inhabited. He appealed to a growing sense of the liquefaction of identity, when he pointed out that he was a "farmer, an engineer, a businessman, a planner, a scientist, a governor and a Christian" (Carter, 1978a, p. 3). Claiming to pay attention to this pluralism between and within people, he offered a path toward good government.

Carter believed more than anything people wanted a government in which multiple perspectives could come together rationally to solve problems. In his 1976 autobiography, looking back over the past 10 years, Carter (1976) commented, "Our nation has no understandable national purpose, no clearly defined goals. … We move from one crisis to the next as if they were fads, even though the previous one has not been solved" (p. 173). He maintained that the people wanted a leader who could stabilize the erratic and reactionary path the government had pursued in the past. They wanted a leader who was a moralist and a technocrat, a president who would create an ethical and efficient path to a better future. A president composed of these identities could limit an excess of uncoordinated responses and keep the government honest and competent.

Running on this position, Carter narrowly defeated the unelected incumbent Gerald Ford. On the day of his inauguration Carter attempted to embody two personas: a man of the people and a capable, engineer-minded trustee. On the freezing morning of January 20, 1977, so as to not overrun the public address system, Carter (1977) slowly said,

> We have learned that "more" is not necessarily "better," that even our great Nation has its recognized limits, and that we can neither answer all questions nor solve all problems. We cannot afford to do everything, nor can we afford to lack boldness as we meet the future. So, together, in a spirit of individual sacrifice for the common good, we must simply do our best.

Carter explained that what was needed was boldness in the development of the comprehensive plans for each area of federal government work. However, rather than being expansive, these comprehensive plans would provide boundaries, limit reactions, and bring focus. Focused policies would lead to more manageable service-delivery mechanisms that could be adjusted pragmatically to meet the needs of the time. Carter (1976) claimed this was his rational and moral mandate.

As a symbol of his commitment to the peoples' desires, following his inauguration speech, Carter chose to forgo the limousine motorcade and walk with his family the bright, cold, 1.2 miles to the White House. Carter had kept the idea quiet; none of parade coordinators, military or civilian, had known, not even the Washington, DC, police, only the Secret Service. He was the only president in the history of inaugurations to walk the entire route. When asked about it, Carter replied in a low-key manner, "We enjoyed the walk. It's something I've thought about for a long time. ... This was a good parade" (as cited in Gorney, 1977, p. A16).

The symbolism was not lost on the crowds. A young man with an uncut beard and hippy attire, which in past years had symbolized disdain for the establishment, lit up when he saw the Carter family walking and yelled, “Jimmy! Jimmy!” The President looked over smiling, caught the man’s eye, and waved. Then the young man exclaimed, “Alright!” (Naughton, 1977, p. A1). Another woman in the crowd holding an empty champagne glass implied a reference to the multiple attempts on President Ford’s life and noted, “Isn’t Rosalyn [Carter] brave? She hasn’t even got a hat on” (Gorney, 1977, p. A16). Jasper Lewis, an African American resident of Washington, DC, also noted that the walk reflected a stark contrast between Carter and the previous administrations. He commented, “Man, he got out and walked among the people; like a man. Not like Nixon. He has got no reason to be scared” (Gorney, 1977, p. A16). People were jubilant as in any inauguration; however, part of their joy this time was mustered out of a respect for a dressed-down shunning of extravagance and pomp. Carter had crafted that symbol to signal a break with the past.

Symbols of pragmatic limits would be invoked throughout Carter’s presidency (Leuchtenburg, 1998). It was in direct contrast to the buoyant descriptions of national goals as laid out by the last Democratic president, Lyndon B. Johnson, just 13 years earlier. The Johnson Administration desired to put forth a different symbol of omnipotent leadership.

Omnipotent Leadership

On January 8, 1964, Johnson stepped onto the House of Representatives dais to deliver his State of the Union address and donned his surest man-in-charge expression (Steinberg, 1968, p. 654). When people tuned their televisions to the speech that Wednesday afternoon or in the rebroadcasts that night after work, the black-and-white image was focused on Johnson's left side, which was thought to be both stern and kindly. In order to appear as though he was speaking from the heart, Johnson used a teleprompter, which included stage directions such as "Look left," "Pause," and "Look right" (Steinberg, 1968). Theatrics were crafted to insure that Congress and the American people would be convinced of the omnipotence of his leadership. In this speech Johnson laid out a very large legislative agenda that included a tax cut and a plan for an all out effort to eradicate poverty from U.S. life. In the address, Johnson (1964) urged,

> Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for civil rights than the last hundred sessions combined; as the session which enacted the most far-reaching tax cut of our time; as the session which declared all-out war on human poverty and unemployment in these United States; as the session which finally recognized the health needs of all our older citizens; as the session which reformed our tangled transportation and transit policies; as the session which achieved the most effective, efficient foreign aid program ever; and as the session which helped to build more homes, more schools, more libraries, and more hospitals than any single session of Congress in the history of our Republic.

In 1964, more was definitely better. This rhetoric reflected the sense that it was the wealthiest and most powerful nation's responsibility as a superpower to create an

entire “world of peace and justice, and freedom and abundance, for our time and for all time to come” (Johnson, 1964).

The speech worked. Congress and the press were impressed. Following the speech, Johnson continued to impress Congress. As an enthusiastic senator was congratulating him, Johnson replied, “Yeah, I know. I was interrupted eighty times by applause” (as cited in Steinberg, 1968, p. 654). Somebody later went back to the recording and counted the bursts of applause and found that the President, amid his speech and stage direction, had kept count exactly.

The *New York Times* ran a story the next day that located Johnson’s approach in a progressive lineage including the Fair Deal and New Deal, the Progressives and Populists (Reston, 1964). The reporter, Reston, went so for to quote the ancient speech by Pericles, “Wealth to us is not mere material for vain glory but an opportunity for achievement” (p. 17). Johnson was seen as the latest bearer of a torch that had been lit long ago.

The wide difference in the choice of symbols from the two Democratic presidents suggests the multiple ways in which society was discursively relocating. Johnson’s speech had described a limitless future of leadership and progress, and Carter (1977) had asked that we consider limits and that “we simply do our best.” The Carter Administration, while claiming to hold to the core of Democratic ideals, was grappling, as many were, with how to practice and articulate a new way living in the United States.

Shifting Modes of Life Across the 1970s

During 1964–1977, the nation's sense of economic superiority and security faltered as the postwar boom ended and an energy crisis plagued the nation. People's geographic ties were severed as they moved out of the northeast and into the southern suburbs. Technology was changing at rapid pace. In concert with these shifts were changes in political coalitions and regional perspectives. Each of these changes interacted with and fed off each other.

Changes in Economic Growth

American wealth has no precedent. The growth of this wealth developed largely throughout the 20th century. The real gross domestic product per capita increased from $1,932.55 in 1950 to $5,000.27 in 1970; by 1990 it was at $23,004.95 (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002). Gordon (2004) pointed out that by the turn of the 21st century, while "the United States [was] only 6 percent of the land and the people, it [had] close to 30 percent of the world's gross domestic product, more than three times that of any other country" (p. xiv). Because wealth accumulation during the middle and late 1970s slowed relatively, many people felt as though their expectations of a better life were not going to be met, that this growth was not going to continue.

When Johnson gave his address to Congress in 1964, Americans were still experiencing the largest postwar economic boom in history. Individuals all over the country increased their personal wealth. This increased wealth and favorable tax laws

had enabled the percentage of people who owned a home to jump from the steady 43–46% that had characterized the first half of the 20th century to over 60% by 1960 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).

In addition to changes in personal wealth, the public coffers were flush. During that same period of time, the United States spent money both at home to build up armaments and abroad to rebuild its allies and former enemies in Europe and Asia. The United States also spent a great deal of money subsidizing the development of the middle class through housing, education, and transportation policy. In addition, Social Security legislation was passed that would reduce poverty for the elderly (Schulman, 2001, p. 7). As a result, the proportion of elderly poor dropped from 35.2% in 1959 to 15.7% in 1980 (Katz, 1996, p. 278).

However, by 1970, the dollar began to lose its prestige. Foreign investors started to dump the dollar, which forced the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Throughout the 1970s, in a country whose citizens expected growth, the economy was stagnant. Termed *stagflation*, the nation experienced a combination of high rates of inflation and high unemployment. In 1973, hourly earnings fell for the first time since 1951, and "in a whipsaw action, the middle-class tax burden rose with inflation just as the economy and real-income slowed" (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 105). At the same time the tax system was becoming more regressive. During the mid-1970s, Carter started down the campaign trail, and "for the first time since the Great Depression, talks of limits and diminishing expectations filled presidential addresses and dinner table conversations" (Schulman, 2001, p. 8).

On top of stagflation, there was a recurring fuel crisis. Television news teams filmed lines of cars that looked like kinked steel chains emanating from gas stations. Drivers were seen standing and waiting with their elbows on the car roofs, heads in hands. This depressingly common sight was the result of a turbulent market and American foreign policy. For example, in 1973, several oil-producing nations in the Middle East used an oil embargo to punish the United States for supporting Israel in the October Yom Kippur War. Oil prices in the United States jumped 350% (Killen, 2006) .

American military and industrial might was built on gas-powered mechanization, and ordinary citizens had been able symbolically to own a piece of this power in their General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler V8s. By 1973, the politics of the oil market were now crippling this power abroad and in hometown America. The oil shocks of the 1970s also reached U.S. families at the hearth. As Bailey and Farber (2004) pointed out, “A nation of people who expected indoor winter temperatures approximating a day at the beach in June had to lower their thermostats and put on sweaters” (p. 3).

While it is apparent today that the trouble in the U.S. economy during the 1970s was a time of transition rather than the beginning of continuous downward spiral, at the time these changes caused fear and frustration. With the growth in global competition in manufacturing, stock market investors and manufacturing industry leaders watched as their investments failed to materialize into sustainable profits. Factory workers, family farmers, and other people in the bottom 20% of the income

distribution acutely felt the growing pains of this deindustrialization. Bailey (2004) pointed out that in the transition from a manufacturing to service economy, "the majority of the new jobs created in the service sector paid less than the jobs they replaced, and by 1976, according to one estimate, only 40 percent of the nation's jobs paid enough to support a family" (p. 109). As factories closed, banks foreclosed on farms and unemployment rose.

Changes in Living Patterns

At the same time that the economy started to slow, the place where people chose to live was also changing. The place people called their hometown changed greatly between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s. Mostly, people moved out of the Northeast into the South and West. People were moving out of the manufacturing North in search of new opportunities that were growing up around suburbs in the South and West that stretched from Virginia to Southern California; the area was termed the Sunbelt. For example, between 1950 and 1975, the population of states such as California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida grew by 98%, 197%, 59%, and 202%, respectively. This is compared to an average growth for states outside the Sunbelt of only 32%. Traditional centers of population such as New York and Pennsylvania only grew by 22% and 13%, respectively (Nordheimer, 1976).

People were making these moves for multiple reasons. As Lassiter (2006) wrote,

> The growth policies of New Deal liberalism and the emergence of the Cold War military-industrial complex shaped the special patterns of development in

> the postwar suburbs and transformed the South and the West into the Sunbelt, the booming region stretching from Virginia to California. (p. 10)

These patterns reconfigured patterns of housing segregation along racial and class lines. Policies such as the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 "facilitated automobile-based commuting and corporate relocation to the metropolitan fringe" (Lassiter, 2006, p. 10). This combined with the Federal Housing Administration and the GI Bill that subsidized middle-class home ownership for millions of people who left the city centers and the countryside to live in these Sunbelt suburbs, according to Lassiter.

However, these opportunities were mostly reserved for Whites. For the first several decades of the postwar boom, racial minorities were excluded from suburban neighborhoods. At the same time, many cities used the federal highway and urban renewal spending to "concentrate the poorest racial minorities within inner-city ghettos" (Lassiter, 2006, p. 10). Upper middle-class workers followed the jobs to suburban neighborhoods that clustered around defense industries or regional branch offices of companies like EDS, IBM, Arthur Anderson, and "other service-oriented sectors of corporate capitalism" (Lassiter, 2006, p. 10).

Changes in Technology

As people began to change their expectations for the U.S. economy and moved into new towns, their modes of living were also being reconstructed through changes in technology. As alluded to above, over the course of the 20th century, personal mobility changed through widespread use of the car. At the same time, the "mechanized entertainment of film, radio, and television made modern life more

homogeneous but also more private" (G. Cross & Szostak, 2004, p. 235). Rapid changes in technology over the course of the 1970s accelerated all of these dynamics.

Auto-nation

The postwar boom had created a sellers' market in automobiles. In 1940 there were around 27 million registered passenger cars in the United States; by 1950, that figure doubled. By 1970, "there were more cars than there were households in the United States, and in Los Angeles in that year there were more cars than there were people" (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997, p. 236).

This almost universal ownership prodded the reconfiguration of life along lines of suburbanization. As the demands for affordable housing increased, developers sought to plant new residential neighborhoods that gave primacy to yards and wide streets in areas that used to be pastures, cornfields, or orchards. The developers worked with local municipalities to develop zoning plans that separated industrial and commercial properties from residential neighborhoods. Supermarkets, office complexes, and schools were built bigger and spread out across the landscape. People no longer could walk to places outside the home. Shopping, school, and work were accessible only through a ride in the car (Lassiter, 2006). By 1970, more people lived in suburbs than in any other demographic; this trend continued through the decade (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997). The car ride was a necessary part of social life. It was often done alone.

This way of living worked well for many Americans; however, there were cracks in this automobile configuration of space and living. In the 1970s, just when

most people were becoming completely dependent on the automobile, people began to discover "somewhat to their surprise and often to their horror, that they had three serious problems with their cars: safety, environmental degradation, and as noted above, the climbing price of fuel" (Schwartz-Cowan, 1997, p. 240). By the mid-1970s, due to congressional hearings and reports released in the late 1960s, most Americans were well aware of the dangers to bodily and respiratory health that cars represented. Images of smog and traffic fatalities became common. At the same time, as noted above, drivers in 1973 became familiar with the crippling effect of being dependent on oil in a country of gas-guzzling cars. In the summer of 1977 a film titled "The Car" hit movie theaters. It told the story of sleek, large, black car that was possessed by the devil and terrorized a small, southwestern town. The tag line seemed to reflect the worries that many Americans held about being tied to their automobiles: "There's nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no way to stop... THE CAR." Six years later, in 1983, Stephen King released a novel and a horror movie about a car named Christine.

A Private Mass Media

Often the only sound outside the rev of the V8 engine was music emanating from the increasingly popular eight-track tapes. William Lear, the owner of Lear Jets and also developer of the first commercially viable automobile radio, had developed the eight-track recording format specifically for its portability (Moy, 2004). He quickly contracted with Ford and later General Motors, and the eight-track became a popular option in the 1970s.

The eight-track was part of the mechanization of entertainment in the 20th century. The development of film, radio, television, and recorded music allowed people to experience varied and frequent stimulation. It also allowed for the centralization of cultural consumption through the creation of mass audience. Ironically, most people experienced these shared experiences in the seclusion of their own home or alone in their car (G. Cross & Szostak, 2004).

This mass yet privatized culture was further specialized with the introduction of such portable formats as the eight-track in the 1970s. This allowed consumers to stick to a preferred genre rather than rely on "broadcasting" for their stimulation. In the fall of 1976, if you shook your head when the number one song ("Shake Your Booty" by K.C. and the Sunshine Band) came on your radio, you could pop in your C. W. McCall eight-track and listen to "Convoy." In the same way if you groaned when songs like "Old Dogs, Children, and Watermelon Wine" by Tom T. Hall came on, by 1977 you could take out your Clash cartridge, "London Calling," and rock all the way to work. The introduction of cable television and the VCR at the end of the 1970s did much of the same for the television medium. Increasingly, mass media were consumed along narrower and narrower demographic lines and were consumed alone in the privacy of the car or home.

Changes in Gender Relations

Another significant transformation in U.S. life was around gender roles. This transition was set in motion by the struggles of the 1960s, but it was in the 1970s in

which the liberal wing of the women's movement began to see victories. Throughout the 1970s there was a push in every state to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. As Bailey (2004) pointed out,

> In 1973, *Roe v. Wade* guaranteed women's right to choose abortion, and as of 1972, the unmarried could no longer be denied access to birth control. In 1975, new legislation ended practices that made it impossible for a married woman to obtain a credit card or a loan without her husband's written permission. Title IX of the 1972 Education Act amendments prohibited discrimination by sex in any program receiving federal aid, thus guaranteeing funding for women's athletics in high schools and colleges. Girls' participation in high school athletics increased fivefold by the end of the decade. And during the 1970s, women flooded the work place. ... The percentage of female law students had risen from 4 percent in 1960 to 19 percent in 1974, gains similar to those made in medicine. (p. 108)

Although these changes were significant, it is also important to remember that the increase in the number of women working outside the home was related to the economic situation of the time. By 1970, 30% of women with children under the age of 6 had paid jobs, and by 1976 that number was up to 43%. Part of this increase is explained by changes in the economy, and part is explained by the empowerment of women. Another influence was the doubling of the divorce rate between 1966 and 1976, which resulted in many single mothers entering the work force.

People reacted in different ways to these approaches to gender. Some people responded with anger and violence; others, such as the mainstream media, responded with derision and or by being dismissive. In 1973 ABC Sports put together a "Battle of the Sexes" tennis match between the top-ranked women's player, Billy Jean King, and former Wimbledon champion Bobby Riggs. The misogynistic Riggs teased and taunted King and hoped that the match would settle the argument not just on the

court, but also in places from the boardroom to the bedroom. Riggs described the match as a "battle of the sexes. Man against woman; sex against sex. Husbands argue with wives, bosses with secretaries. Everybody wants to bet" (as quoted in Schulman, 2001, p. 160). Riggs lost in straight sets.

The tennis match was an overhyped example; however, it did signal that gender issues had broadened to the wider society. Although in the wider landscape of U.S. life, the lines in the struggle were not as clearly drawn as on the tennis court. Many women were outraged at the slow pace of change they observed and felt slighted by organizations such as National Organization of Women. Other women, such as Phyllis Schlafly, actively fought against women's liberation and claimed that women could only lose their security by embracing women's liberation. During the 1970s, Schlafly successfully staged a campaign to block the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (Critchlow, 2005). Schlafly claimed to represent people such as a 30-something farm wife who, when asked about her views on women's liberation, responded,

> Women's Liberation? I just laugh when I hear them talk about it. Today's women have all the freedom they please to come and go. Husbands have been brainwashed into letting women do anything. I suppose it's the economic thing—women having to go to work to help make ends meet. But it's not good for the family. I think the trouble with these women who complain about their lives is that they're disorganized. With a washer and a dryer, I don't see how any woman can get behind. (as quoted in Bailey, 2004, p. 114)

Just as there were debates about womanhood, there were also arguments about maleness. John Wayne had been the dominant American mass media icon of manhood in the 1950s. However, as multiple changes across society occurred through

the 1970s, there was a partial embrace of other male figures such as Alan Alda. Alan Alda was an outspoken supporter of the National Organization for Women and the Equal Rights Amendment. He also argued for a new construction of manhood. A writer on the subject in 1975, Robert Bly, noted that men of the mid-1970s recognized that "the images of the right man, the tough man, the true man which he received in High School do not work in life" (as quoted in Schulman, 2001, p. 184). Slowly through the 1970s men began to claim that it was important to share the domestic responsibilities, even if this was not followed through in action (Schulman, 2001).

However, much like feminism, this new masculinity was hotly contested, and men in different places defined these shifts differently. All along the spectrum in the 1970s people tried on different identities and new affiliations. The strict gender roles that characterized much of U.S. history began to fracture.

Changes in Collectives and Coalitions

The complex and uneven changes in the economy, spatial location, technology, and social mores during 1964–1977 were also traced by a shift in the political world. The political coalitions of the mid-20th century had coalesced around two national crises: the Great Depression and World War II. First, the great depression developed a common political point of view and a broad national voting coalition. The sudden market crash that occurred on a street in New York City in 1929 had made very clear the interdependent nature of the nation's economy. As

Miles (1974) noted, “The New Deal made it respectable and eventually indispensable to use all the fiscal and budgetary powers of the federal government … to fight depressions, recessions, and even ‘rolling readjustments’” (p. 1). An array of voters from factory workers in northern cities to rural Southerners appreciated an active, stabilizing federal government.

World War II also established a pattern of expanding allegiance outside of local places. The war increased American mobility as never before. The regionalism that was common before the war was less acute, as the war brought people together against a common enemy. Following the war, the mobilization continued as people moved to opening job markets in the South and West. The common enemy in the war also encouraged a sense of “we are all in this together,” which slowly began to chip away at American segregationist traditions. Legislation such as the GI Bill made it possible for previously marginalized groups to fight for entrance into higher education (Wuthnow, 2006).

By the 1970s, though, this unity began to fracture; the New Deal consensus began to crack. As Edsall and Edsall (1992) noted, the overlapping issues of race and taxes allowed the conservative movement to focus white voter attention onto the costs of Great Society programs. Edsall and Edsall wrote that those costs were first sensed by Whites in terms of loss of privilege: “the loss of control over school selection, union apprenticeship, hiring, promotions and neighborhoods” (p. 11). The outrage about loss of the White privilege in these areas was exacerbated by the rising tax burden that was needed to pay for such services as busing and subsidized public

housing as well as the new "lawyers of civil rights enforcement at every level of government" (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 11). Such a focus on the costs rather than the moral imperatives of these programs cracked the new deal coalition by

> pitting private sector against public sector, by pitting those in the labor force against the jobless, and by pitting those who bear many of the costs of federal intervention against those whose struggle for equality has been advanced by interventionist government policies. (Edsall & Edsall, 1992, p. 3)

The liberal coalition also began to crack in other places. Young liberal radicals became enraged at the moral contradictions made evident by U.S. imperialism abroad and the slow pace of social reform at home. In the 1960s they sought to disrupt authority and order, mostly at colleges and universities in which many of them enrolled to avoid what they believed was an unjust war. They hoped the disruptions would create new public venues and dramatize important issues. At Columbia University, one student radical, Tom Hayden, noted that he felt there was a nihilistic discontent that was welling up, which was going to result in the power to "stop the machine if it cannot be made to serve humane ends" (as quoted in Schulman, 2001, p. 10). However, by 1973 many of the radicals left the public sphere, and their discontent became a private affair mostly. Radicals such as Hayden had turned their energy away from coalition building and moved to communes like the Red Family in Berkley California, which was famous for changing the lyrics of Broadway show tunes to create songs to praise North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (Killen, 2006).

All along the spectrum, people were disengaging from what they felt were messy difficult politics. At the same time, many of the mainstream Whites who dropped out were becoming uncomfortable with what they saw as costs of the activists' policies. The minority groups began to drop out, disappointed and angered by what felt like a bag of false promises. The way people "dropped out" varied. Some dropped out to focus on music, nakedness, nature, and drugs; others dropped out to focus on kids, careers, and lawns (although those were not mutually exclusive). People across the nation were beginning to seek a personal identity that could act as a buffer to the complexities and instabilities of the time. The public life that was required to establish voting coalitions was fractured.

A Review of the Shifting Modes of Life

This research was animated by a desire to make sense of how the possibilities for U.S. education and social policy were transformed during the late 1970s. I am interested in how people in the late 1970s chose one explanation over another and thus enacted one policy possibility over another. I have offered a representation of the multidimensional crackle and flow[1] of the changes occurring during this time to situate Carter's attempt to articulate national goals.

Over the course of a little over a decade, there were changes in what people expected from the economy; they could no longer expect the rising tide that would lift all boats. At the same time, gender roles were being reorganized as women entered

[1] My thanks to Justin Olmanson for this nice little phrase. It helps me think about the swiftness and the resistance that seems to be present in change.

the job market and fought for rights in the political realm; the competition for the construction of manhood and womanhood was explicit during this era. Often, this competition took place through mass media that were becoming more prominent in the lives of people; however, due to technological changes, most people were beginning to experience this media privately and along slimmer demographic lines. The increased use of the automobile and the suburbanization that it facilitated allowed people to experience less diversity and to separate their interests from those in the city center. Political coalitions that had been developed throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s began to dissolve; people in general began to withdraw from the public. These changes in these practices of daily life interacted with and constructed each other. The new intersections that resulted from these reconstructions of daily life made new possibilities visible and others more impossible. An articulation of national goals by Carter would require an enactment of a different set of possibilities than had been articulated in the past, one that acknowledged centrifugal tendencies in U.S. culture at the end of the 1970s.

Listening for a Charge From the People

It was in this time that Carter began to listen for a mandate. It was in this cacophony that Carter began to assert that his centrism fit with what he heard from voters. In his presidential memoir, Carter (1976) remembered,

> Throughout the 1976 campaign, the most persistent question of the news reporters was, “Are you a liberal or a conservative?” When forced to answer, I would say that I was a fiscal conservative but quite liberal on such issues as

> civil rights, environmental quality, and helping people overcome handicaps to lead fruitful lives. My reply did not satisfy them, and sometimes they accused me of being evasive, but it was the most accurate answer I could give in a few words. (p. 74)

Carter, much like others of the time, was dissatisfied with the past categories of public life. Living out the multiple changes described above and listening to other people's descriptions of their lives, Carter began to sense that there was a different mood in the country. As the social critic Michael Harrington pointed out, "It was a weird period for liberals. ... The problem is the conventional wisdom of the past doesn't work anymore" (as quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 20).

Hamilton Jordan (2001), Carter's campaign manager and eventual chief of staff, noted that he stuck with the uphill battle of the 1976 campaign because he believed that Carter represented a way to shake up the political establishment that he felt was "so out of touch with the mood and needs of the American people" (p. 64). Out on the campaign trail with Carter, he, too, sensed a need for a new vocabulary. In this sense Carter did not "invent a centrist mood; he inherited it" (Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 18).

Other Democrats were aware of these changes. In 1976, Gary Hart stated, "The New Deal has run its course. The party is over. The pie cannot continue to expand forever" (as quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 18). Carter and the other Democrats recognized that the past unity could not be taken for granted, and change was required if they were going to stay in power. However, at the time it was not clear what type of approach could meet the needs of this changing America. What

was certain was that to be successful the approach had to resonate with this new national mood. During his acceptance speech at the national convention, Carter (1976) also acknowledged the shifting mood: "There is a new mood in America. We have been shaken by a tragic war abroad and by scandals and broken promises at home. Our people are searching for new voices and new ideas and new leaders" (p. 347).

It is important here to stop and think critically about what the vague term *national mood* means. Mood itself is often given a causal status in policy production literature, even though the concept of a national mood remains ambiguous (Kingdon, 2003). I assert that in this case the mood was a combination of not only the practices and discourses that people socially constructed (such as gender roles or economic expectations), but also their satisfaction with these constructions. In their attempts to put together new ways of living, people struggled to use past social regularities in different ways. They had to rearticulate the most dominant categories in U.S. life. An easy example of this attempt to reconstruct the dominant categories is Carter's frustration with the conservative and liberal categories. He sought to reterritorialize the liberal category and to pursue fiscal conservatism and the core values of an active federal government.

The mood was also a stew of people's visions of the future. While describing their world, people employed normative statements. That is, they included in their discussions about current conditions an implied discussion of what should be. As Carter culled his charge from the people, he not only was listening to a nation of

people explaining change in their lives, he also was hearing stories of what should be and how people felt about the discrepancy.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described the social and historical context in which the Carter administration attempted to rearticulate new national priorities. Carter's choice of symbols was strikingly different from those employed by the Johnson Administration. However, placed amongst the multiple and complex changes that were unfolding over the course of the 1970s, it is clear that Carter's speech was trying to resonate with these changing modes of life. He was trying to speak to people many of who felt betrayed by the economic slump, were living in and driving to and from new suburbs, were negotiating new gender roles and, at the same time were living an increasingly private life. Carter chose as his priorities the development of an honest government that acted rationally. Johnson's 1964 performance of omnipotent leadership was not as palatable by 1976. The fracturing of liberal consensus, the disappointing economic opportunities, and the growing privatization of life made an investment in the public that hinged on a growing amount of national wealth seem senseless.

In addition to looking at why the Great Society priorities seemed unappealing, in this study I also investigated the ways in which new priorities were constructed. Scholars have pointed to a shifting national mood as not only the reason for Carter's victory in 1976, but also the reason for his loss in 1980; his administration was caught in the middle of liberal commitments and growing conservatism (Leuchtenburg,

1998; Mazlish & Diamond, 1979). We have seen in this chapter that across society the way people were living changed in some important ways between 1964 and 1976. The mood, as understood as the meanings and the expectations that the new ways of living engendered, allowed people to recast to their priorities. Important to this study are the ways in which this mood allowed people in the Carter Administration to explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. As Carter and his administration took steps to elevate education to the cabinet level and attempted to create a coherent urban policy, they enacted the shifting dominant social regularities to narrate and constitute their priorities.

A closer investigation of how the mood was socially constructed can help us capture the systems of knowledge that were used in this process. Paying attention to these narrations and the intersections of the social regularities they are built from helps us grasp how people at this time came to draw lines around what is education policy and what is not. In the next chapter, I highlight some of the social regularities, such as race, property, individualism, and social stability, that discursively constructed the mood of the late 1970s. I also show how the intersection of these discourses privileged some policy priorities over others.

CHAPTER 5: DECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL MOOD: COMMON SENSE, EXPECTATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS

Historians point to the 1970s as the decade in which U.S. culture suffered a seismic, discursive break (Frum, 2000; Killen, 2006; Schulman, 2001). As Killen noted, it was a decade in which many people began to realize that the egalitarian dreams of the 1960s would not come to fruition; at the same time, they sensed that the self-satisfied stories of accomplishment in the 1950s were irretrievable. In the 1970s many Americans began to see their daily lives and the stories that narrated them as unhinged from any master narrative, and "amid the wreckage, Americans discovered that instead of the chosen people they had become a nation of survivors" (Killen, 2006, p. 8). In this unhinged world of survivors the mood was at times described as a general malaise.

The pervasive uneasiness was acknowledged in the keynote addresses delivered at both the Republican and the Democratic conventions in 1976. In Kansas City, Missouri, speaking to the Republicans, Baker offered a remedy to this free floating:

> If we are to meet the challenges of the future, if we are to avert the perils and fully realize our promise, we must continue to harken [sic] to the common sense of this nation, to those shared perceptions, those basic ideas, that reflect the popular wisdom and embody the national will. (as quoted in Milton, 1976)

A month earlier, at the Democratic convention, Barbara Jordan underscored the growing desire to search for a meaningful vocabulary. As she spoke to the crowd at

Madison Square Garden, Jordan (1976) assessed, "We are a people in a quandary about the present. We are a people in search of our future."

The people of the time, aware that the past stories and ideologies failed to give meaning to their changing ways of living, began to tell themselves different stories and do different things. Bailey and Farber (2004) described it as a time in which "sexual liberationists and *Gospel Hour* devotees, Mohawk-haired punks and disco dancers, furious displaced steel workers and new women professionals, residents of the Sun Belt and of the Rust Belt, and white ethnics and people of color" all struggled to construct a life (p. 8). Many people in the United States found the dominant categories in life unsatisfactory and strived to construct new ways to make meaning. The meanings and the expectations that these struggles fomented generated a national mood of cultural discomfort.

A purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter Administration. In this investigation I offer an interpretation of how certain explanations and practices around education and antipoverty policy became intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, whereas others became discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). My approach assumed that the context and the meaning in everyday life are coconstructions and open (Lather, 1991). I also assumed that the intersection of multiple scattered practices and discourses constitutes the historical moment's becoming of the possible and the impossible. I believe an investigation into some of these regular social constructions can help us bring into

sharper focus the mood of the country in the 1970s that so many historians link to Carter's presidency (Fink & Graham, 1998; Leuchtenburg, 1998; Schulman, 2001).

Purpose of the Chapter

In this chapter I look at the social construction of the mood that many point to as an important factor in the election of the Carter Administration. In doing so, I explain a few of the many scattered practices and discourses, or social regularities, that allowed the performance of knowledge or common sense of the late 1970s. A review of these practices can help us grasp the ways in which people of the 1970s constructed their world and the power relationships that made these constructions possible. In doing so, I offer a picture of how education and antipoverty policies were part of the social patterns of the time and how the unity and disunity of the policy approaches were the products of knowledge-production procedures. Specifically, I argue that ways in which the social regularities of the time organized social interactions revealed new racializations, naturalized the idea of individual as the economic man, and discounted the public realm as an arena for developing social change and peace.

In the chapter that follows, I explain two bundles or intersections of social regularities that people enacted to constitute their ways of life in the 1970s. I have chosen the word *bundle* because I believe it offers a visual representation of the ways in which the multiple discourses and practices bumped into each other and were often enacted as a single point of logic. I also, at times, use the word *intersection* because it

connotes interpenetrations of ideas that were on different vectors and so directs our attention to the ways in which the connections between ideas are historically contingent. I believe the use of both of these terms helps us grasp not only the manner of distribution of social regularities, but also the degree to which that distribution is not geometrical (Foucault, 1972).

Thus, I first discuss Bundle 1, which consists of an intersection of Whiteness and property. Second, I investigate the intersection of the social regularities of around individualism and domestic stability. For each bundle, I first briefly situate the multiple articulations of these social regularities historically. Then, I provide a fuller description of the dominant rearticulation of these bundles or intersections during the late 1970s. I also provide a few examples of the ways in which these dominant social regularities constituted and made visible the national priorities during the Carter Administration. Finally, given my assumption of the openness and incompleteness of our social interactions, I offer some examples of resistance to these dominant ways of meaning making that were present at the time.

This is not a representation of the gestalt or spirit of an era. The networks and manifolds of social regularities across years and locations are too complex for a single representation. The social regularities pointed to here are only a few of the multiple, dynamic complexes that constitute high modern society. My isolation of these social regularities serves a rhetorical purpose; however, it is not meant to reflect an assumption of unity or mutual exclusiveness from other social regularities. Also, other important, social regularities could have been chosen just as easily. For

example, Fraser's (1989) work has offered important insights into how the bundles around femininity and masculinity and their intersections with welfare and work were important to the development of social policy at the time.

Bundle 1: Race as a Resource

In 1977, in a phone call to Secretary of the Department of HEW Califano, Hy Bookbinder, a civil rights activist and representative of the American Jewish Committee, explained, "We've come to opposite conclusions on *Bakke*. But just as you shouldn't be automatically branded a quota lover or opponent of merit, we shouldn't be branded opponents of civil rights generally" (as cited in Califano, 1981, p. 235). The phone call was meant to ease the tensions between Califano and the Jewish and Catholic communities who were deeply worried about the use of quotas in affirmative action policies, such as the one disputed in the Supreme Court case *Regents of University of California v. Bakke*. From their perspective, the required numbers in the newest affirmative action policies were reminiscent of the spaces that were allocated to Jews and Catholics at the nation's universities in the 1920s and 1930s. The quotas for Jewish and Catholic students acted as ceilings that limited the number of religious minorities and secured White Protestant dominance.

In 1973, a White, male, NASA engineer from California, Alan Bakke, was asserting that he was not admitted to the medical school at University of California at Davis because of the "reverse discrimination" of the new quotas (as cited in Dreyfuss

& Lawrence, 1979). By 1977, Bakke's case had reached the Supreme Court. It would become one of the most important decisions of the era.

Califano had supported the use of affirmative action in the nation's universities. In his memoir, Califano (1981) cited one of President Johnson's last speeches in which he stated "to be black in a white society is not to stand on level and equal ground. ... [Whites] stand on history's mountain and blacks stand in history's hollow" (p. 231). According to Califano, this difference needed to be changed. In a commencement speech at City College in New York in 1977 Califano (1981) had noted, "If American colleges have been able to exert such efforts—special tutoring and financial aid—for star quarter backs, surely they can do for other Americans" (p. 234). Califano went on to emphasize, "If we are serious about achieving minority participation in American education then we must have a measure of progress" (p. 234) However, Califano agreed with Hy Bookbinder and noted that the *Bakke* case highlighted a "real clash of the conflicting interests between constitutional concepts of equality and the need to remedy past discrimination, and tested the deep American traditions of giving everyone a fair chance" (p. 235).

In this phone call we can see a negotiation around the intersection of the social regularities that constituted the categories of race and entitlement in the late 1970s. These negotiations were taking place in multiple places across multiple interactions across the nation. In the 1970s people sought new ways to racialize people and invest in the entitlements that were connected to these racializations (D. Bell, 2004; C. I. Harris, 1993; Porter, 2004; Schulman, 2001). According to Porter, "In the United

States, Americans transformed the way their society was structured along racial line during the 1970s; they embraced, rejected or otherwise negotiated racial identities and mobilized themselves around them in important new ways" (p. 52). Schulman (2001) asserted that in the United States during the 1970s, people were struggling with questions such as "could Americans acknowledge difference and still share the same city, the same university, the same polity?" (p. 67).

In this section I show the ways in which the mood of the late 1970s was partially constructed out of the ways in which people enacted the social regularity bundle of race and property to make meaning and set expectations. In order to do so I first lay out the argument put forward by many critical race scholars that the ideas of Whiteness and property have been bundled through discourses and practices across U.S. society, including the law (D. Bell, 2000; C. I. Harris, 1993). In doing so I briefly trace how this bundle was rearticulated in different ways throughout U.S. history. Then, I provide examples of how this bundle was enacted in specific ways in the 1970s. Finally, I explain how these bundles helped constitute some of the policy priorities in the Carter era.

Whiteness as Property

C. I. Harris (1993) asserted that in U.S. history "rights in property are contingent on intertwined with and conflated with race" (p. 1714). Through this bundling, "through this entangled relationship between race and property, historical forms of domination have evolved to reproduce subordination in the present" (C. I.

Harris, 1993, p. 1714). D. Bell (2000) argued that the racialization of people allowed the White society to remain stable, because

> even those whites who lack wealth and power are sustained in their sense for racial superiority, and thus rendered more willing to accept their lesser share, by an unspoken but no less certain property right in their "whiteness." This right is recognized and upheld by courts and the society like all property rights under a government created and sustained primarily for that purpose. (p. 72)

However, the ways in which this right has been legislated and upheld in court have changed over time.

Convergence of Race and Property

Chinn (2000) noted that the U.S. talent for "transforming bodies into things (information, statistics, evidence, databases) is part of the legacy of slavery" (p. 171). The development of these racialization practices can be found at the beginnings of the Colonial era. According to C. I. Harris (1993), "The racialization of identity and the racial subordination of Blacks and Native Americans provided the ideological basis for slavery and conquest" (p. 1715). Connected directly to the racialization was the concept of property. While Blacks were transformed directly into physical property, Native Americans were divested of their land through an assertion that only White culture offered a clear definition of possession and thus had the purchase on the rights to use. In the development of chattel slavery we see the multiple ways in which this race and property bundle formed the dominant form of social relations. For example, early on in the United States, these social relations were codified in the three-fifths compromise, in family laws of the time that turned Black women's wombs into commodities and facilitated the reproduction of a slave workforce, and in the legal

precedent that allowed slaves to stand in for currency in the repayment of debt (C. I. Harris, 1993).

When non-Whites were subjugated and their bodies turned into commodities of which they themselves had no control, the control over one's body became a valuable asset. Thus, the property rights that developed during slavery facilitated the merger of Whiteness and property. In other words, as C. I. Harris (1993) put it, "It became crucial to be 'white,' to be identified as white, to have the property of being white. Whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings" (p. 1721).

However, the end of slavery did not undo the connection between property and Whiteness; instead, the bundle was recreated through the social interactions of the time. White supremacy was propagated by the states' willingness to attach value to White expectations of superiority. Specifically, at the individual level,

> recognizing oneself as "white" necessarily assumes premises based on white supremacy: It assumes that Black ancestry in any degree, extending to generations far removed, automatically disqualifies claims to white identity, thereby privileging "white" as unadulterated, exclusive, and rare. Inherent in the concept of "being white" was the right to own or hold whiteness to the exclusion and subordination of Blacks. (C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 1737)

For example, the state worked to classify people. Race discourses combined with accounting practices played an important role in the constitution of racial categories and identities. Chinn (2000) noted the U.S. Census has been more than just a counting tool; it is also meant to generate meaning. Chinn wrote, "It is the job of a census to reduce the population into correlations of numbers and figures that then

take on independent meaning, whether or not they are accurate" (p. 3). In 1890, the census included "Negro" and "Mulatto" as racial categories. By 1920, with the advent of Jim Crow laws, the "Mulatto" category was dropped. Changes in the styles of the U.S. Census were not a product of convenience. They were done to make a point, according to Chinn, "about order, difference, inequality of faculties, and the need of the subordination of the dominated" (p. 5). The categories and their relationship to property value of Whiteness determined whether "one could vote, travel freely, attend schools, obtain work, and indeed, defined the structure of social relations along the entire spectrum of interaction between individual and society" (C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 1745).

Most famously, the value of Whiteness as a property was upheld in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993). The plaintiff's argument hinged on the fact that the railroad employee, through his barring of Plessy from the White car, had without due process deprived Plessy of his reputation of being regarded as White. Plessy, who phenotypically appeared to be White, then would be denied future public access to public and private privileges. However, the court defended the railroad employees' right to judge Plessy as Black. In the decision the court argued that if Plessy had been White, the railroad would be responsible for damages. However, the justices posited, "If he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man" (*Plessy. v. Ferguson,* as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993, p. 1749). Although the decision

recognized the value of being White, it did not assume that the conditions of the separation were unnatural and thus naturalized Whiteness as a property.

Of course, *Brown v. Board of Education* (as cited in C. I. Harris, 1993) undid the separate but equal laws that were established by *Plessy*. However, the bundling of Whiteness and property was not eliminated; instead, it was rejoined through the available cultural resources of 1954. Although the decision dismantled the past property rights found in legal segregation, it did not offer any reparations for the gross inequality that this system had perpetrated. Thus, it naturalized as a starting point the inequality of 1954. C. I. Harris (1993) stated it this way:

> In accepting substantial inequality as a neutral baseline, a new form of whiteness as property was condoned. Material inequities between Black and Whites—the product of systematic past and current, formal and informal, mechanisms of racial subordination—became the norm. Brown disregarded immediate associational preferences of whites, but sheltered and protected their expectations of continued race-based privilege. (p. 1753)

The expectation that White privilege would be protected extended into the 1960s. Non-Whites continued to be segregated and provided with substandard public services. The civil rights movement attempted to remedy differences through advocacy of integration.

The 1960s: Investment in Whiteness and a Promise of Redistribution

In 1960 it did not appear that the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision would change the expectation that Whiteness could be counted on to signal preferential treatment. As G. Orfield (1988) noted, “Only a fraction of 1 percent of black students in the South went to white schools, and no white students in the South had ever

enrolled in Black Schools" (p. 315). However, the impressive numbers in the Black protest movements in the South dramatized the disparities between groups. The civil rights movement became a driving force in arousing and focusing public concern and thus generating a coalition for major change in national policy; "it galvanized white liberalism" (G. Orfield, 1988, p. 316). Developing these coalitions, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations transformed the executive branch attitude from one of disinterest to one of national leadership in civil rights issues. Besides the legislative victories of 1964 and 1965, there was also a move in the executive branch to enforce the laws. For example, "the Justice Department was authorized to sue on behalf of minority plaintiffs in civil rights matters" (G. Orfield, 1988, p. 316). In addition, the federal government began to withhold funds to the institutions that practiced discrimination.

The coalition that helped highlight these priorities consisted of urban and southern Blacks, minorities, northeastern intelligentsia, and a large swath of middle-class Whites. Lyndon B. Johnson expanded the effort to eliminate privilege distributed on the basis of race when he proposed a larger effort to eliminate poverty. This leadership impressed Roy Wilkins, the leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons (NAACP). Johnson had called him in the summer of 1965 and explained that he was ready to deal with the race problems. Wilkins described the phone call:

> That June President Johnson called me before his Howard commencement speech to tell me that he was ready for all all-fronts assault on the problems of race. I was astonished by he fervor and by his daring. ... No President before

> had ever been so enlightened or bold in facing up to these truths. (as cited in G. Orfield, 1988, p. 326)

However, this jubilation faded quickly. The group politics that had brought the coalition along started to break up when faced with the urban politics and the riots that irrupted later that summer.

The Move From Group Politics to Identity Politics

The group politics of the 1950s and 1960s would give way to identity politics in the 1970s. The riots of the late 1960s prompted a national committee to study civil disorders. The committee's findings, known as the Kerner report (Carroll, 1990), pointed to the structural differences between White and non-White groups in America. According to Carroll, the report stated that the country was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and un equal" (p. 40). However, that statement lacked the effect that many similar statements, such as those found in the *Brown v. Board* decision or Harrington's *The Other America*, had enjoyed just a few years prior (Carroll, 1990). In the 1968 election Nixon, in an effort to attract conservative southern votes to the Republican Party, scorned the report's "refusal to condemn the perpetuators of urban riots" (Carroll, 1990, p. 40). Nixon claimed that the report tended to divide people. Instead, he claimed what the nation needed was "more talk about reconciliation, more about how we're going to work together, rather than the fact that we have this terrible division between us" (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 40). Known as the *southern strategy*, the approach proved effective at the polls and the Republican candidate carried many southern states.

Nixon's strategy carefully reframed racial issues in U.S. society by claming a desire for color blindness. The ideals of color blindness voiced by "minority activists were "rearticulated" during the 1970s in ways that served the group interests of Whites (Porter, 2004, p. 67). The call for color blindness was not one that would eliminate difference between White and non-White groups. Instead, in this iteration, it was intended to hide or ignore the major differences between the groups and protect the property value of Whiteness. Despite the claim of a desire for reconciliation, the approach increased alienation of Blacks. Many saw through this approach as a protection of White power and did not vote for Nixon. Thus, as Carroll (1990) pointed out, "The new President felt no obligation to reward a black constituency. He appointed no blacks to the cabinet, picking his campaign manager, John Mitchell, architect of the 'southern strategy,' to head the radically sensitive Department of Justice" (p. 40).

The nation also shifted in priorities. Nixon had run as a law and order candidate. Instead of working to eliminate poverty and racism, the southern strategy focused on the need for civil peace. Nixon declared, "Until we have order, there can be no progress" (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 42). This argument was used to slow change and deconstruct the civil rights groups that were working to organize group action. In desegregation cases Nixon worked to slow required integration. Nixon claimed, "There are those who want instant integration and those who want segregation forever, I believe that we need to have a middle course" (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 42).

At the same time activist groups became the target of the Justice Department. In planning a racial policy, "the White House assumed that the ultimate weapon for achieving racial peace was military force" (Carroll, 1990, p. 49). The Black Panthers, philosophy professors, and other dissidents became the target of John Mitchell's surveillance and illegal spying activities. Mitchell summed up his position in his discussion of the purpose of the Justice Department: "I think this is an institution for law enforcement, not social improvement" (as cited in Carroll, 1990, p. 49).

Nixon's strategy worked to reframe group activities as threats to civil rights. It allowed people to assume that a focus on the differences between groups would lead to violence in the streets. This resulted in a resignation by many past civil rights activists. Carroll (1990) pointed out, "As blacks learned to expect less from government and as examples of police repression appeared more frequently, blacks retreated from the barricades of urban revolt" (p. 54). The alienation led often to a conclusion that in White society there would be little hope for full participation. Instead, people started to conclude that was an approach that focused on the development of Black power. A middle-aged Black man captured this growing desire for a more multicultural approach when he dissented:

> I get tired of that one-nation-under-God boogie-joogie, we are ourselves. We are our own nation or country or whatever you want to call it. We are not one-tenth of some white something! That man has got his country and we *are* our country. (as quoted in Carroll, 1990, p. 55)

Cultural Movement as an Investment in Non-Whiteness

Disappointed by the lack of substantial change that the civil rights movement had achieved, many started to question the value of working through the legal system or the legislative system. Faced with their inability to upend the system that had invested in Whiteness, many came to the conclusion that if they could not divest White privilege, they should invest in Blackness or Chicano culture. Schulman (2001) noted, "By the mid-1970s, cultural nationalism had become the dominant force in minority activism" (p. 67).

The cultural movement rejected a complete integration approach and instead claimed the United States was actually composed of multiple cultures that were woven together rather than a melting pot that generated a single White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) culture. The Chicano movement was one of the first to assert this approach. In the late 1960s, frustrated with the lack of improvement in race relations, Corky Gonzales developed a plan to affect change in the Southwest (Schulman, 2001).

In 1966, Gonzales began working in Denver and formed the Crusade for Justice. The purpose of the organization was to develop a grassroots movement that would lead fights to reform of the "police and courts, better housing, more economic opportunity, and significantly, 'relevant education' for Chicanos" (Schulman, 2001, p. 65). Part of the organizing elements was the use of a nationalistic rhetoric in the rallies. Later, when Chicano/a activists and artists "began to invoke Aztlán, a concept first publicly defined in 1969, they further rejected the idea that their identities were

rooted in the political and cultural systems of the United States" (Porter, 2004, p. 55). Aztlán was a symbolic nation that encompassed southwestern areas the United States had seized when invading Mexico in 1848. The idea had become so powerful that at one point "Gonzales considered appealing to the United Nations for a plebiscite in the Southwest to determine whether the people—la raza—might desire independence from the United States" (Schulman, 2001, p. 65).

The move to from integrationist ideas to a focus on Black power and eventually Black culture also developed in the 1970s. The movement was evident not only in the grassroots organizations, but also in popular culture. Schulman (2001) wrote that the success of "Sly and the Family Stone marked the apex of integrationism in American popular culture" (p. 59). The Family, which included Blacks, Whites, women, and men, "produced a startling fusion of white San Francisco rock, soul, British pop, jazz, and dance tunes—a music they called 'a whole new thing'" (Schulman, 2001, p. 59). The messages of songs like "Everyday People" declared that it did not make difference what group people were in because "we got to live together" (as cited in Schulman, 2001, p. 59). However, by the 1970s, Sly and the Family Stone had started to abandon the integrational aspect of their music. In 1971 they released an album titled "There's a Riot Goin' On." The lyrics in these songs focused "on betrayal, failure, oppression, on being trapped" (Schulman, 2001, p. 61). The album was not well received by its White listeners. White listeners did not want to hear about the Black suspicion of the unified American culture. Many U.S. Blacks began to ask, "Who is being integrated into what?" (Schulman, 2001, p. 60).

Instead of looking for integration into White culture, many Blacks sought to develop their own culture. Much like the Chicano movement, they sought to become focused on the power that lay "inherent in maintain and expressing a distinctive culture through clothing, music, hairstyle, literature, cuisine, and the arts" (Schulman, 2001, p. 63). If the property value of Whiteness could not be undone by legal means, there must be investment in the property value of Blackness, Latin-ness, and other ethnic identities.

The state once again affirmed this protection of the property right of Whiteness by encouraging this multicultural flavor. Porter (2004) pointed out, "Multi-cultural education programs were often undertaken with governmental funding proves that the 1970s marked a shift in the implementation of race as a resource because of the particular ways political, cultural, and personal affirmations of identity were facilitated by or supported by the state" (p. 56). It was in this environment that Carter took office and claimed that the priorities of the government would be focused, ethical, and rational service delivery.

The Partial Construction of the Mood

The uneasy mood of the era, then, was partially constructed by a recognition and protection of the property entitlement that was invested in Whiteness. Citing the civil rights victories that established equal treatment under the law, many people began to claim that redistribution was not necessary. Some claimed that Whites should be allowed to expect that their position could be exploited for personal gain. Many who desired a more equal society felt betrayed by this co-opting of the civil

rights agenda to defend White privilege. They also began to feel that White privilege was so immovable that their options for leveraging change were limited to investing in their own culture and identities. Thus, there was a mixed feeling: While the struggle for equality was important, there was also an expectation that it could not be pursued through explicit redistribution. The common sense of the time dictated that only approaches that maintained White expectation of privilege would succeed. The national mood was partially constructed out of the dismay of the realization that the equal protection under the law did not translate into an equitable society, ambivalence towards the necessity or possibility of redistribution, and surety that the only recourse was investment in identity.

How Was This Bundle Enacted Through Carter's Actions?

To what degree can we see the protection of property right in Whiteness and the investment other identities in Carter's administration? In his acceptance speech, Carter (1976) called for investment in the value of multiple cultural identities:

> We can have an America that encourages and takes pride in our ethnic diversity, our religious diversity, our cultural diversity—knowing that out of this pluralistic heritage has come the strength and the vitality and the creativity that has made us great and will keep us great. (p. 352)

Carter won 94% of the Black vote in 1976. However, it has been noted that Carter did not make civil rights issues a defining element of his presidency. Carter has been represented as centrist who struggled against the liberal constituents of his party. However, I agree with Graham (1998) that Carter's course reflected the uneasiness of the time in that it created a zigzag pattern. The attention to issues of

inequality was pressing; however, the common sense of the era required a move against redistribution. Carter desired to balance the budget, to push for progress in the fight against racial inequality, and to uphold ideas of color blindness. Each of these discourses mobilized different constituencies with different assessments of the property and Whiteness bundle.

In an interview after his presidency, Carter explained his approaches to deal with racial inequality in the United States:

> I looked on them as kind of a continuum of what had been initiated und Lyndon Johnson and talked about under President Kennedy. ... And so I didn't look upon these achievements as notable in nature. I just felt as if they were my duty. (as cited in Graham, 1998, p. 204)

Specifically, Carter felt it was his duty to remain committed to affirmative action activities and policing discrimination in organizations that received federal monies. In his administration Carter appointed many more "minorities and women to top administrative posts and federal judgeships in numbers fare exceeding the tokenism of his predecessors" (Graham, 1998, p. 216). The administration supported the use of affirmative action programs in higher education.

Another form of affirmative action that the Carter Administration supported was the creation of Minority Business Enterprises. In the last month of the Ford presidency, the House Committee on Small Business asserted, "Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt social and economic discrimination presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past inequities" (as cited in Graham, 1998, p. 207). The Carter

Administration, despite considerable backlash from White voters, pushed for 10% of grant funds to be set aside for minority businesses.

However, in another important racial issue of the time, school busing, Carter was on record as a critic. He felt that although school busing was an important symbolic move, ultimately it was a bad policy move. In a position paper released in 1976 by the Democratic Committee Headquarters, Carter (1978a) explained his understanding of busing:

> At first it is very important to the black citizens to have the busing order, and this is a phase that you have to go through, and I think maybe it's a mandatory phase. I don't argue with it. But eventually the poor parents, mostly blacks, say "We don't want our kids bused any more to a distant school," because these are the very parents who don't have a second car, and if their children get sick in the middle of the day or if they want to go to athletic events they can't go. (p. 611)

Based on this assessment Carter and local Black leaders then reconstructed a less radical busing plan. In their plan they developed four principles: (a) Any kid who wanted to be bused could be at the public's expense; (b) if the student was being bused, it had to contribute to integration; (c) any busing operation had to include the input of Black leaders; and (d) "this is important in my opinion, no child is bused against the wishes of the child" (Carter, 1978a, p. 611).

Carter's decision here seems to capitulate to the argument that White expectation of privilege could not be disturbed. As shown in the next chapter, Carter's approach to education called for the improvement of all schools, a move away from integration ideals and categorical aid and toward the general aid toward a plurality of schools. This is reflected also in his strong push for the full

implementation of the Bilingual Act. The administration attempted to strike a balance by funding an investment in different identities through affirmative action and education programs. However, the Carter Administration tended to shy away from more redistributive approaches that would divest Whiteness

The uneasy mood of the era was partially constructed out of the social regularities that bundled property rights to racial identity. Carter's attempt to resonate with this bundle of practices and discourses that constructed the common sense of the day led to path that zigzagged through the various interests of the day. However, these constituencies and their interested were constituted through more than just this Whiteness and property bundle.

Bundle 2: Individualism and Domestic Stability

On December 4, 1974, just prior to his formal announcement of his intention to run for the candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President, Jimmy Carter wrote a letter to his friends explaining his decision and asking for their support. In the letter, he argued that in his travels across the United States and during his time as governor he had heard that people were disappointed in the lack of stability that the past leadership was providing. Carter (1978a) wrote,

> They feel alienated from the decision making process. They are troubled by the dishonesty of public officials. They deplore the absence of effective business management in government. They are bewildered by shortages and runaway inflation. With good reason, they have lost faith in federal programs that waste their taxes while the needs of the people go unmet. (p. 1)

Carter (1978a) went on to say that the people were "looking for a new face, a new leader whose ideas work" to bring stability back to the country (p. 2).

Whereas the listing of grievances to predicate a call for change might be a common rhetorical strategy in politics, in Carter's historical moment the argument gained traction. At the time in the United States, the growing list of problems instigated a strong sense of instability. As described above, the expectations of people were continually challenged in areas of life from jobs, to gender roles, to living patterns and political alignments. The confusion led many to describe the country as heading into a downward spiral. There was a strong desire for a stabilizing force.

Wuthnow (2006) suggested that social change is most apparent "when it influences our ideas about the rights and responsibilities of individuals" (p. 40). Inversely, a stable construction of the individual in a given time helps define group stability. Thus, the emergent rules of a time that generate the concept of the individual intersect with practices we engage to maintain domestic stability. By stability, I mean the practices and discourses that define the threshold upon which collective action is thought possible for the majority, without the use of a constant threat of violence. For example, people assert the United States has avoided class warfare through the discourses and practices that allowed people to claim that the nation operated as a meritocracy in the economic realm. In the political realm, the democratic ideals and rule of law were thought to reduce the possibility that one group would rule solely by force.

In different times in the United States, the common sense around the possibilities for nonviolent collective action (economic or political) was bundled with the common-sense definitions of the individual. However, these social regularities, domestic stability or the individual, cannot be reduced to fundamental elements. They are always being reconstructed and brought into relationship in different ways. At different times in U.S. society, the relationship between the individual to the group has been defined differently.

Therefore, if we are going to understand the mood of the 1970s, I assert that we must investigate the ways that, through the power relationships of the time, people constructed and enacted the social regularities around the individual and domestic stability. An investigation of this bundle of social regularities gives us some insight into the ways in which the renegotiation of past categories was part of the uneasiness that characterized the late 1970s. This helps us capture the ways in which the common-sense knowledge of the time made some policy approaches more visible, more reliable, or more logical than others.

In this section I show the ways in which the mood of the late 1970s was partially constructed out of the ways in which people enacted the social regularity bundle of individualism and domestic stability. First, I briefly trace how this bundle was rearticulated in different ways in different moments in U.S. history. Then, I provide examples of how the social regularities that constructed individualism and requirements for domestic stability were enacted in specific ways in the 1970s.

Finally, I explain how these bundles helped constitute some of the policy priorities in the Carter era.

Historical Bundles of the Individual and Domestic Stability

The construction of individuality and the construction of the definition of domestic stability have always been part of U.S. governance conversations. The tension between federalist concerns and democratic ideals was part of the attempt to agree on the configuration of this bundle. In the late 18th century, the ability of the people to govern themselves was tied to the ways in which the person was socially constructed. The wrong construction of the individual, it was feared, would lead to anarchy and bloodletting or the consolidation of oligarchic rule through force. Individuals had to be constructed as worthy of the capacity of ruling. However, the needs of the individual also had to be connected to the desire for domestic stability. As we will see, at different times in U.S. history people have used multiple discourses and practices to establish what stability is and at the same time to define the individual.

The 1840s: Political Stability and the Individual

Many of the elites across the world considered the option of "handing over self-government to the masses of diverse, largely uneducated farmers and laborers" extremely dangerous (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 29). Achieving stability would require that people construct their individuality as tied to the peace of the local community. In many places in the United States by the mid-1800s, this had been achieved through

practices and discourses that were advocated for by scattered organizations, such as Bible societies, revival meetings, and temperance unions. The dominant Protestant society worked to consolidate its power by forging the fundamental political assumptions around individual conscience and local democracy (Wuthnow, 2006).

In this time period of revival camps, traveling preachers such as Charles Finney began to mobilize people in the North and growing Midwest (Wuthnow, 2006). Their knack for mobilization of many different communities around similar issues of temperance, parental responsibility, and slavery hinged on the idea "that every person was governed individually by an inner sense of morality" (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 30). Preachers combined the value of the inner self with a sense of responsibility to the group through an appeal for people to get involved as citizens. According to Wuthnow, this definition assumed "invariably that persons of modest means and no schooling could function responsibly as citizens, just as persons of higher rank could" (p. 30). The practice of this individual morality was a practice in common-sense morality; the individual should take part of his or her opportunities in a democratic society in order to establish that the common person was capable of self-rule.

In this way, Wuthnow (2006) stated, "it redefined the moral capabilities of individuals in a way that rendered democracy possible on an enlarged scale" (p. 30). By linking democratic practices to the construction of the individual with a mortal soul whose guide was the Holy Spirit to the people of the time had made the practice of local democracy an act of faith and testimony. The stability of society was tied to

the practice of Protestant schemas. According to Wuthnow, "This cultural mechanism was both public and private, challenging whole communities to think about such issues as drinking and slavery, but doing so in a way that encouraged self-transformative experiences on the part of individuals" (p. 31).

These configurations worked to ensure the stability of democracy of future generations; however, it is important to remember that this type of democracy was naturally local. Also, by foregrounding the common sense of the dominant local group, this idea of democracy imposed limits on valid participation, "especially through its implicit assumptions about religion, race, gender, and cultural homogeneity" (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 31). When the U.S. population became more mobile and more integrated, the bundle needed to be reconfigured.

Keynesian Stability and the Organization Man, 1940s–1960s

World War II mobilized the U.S. population "on a larger scale and with greater unity of purpose than did anything else in the history of the United States" (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 33). The recognition of an interdependent society learned through the painful lesson of the Great Depression and the regional integration of the WWII mobilization engendered a social ethic that placed importance on the individual's ability to work with the whole. These events asked Americans to redevelop their understandings of the individual and what was necessary for domestic and international stability.

The high stakes of the Great Depression and the war had encouraged a construction of the individual that prioritized conformity. In this context, "conformity

meant that work was done and social order was maintained. The trains ran on time and factories filled their orders" (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 43). Conformity also meant that people desired to be joiners. According to Putnam (2000),

> [The] two decades following 1945 witnessed one of the most vital periods of community involvement in American history. ... The breadth of this civic explosion encompassed virtually every organization on the list, from old fashioned ones like the Grange and the Elks (roughly a century old in the 1960s) to the newer service clubs like the Lions and the League of Women Voters (roughly four decades old in the 1960s). (p. 55)

This generation of people also joined labor unions and professional associations at a record rate. Community projects were more frequently attended. In general, in these years people took a more active role in the social and political life of their communities by joining in together at "churches and union halls, in bowling alleys and clubrooms, around committee tables and card tables and dinner tables" (Putnam, 2000, p. 184).

In these environments the individual's responsibility was to go along with the crowd. Common sense at the time held that group action led to more productivity in industry and more consensus in politics. The service to the organization gave individual life purpose.

The formation of the individual in this configuration was tied to a drive for domestic and international stability. The drive for stability was characterized by a desire to prevent a return to the depression that had threatened the capitalist order. At the same time, many wanted to prevent the reemergence of nationalist rivalries that had plagued Europe for the first half of the 20th century.

On the international level, “free trade of goods was encouraged under a system of fixed exchange rates anchored by the U.S. dollar’s convertibility into gold at a fixed price” (Harvey, 2007, p. 10). This approach provided a stabilization element in the international economy as the dollar functioned as the reserve currency. However, it prevented capital accumulation, because the U.S. dollar under this system had to flow freely to other parts of the world that were secured through U.S. military might. The individualist pursuit of accumulation of capital that was valued in previous forms of U.S. capitalism had to be subsumed to the needs of the nation as the government and military worked to maintain overall hegemony worldwide. The individual as a joiner and conformer helped to ensure that the nation’s interest was put in front of that of the individuals.

On a domestic level, stabilization was maintained through supports that would dampen the business cycles. This approach was represented by a group of practices based on Keynesian economic theory. Under the Keynesian approach, the state’s job was to focus on “full employment, economic growth and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends” (Harvey, 2007, p. 10). Harvey noted that the development of union participation meant “to ensure domestic peace and tranquility, some sort of class compromise between capital and labor had to be constructed” (p. 10). Countries such as the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan practiced these systems. The common sense of the time dictated that as the percentage of the population employed

went up, the rate of inflation would go down. This system created a stability that allowed for the continued growth of the leading economies and a growth of the middle class. The social ethic that constructed the individual with the ultimate need to belong allowed for the development of unions and other groups that worked to create a balance and maintain social stability.

At the time, though, there were critiques of this configuration (Mills, 1958; Whyte, 1956). People began to feel alienated when, in their quest for belonging, they were continually becoming members of larger more impersonal organizations. Critics claimed that this led to a fatalistic view of life. In addition, people were complaining that in the name of stability the redefined individuality cut away creativity. The focus on the joining of groups disrupted older ideas of meritocracy that legitimated the distribution of resources. The new distribution of resources was based on one's ability to make good in the company. Wuthnow (2006) pointed out, "Even good citizenship was suspect because it was more likely to be motivated by social climbing than a genuine desire to serve" (p. 46)

The 1970s: Loss of Stability and the Neo-Liberal Reconstruction

During the 1970s the sense of stability that had been experienced through the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s soon gave way to confusion in the domestic and international realms. As a result, the social regularities that constituted the individual were again transmuted to engender a new formation of stability. The use of neo-liberal logics and the development of the economic individual became the newest ballast for the American system.

Growing instability. Starting in the 1960s U.S. society reinvented again its definition of an individual. The individual was again highlighted as the source of creativity and innovation. A concept of the inner self was identified as a place to find value, no matter how the group judged one's outside (Wuthnow, 2006, p. 46). This individualism renewed an interest in the civil rights of each U.S. resident; it also encouraged a challenging of authority and unique artistic expression. This urge was cultivated at universities and through youth culture. Students wanted to take advantage of the opportunities of a free society and expand this opportunity to others. In the late 1960s those seeking individual freedoms and social justice could attack a common enemy. Harvey (2007) wrote,

> Powerful corporations in alliance with an interventionist state were seen to be running the world in individually oppressive and socially unjust ways. The Vietnam War was the most obvious catalyst for discontent, but the destructive activities of corporations and the state in relation to the environment, the push towards mindless consumerism, the failure to address social issues and respond adequately to diversity, as well as intense restrictions on individual possibilities and personal behaviors by state-mandated and "traditional" controls were also widely resented. (p. 42)

The pursuit of individual freedom and social justice threatened the power structure and the configurations of domestic and international stability. Domestically, urban riots irrupted throughout the United States. Internationally, these calls for reform created suspicions of communist infiltration of American youth culture from the Soviet Union.

These domestic instabilities were also quickly followed by major recessions that began in 1973. During this time, the Keynesian approach that promised to

moderate wide swings in the business cycle through the power of the state failed to achieve the goal of economic stability. As investors set their sights on overseas manufacturing and capital continued to leave the country, the development of the welfare state suffered. Harvey (2007) observed, "Unemployment and inflation were both surging everywhere, ushering in a global phase of 'stagflation' that lasted throughout much of the 1970s. Fiscal crises of various states resulted as tax revenues plunged and social expenditures soared" (p. 12).

Coinciding with the turmoil in the domestic realm, the international money system that had been built on the American dollar—whose value was protected by the military—might began to crumble. Oil shocks and the growing distribution of capital through international trade put stress on the system of fixed exchange rates. By 1971 U.S. dollars had flooded the world and escaped U.S. controls by being deposited in European banks; the fixed exchange rates were abandoned (Harvey, 2007). Harvey noted that the previous system that had delivered high rates of growth since 1945 was "clearly exhausted and was no longer working. Some alternative was called for if the crisis was to be overcome" (p. 12).

The individual's search for stability. As described in chapter 4, faced with growing instability and the slow pace of change, many of those who in the 1950s and 1960s had sought both personal freedom and social justice became weary of the turmoil that resulted from engaging the public and instead decided to focus on personal fulfillment. As many of the youth movement of the 1960s moved into companies and the government, they began to sense that the common-enemy,

defense-industrial complex was no longer as monolithic. By the definition of the time, the pursuit of "social justice presupposes social solidarities and willingness to submerge individual wants, needs, and desires in the cause of some general struggle for, say, social equality or environmental justice" (Harvey, 2007, p. 41). This discrepancy created tension between organized labor or the political parties espousing social solidarities and the student movement for exploration of the self, identity, and sexuality.

By the 1970s many began to withdraw from the solidarity movements; however, the pursuit of individual fulfillment spread. There was a growing interest in religion, especially religions that could ground people through an individual's personal relationship with a larger transcendent force. There was experimentation in all areas of religious life, from "New Right Christians to New Age seekers, students of the Book of Revelation and the Torah, the Bhagavad-Gita and the I Ching" (Schulman, 2001, p. 92).

This search for a new inner self was partly based on a fear of an international instability that would lead to nuclear war. According to Schulman (2001), "The single best-selling nonfiction book of the 1970s was not *The Joy of Sex* or even *The Joy of Cooking*, but Hal Lindsey's apocalyptic pronouncement, *The Late Great Planet Earth*" (p. 93). Lindsey's book recast the book of revelations in terms of the global politics on the nuclear age.

People also sought other ways to transcend the dominant construction of the individual that had been enacted following World War II. The new age or personal

awareness movement represented the development of multiple strategies to find stability by looking inward. A single example of this new age movement was known as the Erhard Seminars Training (EST). The training session was meant to eliminate the social construction of the individual and reconstruct one's personhood along lines of personal enlightenment. In other words, EST would force you to "throw away your belief system, tear yourself down, and put yourself back together again" (Schulman, 2001, p. 97).

The entrepreneurial aspect of both the new age movement and the evangelical revivals, while off-putting to some, were integrated into gospels they preached. The message worked especially for a majority of Americans who began to flood the ever-growing churches, such as the one led by Jerry Falwell. These churches filled their halls "with middle-class professionals and educated suburbanites, attracted to the recipe for wholesome living, biblical devotion, and worldly success" (Schulman, 2001, p. 96).

However, this search for inner peace did not translate into economic security for all. The growing inflation and unemployment and the inability of past Keynesian strategies to deal with these problems spurred an outcry for new approaches to the development of stability. The proper solution at the time was not clear. Harvey (2007) mentioned, "I think it is fair to say, no one really knew or understood with any certainty what kind of answers would work and how" (p. 13). The obscure approach of neo-liberalism would become the answer.

The neo-liberal reconfiguration. Just prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court by Nixon, Lewis Powell (1971) sent a memo entitled "Attack on the American Free Enterprise System" to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Powell argued that the stability of the capitalist system was under siege and, therefore, "the time has come—indeed, it is long overdue—for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American business to be marshaled against those who would destroy it" (The Apathy and Default of Business section). Such a mobilization of resources could work through universities, schools, the media, publishing, and the courts in order to change how individuals thought about the corporation, the law, culture, and the individual.

The answer to this challenge of the American enterprise system was a philosophy that worked to legitimate capital accumulation as a national priority. Neo-liberalism, a theory of political economy, filled this role. Harvey (2007) described the theory: "Human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (p. 2). The role of the group was to create and preserve an institutional framework that could accumulate capital at the top so investors could fund entrepreneurial enterprises. The individual's role was to pursue self-interest and in doing so be the engine of the market. The market would become the sole means of distribution because, it was postulated, "the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state

interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit" (Harvey, 2007, p. 2).

Neo-liberalism had been slowly developed by Austrian philosopher Friedrich von Hayek and a group called the Mont Pelerin Society (n.d.). The group first met in 1947 at the Spa at Mont Pelerin and developed a purpose statement. In this statement they argued that the use of political coalitions to encourage redistribution had hurt "Western Society." The Mont Pelerin Society wrote that in communist countries human dignity and freedom were obliterated and in other countries such as the United States and the UK these ideals were under "constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy" (¶ 2). According to the group, the biggest threat to these ideals was from minority groups who had wrested power through political means. The Mont Pelerin Society wrote,

> Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own. (¶ 2)

Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, economists such as Milton Friedman and government officials such as William Simon also expressed this form of individualism and its push towards stability through capital accumulation through their academic and policy work.

According to neo-liberal theories, individuals should take advantage of their opportunities in order to pursue their own goals in the marketplace. According to this theory, the invisible hand of the market provides the fairest distribution of rewards for

individuals. The only responsibility that the individual has to the group is to get involved in the market. The state's responsibility is the securing of the competitive market. Policies that focus on the well-being of people are reframed in terms of human capital development. For example, in education policy the goal is no longer to be a capable citizen but part of a well-educated population of workers. This leads to a more competitive labor market and thus a sorting up of the best of the best. This reconstruction of the individual as essentially an economic animal resonated well with those who sought stability through a focus on the self. All that was required for communion with a stabilizing force, the invisible hand, was an aggressive pursuit of one's economic interests.

The neo-liberal practice. In the 1970s the neo-liberal bundling of the economic individual and the stabilization of the capitalist state became an important force in the practice of politics. This can be seen in the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher in the UK. It also can be seen in the economic crisis in New York City in the late 1970s.

In 1978 in the UK Margaret Thatcher laid out neo-liberal arguments as her country dealt with growing unemployment and rising inflation. Thatcher endorsed a strong move to free up capital by reducing the influence of groups. Harvey (2007) wrote,

> This entailed confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social solidarity that hindered competitive flexibility (such as those expressed through municipal governance and including the power of many professionals and their associations), dismantling or rolling back the commitments of the welfare state... reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative. (p. 23)

Doing so advocated for the removal of the groups that had once helped define the individual. By eliminating the group, Thatcher attempted to liberate a new construction of the individual. There was, according to Thatcher, "no such thing as society, only individual men and women" (as quoted in D. Harris, 2007, p. 23). D. Harris (2007) explained, "All forms of social solidarity were to be dissolved in favor of individualism, private property, personal responsibility, and family values" (p. 23).

Back across the Atlantic, this rhetoric was translated into practice in New York City. The runaway inflation and the growing unemployment along with deindustrialization had left many disoriented and struggling to make ends meet. During the fiscal crisis of New York City in the mid-1970s, common sense was reshaped along neo-liberal lines.

A confluence of capitalist restructuring, rapid suburbanization, growing racial isolation, and a shrinking job market had left cities with increasing crime and an eroding tax base. During the 1960s, the solution to this problem was expansion of federal subsidies and increased job creation through public works. However, these approaches failed to produce the any lasting revenue for the city. In the 1970s the Nixon Administration cut federal funds to cities. At the same time the recession cut into the tax revenue, while outlays for city services continued to grow. In New York City, in 1975, investment bankers refused to cover city debt, and the city had to enter bankruptcy. The city had to turn over budget management to a group whose charge was to get the bondholders their money back. Only after the money lenders were paid did the city fund services such as police, garbage collection and public transit. While

in the UK Thatcher had spoken out against unions, in New York City it became common sense, that for the sake of everyone, the political demands of the municipal unions would be ignored. Wage freezes were implemented, social services were cut, and user fees at the city college were implemented in order to make sure capital flowed back to the investors at the top. Eventually, the unions were told that union members had to invest their pensions in city bonds that went to payback investors (Harvey, 2007).

Stability came at a price. The New York City bailout redistributed income to the top and "established the principle that in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions and bond holders' returns on the one hand and the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former was to be privileged" (Harvey, 2007, p. 48). The democratically elected government was responsible first to the banks and second to the citizens. People were faced with a new common sense: Either save the city and work toward the health of the financial institutions or contribute to a destabilized city in a continued downward spiral.

This choice was generalized to the domestic and international money issues that were seen as related to the lack of capital accumulation. Economic stability was tied to the ability of those at the top to accumulate capital rather than, as in the past, group balance. This definition of stability was combined with a redeveloped idea of the individual as an economic animal whose purpose was the pursuit of self-interest. This resonated well with the growing individualism that had characterized the 1970s.

The Partial Construction of the Mood

The general malaise of the era, then, was partially constructed by a redevelopment of the categories of the individual and domestic stability. The focus on the self that had been growing throughout the decade resonated with the call for the economic self that could anchor the economy through the growing accumulation of capital. The neo-liberal bundling, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, had "the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics multi-culturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism" from group politics that had developed the civil rights movement, labor, and women's movement (Harvey, 2007, p. 41). Thus, there was a mixed feeling: Although the drive toward social justice was important, there was also a growing assumption that the group politics required for the movement would lead to either an obliteration of the individual or a monopoly of power through interest groups. People began to associate interest groups with a destabilized economy. The new common sense developing in the late 1970s dictated that to maintain domestic stability, the individual must be understood in an entrepreneurial sense. The national mood then was a mixture of people's dissatisfaction with past constructions of the individual that had privileged conformity; anger that their expectations of stability could not be met; and suspicion that past social affiliations, such as unions, religion, or social clubs, stood in the way of social well-being.

How Was This Bundle Enacted Through Carter's Actions?

President Carter did not profess neo-liberalism. However, his administration did attempt to redevelop the national priorities that would acknowledge people's anger toward the corruption in government, bewilderment in the future of the economy, and lack of faith in governmental solutions. In doing so, he prioritized policy solutions that achieved balanced budgets through business logics, redeveloped inner cities through private–public partnerships, and eventually espoused fiscal solutions that encouraged the accumulation of capital.

The confusion Carter's centrism created exemplified the degree to which the Keynesian approach to stability had been discounted. By 1976 the development of a welfare state was seen as diametrically opposed to a stable government and economy. For example, on July 11, 1976, the eve of the Democratic National Convention in New York City, Carter appeared on the NBC radio and television programs, "Meet the Press." Lawrence Spivak, in his bow tie and glasses, asked, "Governor, I hope I quote you accurately on this. You have said you are a conservative on spending but a liberal on human welfare. Is that correct?" (Carter, 1978a, p. 298). Carter responded, "Human rights, civil rights, yes, sir" (Carter, 1978a, p. 298). Spivak followed up,

> Now I am not quite clear as to just what that means. How can you be liberal on human welfare, which requires the expenditure usually of a great deal of money, and conservative of spending? How are you going to reconcile the two? (as quoted in Carter, 1978a, p. 298)

In his answer Carter argued that he would approach the federal government much like he approached the state government in Georgia. He told viewers that he had used business approaches to drive government spending:

> We invested state funds on a competitive bid bias, and I think I ran the Georgia government as well as almost any corporate structure in this country is run, in personal management, transportation, electronic processing and so forth. At the same time, I think the best investment our nation can make of its resources is in human beings and not in buildings, not in construction. I think that when we spend money on better health care for our people, a better education for our people, that that is a legitimate and a very good investment for the future. (Carter, 1978a, p. 298)

Carter went on to explain how the priorities were dependent on each other: "I don't believe that you can meet human needs or root out injustice or give people a quality of life with out a well-managed government with the waste eliminated" (Carter, 1978a, p. 298). In his campaign Carter articulated a domestic stability that was established through spending logics that were rooted in market institutions.

Once in office, the goal of bringing economic stability became the prime objective. In August 1978, after attempts to control inflation through Keynesian approaches such job development, Jerry Rafshoon, Carter's communications advisor, sent Carter a memo that argued, "It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the inflation issue to your presidency" (as quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 58). Rafshoon reminded Carter that inflation "affects every American in a very palpable way. It causes insecurity and anxiety. ... It would be difficult to err on the side of too tough a program" (as quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 59). The following summer Carter would appoint Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve. Volker believed that a

stable economy depended on a promise of capital accumulation. Once in office, Volcker "immediately prescribed bitter medicine," and by slowing the money supply though the Federal Reserve banks, interest rates soared to 15%, "the dollar stabilized, and the economy stalled" (Schulman, 1998, p. 61).

Throughout his presidency, Carter had argued that the power of the government should be limited. In many proposals he argued for a private–public partnership and a reduction of government structuring of the market through deregulation (Carter, 1978b). Individual investment and competition in the market was the proper medicine for the nation's economic woes (Schulman, 1998). The individual as an economic engine rather than a citizen would lead to greater general welfare. The naturalization of the failure of past configurations to create stability was fully acknowledged by 1978. In the economic report of that year, the Carter Administration stated, "Government cannot eliminate poverty or provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or cure illiteracy or provide energy" (as quoted in Schulman, 1998, p. 66).

The mood of the era that was said to be so important to Carter's success was partially constructed out of the social regularities that bundled individualism to economic stability. Carter's attempt to acknowledge the feelings of people who craved stability led him to advocate for policies and approaches that would valorize the market and disparage interest-group politics. While Carter did not completely embrace neo-liberal arguments, his necessary attempts to acknowledge the mood that made those arguments visible in some ways naturalized them.

Conclusion

A purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter Administration. In this chapter I have explained a few of the many scattered practices and discourses or social regularities that allowed the performance of knowledge or common sense of the late 1970s. In doing so I have offered an interpretation of how certain explanations and practices around education and antipoverty policy became intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, while others became discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003). Specifically, I have argued that a deeper investigation of the national mood of the late 1970s can provide an important understanding of how people could construct their explanations at the time.

I have defined the national mood as combination of the practices and discourses through which people constructed the common sense of the age and their satisfaction with these dominant categories. Their emotions were engendered by their sense of the discrepancy between what should be and what they experienced. In the late 1970s this mood was partially constructed out of the enactment of the social regularities of race, property, individualism, and domestic stability.

As Carter came to office a common sense circulated that, because the property right that had been invested in Whiteness could not be undone, the only recourse was an investment in other identities. During this time, the integration ideals that had motivated the civil rights movements and the redistributive elements of the Great Society programs became suspect, as colorblindness was co-opted to hide White

privilege. At the same time, it also became common sense that a new definition of the individual was required in order to maintain domestic stability. Neo-liberal arguments that economic stability required capital accumulation and robust entrepreneurship were the keys to a stable economy took hold. This focus on the individual as an entrepreneur resonated with the desire of many individuals to find stability through a personal relationship with a larger transcendent force. Promise of stability, through the market's invisible hand, was contrasted with the inflation and unemployment that supposedly had resulted from interest groups' interference in the market.

The discrepancy between the ideals of past generations and the new growing common sense created a mixed bag of emotions. As described above, the national mood was partially constructed out of the dismay of the realization that the equal protection under the law did not translate into an equitable society, ambivalence towards the necessity or possibility of redistribution, and surety that the only recourse was investment in identity. At the same time, people felt dissatisfied with past constructions of the individual that had privileged conformity; were angered that their expectations of stability could not be met; and suspected that past social affiliations, such as unions, religion, or social clubs, stood in the way of social well-being. These rationalities and emotions of the time generated a sense of what was possible and valuable.

This dispersion of common sense and emotions—and, thus, the possible—were not the result of deep cultural or economic structures; they resulted from historically contingent intersections of bundles of social regularities that were enacted

through many practices and discourses throughout the 1970s. The historical treatment of these bundles showed that at every moment in history the categories that enact our common sense can be "repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased or hidden" (Foucault, 1972, p. 25).

In this chapter I also illustrated that these constructions of the possible are not the result of a single consciousness. The identity or personhood of the people of the late 1970s was produced in interactions with their coworkers, schoolmates, families, lovers, lawyers, spouses, caseworkers, politicians, and bankers. In these interactions, people as "historical actors are also narrators, and vice versa" (Trouillot, 1995, p. 23). I have avoided describing people only as structural agents and local actors who are part of material social processes. At the same time, I have avoided conflating the historical process and historical narrative, assuming that myth is all we have. Instead, I have embraced the ambiguity of the personhood and recognized that while people enact agenthoods, actorhoods, and subjecthoods, these are coconstructions with the context of the historical moment.

Thus, in looking at the late 1970s, I have tried to grasp the ways in which the social regularities of the time irrupted and appeared and so arranged the dominant way of defining social problems (i.e., group politics as an unnecessary way of life), and revealed a target that was in need of a solution (i.e., the divesting of interest-group power). The intersections and bundles of social regularities thus constituted the epistemological and ontological of the moment; they constituted both who the problem group was and how the group was seen or known as the problem (Scheurich,

1997). Carter's attempt to resonate with the common sense of the time brought into relief the irruptions of these reconfigurations the dominant social regularities.

In 1976, Carter claimed that more than any other candidate he was in touch with this changing mood. He claimed only he could offer a new discourse that would acknowledge and address the feelings of dismay, dissatisfaction, anger, and suspicion. He also would put forward new national goals that would animate the certitudes that were crystallizing around the power of the individual and their power over their own identity. In doing so, he was validating a common sense that was developing within a growing coalition of voters who claimed that they were focused not on group interests but on the interests of the individual. This group had a vested interest in the maintenance of the power structures.

Historians have noted that Carter defined the common man in a different way than past Democrats (Gillon, 1992; Luechtenburg, 1998). To Carter the common man was "rural, Protestant, politically independent, financially secure, and fiscally conservative," whereas other Democrats such as Mondale had pictured the common man as a "struggling, urban, blue collar, union member concerned about a secure job, decent wages, and education for his children" (Leuchtenburg, 1998, p. 16). Carter's attempt to build a coalition may have stemmed from a desire to enact social regularities that resonated with his understanding of the common man.

Specifically, it appears Carter wanted to build a coalition of people who were interested in the ideals of human rights yet were suspicious of interest-group demands. He wanted to animate people who were committed to the development of

the individual yet shunned past policy approaches that relied on redistribution. The explanations of the relationships between education and antipoverty policy would be made on a frequency that resonated with the common sense of these people. In doing so, Great Society priorities and domestic policy configurations would be replaced with a set of priorities that focused on the development of the individual and the devaluing of group solidarities. Now that I have situated the Carter era among the social regularities of the time, the next chapter specifically addresses how the administration enacted these regularities to explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy.

CHAPTER 6: HOW PEOPLE EXPLAINED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY

The purpose of this study was to investigate the ways in which people explained the relationship between antipoverty and education policy during the Carter Administration. This study offers a critical interpretation of how some policy approaches became valorized while others were dropped or erased in the late 20th century. Specifically, I highlight the ways in which the Great Society priorities and domestic policy configurations, which linked poverty and education, were let go, superseded, or forgotten. This allows me to historicize our current policy debates around the connections between education and antipoverty policy.

In this project, I have asserted that the exercise of power is productive; it is not simply negative political responses to the welfare policy or federal interventions that led to the demise of the Great Society policy approach (Berry et al., 1996; Foucault, 1980). It was also the multiple reconstructions of human needs and national priorities that occurred during the Carter Administration that contributed to the erasure of a domestic program that explicitly linked education and antipoverty policy (Fraser, 1989). These redefinitions reflected shifts in the enactment of the social regularities around race, property, individualism, and domestic stability.

For the sake of clarity, I briefly review what I mean when I say that education and antipoverty policy were explicitly linked. During the 1960s, the federal role in education expanded most notably in the passage of the ESEA (1965) and the Higher Education Act. These policies and others were passed as part of domestic policy

aimed at improving social welfare. The rhetoric in the War on Poverty and the Great Society agendas offered national leadership in a fight against poverty and its effects. As mentioned in chapter 1, the drive for improved social welfare was carried out through "programs with four *overlapping* purposes: to promote opportunities, stimulate community action, introduce new services, and expand transfer payments" (Katz, 1996, p. 266, emphasis in original).

Education programs, such as Title I funding, Operation Head Start, and Upward Bound were just some of many policy levers that were legislated to meet these four purposes. Congress passed these education policies in concert with other programs, such as increases in Aid to Families and Dependent Children, unemployment and job training services, and health care programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. Community action programs were also developed and administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity, in theory, to form "a broad, inclusive, multipurpose agency to coordinate" the social welfare activity (Katz, 1996, p. 268).

Although the education policies during this time represented a large expansion of the federal government's involvement in education, their inclusion in the Great Society followed the traditional federal pattern. E. Ginzberg and Solow (1974) pointed out, "Over the years, the federal government had made funds available to accomplish high priority national education objectives. Hence it was a logical next step for it to help raise the education achievement of children from low-income families" (p. 219). This national priority in education was linked directly with the national priority of eliminating abject poverty in the wealthiest country that had ever

existed on the face of the earth. The Great Society policy configuration posited education policy as an equal partner with other welfare and health programs in the fight against poverty.

I believe it is important here to point out that the possibilities for coordination mainly existed in the rhetoric of the national leadership (E. Emerson, personal communication, October 31, 2007). That is, the legislation, administration, and implementation of the policies provided less attention to the coordination of programs. The committees that passed the legislation held each program accountable. In the administration, the audit culture that was developing led to the fracturing of tasks across bureaucracies. Moreover, implementation at the local level was subject to the fiefdom politics of the local city, school district, and state districts. Thus, the community action programs that were supposed to coordinate these programs at the local level often had neither the clout nor the will to integrate into the local power structures, whose leaders perceived the programs as a threat (B. C. Jordan & Rostow, 1986).

At the time, despite these difficulties in coordination, many believed that a multifront War on Poverty was still an important priority. Although they could not point to changes in the poverty rate, because most of the programs attacked poverty with in-kind assistance (food stamps, health care, and education benefits), supporters argued that overall the project was worthy. In 1974, E. Ginzberg and Solow argued that despite the mixed immediate results, they could not "argue that poverty [was] not a subject worthy of national concern and federal intervention; that many components

of the specific legislation ... were sensible first efforts" (p. 219). E. Ginzberg and Solow also showed that between 1964 and 1974, "the Black population made striking gains in occupational status and in income, in political participation and as office holders" (p. 220). E. Ginzberg and Solow asserted that what was important was that the country stick with goals of coordinating programs to actively remove barriers to opportunity and learn to approach the problem in a smarter way.

My study centers on how the Great Society goals and priorities were devalued and how other approaches replaced it. A focus on the Carter era can help us grasp how the wisdom of the past approach started to become suspect. As shown in chapter 5, in the late 1970s it started to become common sense that Great Society programs should be judged a failure. Many on the left and right pointed to the ways in which the promises of the Johnson era were grandiose and impossible to keep, as evidenced by the lack of change in the poverty rate. In addition to this lack of change, federal involvement in local affairs increased. An editorial in the *Providence Journal-Bulletin* on March 30, 1978, commented,

> The lavishing of tens of billions of federal dollars under earlier Great Society programs did not cure the cities' ills but worsened them. Washington was too far removed to maintain control over urban renewal efforts; runaway programs destroyed more than they built. And massive corruption followed massive waste. ("Urban Policy for all Americans," p. A8)

Many of the arguments against the programs focused on inefficiency and promises that were impossible to keep through government action.

Throughout the 1970s, the Carter team paid careful attention to these criticisms and evaluations and attempted to chart a new, central course that would

lead to a more positive understanding of the efficacy of government. From Carter's perspective, the right course would be charted through the goals of having a government that was ethical and efficient (Carter, 1976). Throughout the campaign, Carter touted his reorganization of Georgia's government. For example, at Johns Hopkins University on April 2, 1975, he told the crowd, "We had 300 departments and agencies in our Georgia government. We abolished 278 of them, and we did that over the opposition of entrenched selfish interest groups who thrived on confusion" (as cited in Carter, 1976, p. 42). He argued that if the nation could streamline the federal government in a similar fashion, we could address the fact that there was "no long-range planning techniques as an integral part of our society" (Carter, 1976, p. 45). Instead of confusion, he wanted comprehensive policy solutions that were rational and could be related to our long-range plans.

Once in office, he struggled to practice this approach. However, his focus on the rational planning and comprehensive policy approaches often outweighed his development of national long-range goals. In an editorial in the *Washington Post*, March 28, 1978, a commentator reacted to Carter's approach to governing:

> There is something vaguely mosaic about the delivery of these Carter administration policies: energy, welfare, economic, and (now) urban. Tablets are what we get, produced at long last and borne down the mountainside by the leader, who has been consulting in the misty reaches of some other realm ... while the waiting multitude wonder what was going on. Mr. Carter likes to get ideas and intentions and imperatives put in writing. He likes to gather the relevant policies in one place. He likes to see the thing whole ("comprehensive")—or to try to, anyway. ("What's in an Urban Policy," 1978, p. A16)

This emphasis on the rational delivery of appropriate services through the isolation of an issue had a large effect on how Carter rearticulated the goals and policy configurations of the Great Society. His recasting of the government and the domestic policy was a productive force that would valorize new discourses and sedate past approaches; in doing so, Carter would encourage the erasure of the links between education and social policy.

Purpose of Chapter

In order to understand the way the Carter Administration policy and politics produced a new order in greater detail and to help us understand today's policy debates, I have asked the question: How did people during the Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? The people I have looked to for these explanations were primarily the policy elites during Carter's administration and commentators from the press. In answering this question, I was not seeking a single explanatory statement uttered by these people. Instead, I was looking for the ways in which the policies were presented during two policy events: the creation of the Department of Education and the creation of the President's comprehensive urban policy. As these events unfolded, I looked for the ways in which they were ranked as national priorities, the ways in which they were separated, the ways in which one was made dependent of the other, or the ways in which they were pitted against each other when it became time to decide how to fund or organize government activities.

I begin by tracing the legislative struggle to create the Department of Education. This policy event included new descriptions of the purpose of education policy and the importance of its administration through a separate department. There also was an argument about what should count as education policy. My analysis of these discussions revealed three findings: (a) During the Carter Administration, there was a push to symbolically separate education policy from its previous links to antipoverty goals and priorities; (b) the national priority for education policy no longer focused on the provision of categorical aid to serve other national interests, and instead the focus became the improvement of education in general; and (c) this shift in educational policy was constituted by and appealed to a significantly different voting coalition. All of these factors worked in concert and made each other possible. They were partially constructed by an intersection of bundles of dominant social regularities; and thus they were infused with common-sense logic.

The second place I observed an explanation of the relationship between education and antipoverty policies was in the framing of Carter administration's urban policy. Thus, in the second section of this chapter I investigate how the Carter Administration dealt with many of the issues that the Great Society programs were designed to address. My analysis of this event shows that the administration worked hard to distance their ideas from Great Society programs. In this new approach schools were only superficially addressed; thus, the link between education and antipoverty policy was further weakened.

The Creation of the Department of Education: A New Symbol

Many authors have claimed that the creation of the Department of Education was immediately inconsequential or lacked substance as a policy shift (C. Cross, 2004; G. Davies, 2007; Manna, 2006); I disagree. Although I agree with most authors that it was a symbolic and thus a political move, I believe that such a move was crucial in the reterritorialization of education policy, specifically in its reference to antipoverty policy.

In this section, I discuss how the choices of symbols and the ways the political moves in the drive to create the Department of Education offered a new articulation of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. First, I contend that in the arguments for the Department of Education we find an emphasis on the ways in which the new department could elevate the general improvement of education as a national priority. As we will see, it was argued that if education could be elevated as a national priority, the federal government would be positioned to assist in the improvement of the quality of basic education in general. Subsequently, it was argued that linkages to health and welfare often circumvented the federal government's abilities to provide this leadership and therefore education policy must be distanced from welfare and health policy.

Second, I argue that the political moves needed to create the Department of Education aligned the Carter Administration with coalitions that were enacting the dominant social regularities of the time. This coalition building around the dominant discourses and practices of the time offer us insight into the ways in which the Carter

Administration explained the relationship between the policies. The courting of the National Education Association (NEA) and other organizations was an attempt to cobble together a new coalition of voters, voters who were not necessarily supportive of past New Deal or Great Society initiatives. In the struggle for electoral survival, the Carter Administration, through choice of issues and theory of governance, enacted discourses that focused on self-development and the building of human capital.

I explore how the administration was rearticulating the relationship between education and antipoverty policy by tracing the development of the drive to create the Department of Education, from the campaign in 1976 through the eventual passage of the legislation in the fall of 1979. This narrative is not an exhaustive description of the legislative battle; instead, I point to important areas in this legislative initiative through which we can grasp the ways the administration discussed the relationship.

1976–1977: Needs Definition

One of the most consistent issues in Carter's campaign was the importance of improving education. Many emphasize the importance of the promises he made to teachers, specifically the NEA, in his win of the Democratic nomination and later the general election (C. Cross, 2004; Davies, 2007; Hargrove, 1988). The courting of this constituency and a commitment to the issue continued into the 1st year. An examination of these early years shows important shifts in relationship between education and antipoverty policy. These shifts were due in large part to the continued emphasis on making the improvement of education a national priority in and of itself.

Carter's continued focus on education as an end of itself resulted in education policy no longer being dependent on antipoverty priorities.

Remove the Red Tape and Improve Education in General

Once he was president elect, Carter asked that that a compilation of campaign promises be prepared. A copy was issued in the White House on February 17, 1977 (White House Staff, 1977). Under the education subheading were multiple promises: Carter promised to increase the federal funding level to 10% of the total local budget; he also promised that poorest districts would receive an increase in federal monies. However, the bulk of his promises in education focused on his goal to establish a comprehensive education program. This is a departure from the previous categorical approach.

For example, under the subheading, "Administration," there were promises to focus on the improvement of federal education policy in order to release schools from being inundated with paperwork (White House Staff, 1977). These promises mostly come from an NEA interview that took place on June 19, 1976. In that interview, Carter promised work to reduce "drastically the number of categorical aid programs, in order to reduce administrative work" (White House Staff, 1977, p. 259). He argued that that the "only category that [he] would like to maintain is to insure that the federal monies that are spent for the kinds of children who need help most" (Carter, 1978a, p. 259).

In addition, Carter asserted that education, in and of itself, should become a national priority. Carter stated, "I think the public is ready for a clear expression from

the national viewpoint about what we should do for education in this country. It's something that's been relegated to a secondary position in the past" (Carter, 1978a, p. 260).

Once in office, the Carter Administration continued to construct the education issue as one of general support rather than of strategic categorical aid, especially when arguing for the creation of the Department of Education. On July 5, 1977, Vice President Mondale spoke to the NEA during the annual convention in his home state of Minnesota. Noting the importance of the creation of the Department of Education, Mondale (1977) told the audience,

> We're committed to broad reform of our federal education effort, and we're hard at work on that now. Right now 120 separate programs under the office of Education exist in that department alone. And that just doesn't make sense. It's estimated that more than a million and a quarter hours are spent every year just completing forms for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. That can't be right. Red tape and paperwork never educated a single child. We don't reform just to make neater boxes on an organizational chart. We want to help you do your job. (p. 6)

The duplication of forms and processes required by the categorical programs was definitely notorious at the time, and Mondale was committing to reducing it. However, he was also reframing federal education policy, one that would focus on the improvement of education in general.

In the same speech, Mondale (1977) noted that the NEA's political power was on the rise. He stated that more than 80% of the candidates the NEA endorsed for Congress the previous year had been elected. Mondale added that the Carter Administration was committed to a "major new outreach effort to involve teachers in

our decisions in education policy" (p. 2). He asked the crowd for help on other issues, such as the Panama Canal, energy policy, fiscal conservativeness, election day registration, consumer protection, heath care costs, worldwide human rights, Social Security reform, and honest government. The administration was also engaged in an attempt to develop a new urban policy and in reforming welfare; however, neither of these agenda items was noted to the group.

Education Issue Becomes Generalized in the Press

Besides the campaign speeches of 1976 and the coalition building of the early administration, there were other areas in which the issue of education was generalized and separated from antipoverty issues. In August 1977 a high-profile report was released by the Educational Testing Service. The report described the conclusions of a 2-year study headed by former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz (who served during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations), in which researchers tried to explain a steady, 14-year drop in average scores on the SAT (Peterson, 1977). Major newspapers picked up the report.

On August 24, 1977, Peterson described the Educational Testing Service report in the *Washington Post*. On that summer day readers found out that three fourths of the decline in SAT scores between 1963 and 1970 was the result of a greater number of test takers, many of whom were not given the same educational advantages. Peterson explained, "Since 1970, however, the composition has remained stable, and the continuing decline into 1977 results from a change in social attitudes,

relaxed learning standards, television, high divorce rates, and unprecedented turbulence in the nation's affairs" (p. A1).

This report and the newspaper articles that accompanied it in 1977 helped generalize the education issue. There was a growing discourse that the schools could not be trusted to guarantee the suitable education of any of the students, disadvantaged or not. According to Peterson (1976), the report had indicated that "An 'A' or 'B' means a good deal less that it used to. Promotion from one grade to another has become almost automatic. Homework has apparently been cut about in half" (p. A1). In an editorial the following day in the *Washington Post* ("The Test Scores," 1976), the commentator also speculated that increasing amounts of elective courses, such as Science Fiction and Radio/Television/Film, were replacing Basic English classes. He concluded his discussion with his own assessment:

> The purpose of education is not merely to pass tests. But this particular set of tests is a broad and accurate gauge of students' academic competence. That competence is a substantial part of the national wealth, and a persistent drop from year to year is not a thing to be tolerated. ("The Test Scores," 1976)

In this commentary we see the broadening of the issue to a national scale. Here the commentator has related education policy to fiscal policy and economic stability. General education quality was becoming an important national issue.

Generalizing the Educational Issue in the Argument for the Department of Education

The "need" of bail-out education in general began to irrupt in 1977. It became the bedrock for the argument to create the Department of Education. In October 1977, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee conducted hearings on the possible

creation of the Department of Education. In his opening statement, Senator Abe Ribicoff, a long time supporter of the creation of the Department of Education, noted that this concern with national leadership in education was a bipartisan effort and thus a national priority. Mostly he was correct; some important Republicans, such as Alan Quie, were interested in elevating the importance of national education policy (C. Cross, personal communication, October 8, 2007).

Ribicoff (1977) argued that the schools in the late 1970s were caught in a financial crunch of declining enrollments and rising school costs. He observed that this coincided with the general decline in our confidence in schools. Ribicoff stated the nation was "deluged with newspaper articles on declining competence at all levels of education—from the elementary classroom student to the college professor" (p. 1). Ribicoff then posited the question, "Is quality education and educational opportunity for all still a national priority?" He answered, "If so, and I strongly feel it is, a Department of Education is needed" (p. 2). Through this rhetoric we see the expansion of the education issue to include not only the opportunity aspect, but also the need for quality education in all schools. The national priority was no longer linked only to the fight on poverty but instead to the reclamation of a past lost, a confidence lost.

Ribicoff (1977) went on to argue that the creation of the Department of Education was necessary because the office of education was unprepared to engage its new role of leadership. Ribicoff stated that the new role "includes the setting of standards, issuance of regulations, monitoring and evaluating programs" (p. 3).

Ribicoff claimed this leadership was crucial to all of the "parents of 50 million children, their grandparents and all those interested in our coming generation" (p. 4). Ribicoff's arguments are indicative of the changing role of education policy in the national rhetoric. Of particular interest is his opening statement, where education policy seems to be detached for the antipoverty policy discussions, its categorical dimension; in doing so, federal education policy was also attracting a broader set of constituents.

How Was the Relationship Reconstructed in 1976–1977?

The relationship between education and antipoverty policy was reconfigured during the early years of the Carter Administration. Education policy at the federal level in the past had been used strategically to achieve other national priorities, employment, defense, and welfare; the approach was categorical. By the 1960s education policy was being created at the federal level to help in the drive to end poverty. However, as Carter came to office he began to question this strategic investment approach. Instead, he hoped to make general improvement in education a priority. He sought to show that there was a new need, not supplemental to education but basic. Carter's discourse resonated with the worries of others as they began to lose confidence in schools. In the production of this new need, the policy community was bringing into question the rankings of its national priorities as well as the assumption of education's strategic links to antipoverty goals. Federal education policy was still a way to increase opportunity and fight poverty; however, it was not dependent on that national priority. At the same time, this approach was developing a

group of constituents, such as the teachers in the NEA, who were not necessarily invested in the goal to fight poverty.

1978: Drawing the Lines Around Education Policy

The struggle to create the Department of Education was mostly fought during 1978. Although the legislation eventually died, it was the lessons learned in this year that made the creation of the Department of Education possible in 1979 (A. Wise, personal communication, October 26, 2007). The decisions, arguments, and compromises of 1978 offer us another place from which to interpret the ways in which the policy elites explained the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Specifically, I look at the ways in which the education issue was framed early in 1978. Then, I look at the ways in which the administration developed their vision of the new department. Finally, I recount the various arguments about the purpose of a new Department of Education that can be found in the committee hearings of 1978 and the ways in which these policy debates politically separated education policy from antipoverty policy.

Framing of the Education Issue in 1978

The education issue was framed in two important ways in the early months of 1978. First, it was argued that the creation of the Department of Education would allow education to crawl out from under the weight of the health and welfare issues. Second, the announcement of the administration's ESEA renewal emphasized the improvement of education in general through a back-to-basics rhetoric.

Pitting education against health and welfare. In an editorial in the *Washington Post* January 28, 1978, Braden (1978) argued that the office of education should be moved to cabinet status to signal the importance of education in general to the future of the nation. Braden wrote, "It is arguable that, as a function of government, education is more important than some other functions that now rate Cabinet status. Our future and our hopes for high achievement rest on education" (p. A2). He supported this by noting the creation of the Department of Education might require a larger investment, and that this might help realign U.S. priorities in spending. Braden rhetorically asked, "What better objective than excellence in education can we spend money on?" (p. A2). He contrasted this objective with the spending on other health and welfare priorities. Braden argued that the Department of Education was needed because the expenditures on health and welfare were

> based almost entirely on the numbers of aged or infirm who have a draft on the government. So there is little room for thinking in terms of spending innovatively. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano and his assistants can't do much planning because their main task is to keep up with the bills. (p. A2)

Braden's arguments represent ways in which the social policy was pitted against education policy. Interestingly, he recast the federal role in education policy as a more general leadership for all students, while social policy was presented as an interest-group issue. Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and Aid to Families With Dependent Children were characterized as mounting accounting problems instead of worthy objectives. Education policy, in this argument, was almost held back by its unnecessary connection to antipoverty programs.

A similar argument was made by Carter in the early months of 1978. On February 10, 1978, the White House hosted a reception for the board of directors of the NEA and their guests. In Carter's remarks that afternoon, he laid out an agenda that was focused on the improvement of education in general. Carter (1978a) told the crowd of about 185 people that the administration's education policy for the year would focus on "basic educational quality" (p. 1). He went on to explain that he had been disappointed by the fact that the subject of education rarely came up in Cabinet meetings. Carter (1978a) observed, "The only time it does arise is when there is a legal question involving civil rights or the allocation of funds" (p. 3). He then asserted, "As long as the educational function is buried within a large department with welfare and health, I don't think that education will ever get the visibility that it deserves" (Carter, 1978a, p. 3). Again, here we see education posited as a separate issue from that of health and welfare, through a desire to separate it and elevate it. Carter (1978a) explained that the past connections to other social programs buried education and made national leadership in improving basic educational quality difficult. In the new agenda, the improvement of education was not linked to antipoverty efforts; instead it was argued that education should take a detached position from other policy streams and stand on its own as a national priority.

In this same speech, Carter (1978a) emphasized the ways in which the NEA could help him cobble together a new coalition. He urged educators to stay involved with politics and not to restrict their opinions solely to educational matters, "because the thrust of our Nation, what it stands for, what it is, what it can be, is your

responsibility, not only as a private citizen, but also I think as one who helps to mold opinion" (Carter, 1978a, p. 2). Like Mondale, Carter asked for support in his Panama Canal treaties and his push for human rights across the world. However, he did not address the attempt to reform welfare or the administration's ongoing development of urban policy.

Later in the month, an editorial in the *Boston Globe* argued similarly that the education policy was important over and above its links to antipoverty policy. The commentator argued, "When HEW was established in 1954, it was hoped that the unified department would lead to the tight coordination of federal health, education, and welfare policies. But it just has not worked that way" ("Take the 'E' out of HEW," 1978, p. A8). The writer believed that this possibility for coordination is less of a priority than the visibility of national leadership in education. The editorial read, "Clearly in our media-dominated society, power and influence accompany visibility and recognition" ("Take the 'E' out of HEW," 1978, p. A8).

Not all people took this stance. There was plenty of opposition to the creation of the Department of Education, from all sides of the political spectrum. On the far right people worried about losing local control and further disrupting the power structures. Opponents from the left worried that the break up of HEW would lead to a break up of political coalitions that had developed during the civil rights era. This opposition from the left was surprising to many observers (L. Francis, personal communication, January 29, 2008).

The opponents on the left felt the move would signal a clear shift in the coalitions. For example, Albert Shanker, the president of the American Federation of Teachers and a vice president of the AFL-CIO, argued that creating the Department of Education not only would remove the possibility of coordination, but also could also lead to defunding of HEW because constituents could not lobby as a block. On March 6, 1978, the *Christian Science Monitor* out of Boston ran a commentary and opinions piece regarding whether there should be a separate Department of Education. Shanker (1978) penned the "No" response, writing, "America's schools and colleges have a significant part to play in major social programs under taken by the federal government" (p. 31). Shanker cited the importance of the schools role in job training, increased access to child-care services, and "important public health programs, such as the current initiative in disease immunization and adolescent pregnancy prevention" (p. 31). Shanker also argued,

> Federal aid-to-education programs survived the Nixon-Ford years because they commanded the support of a coalition of education, labor and civil rights groups, not because they had a department to shelter them. That coalition still exists in the form of the Committee for Full Funding of Education programs, a force to be reckoned with on Capitol Hill thanks to the AFL-CIO's participation. (p. 31)

Ryor (1978), president of the NEA, disagreed with Shanker and wrote the "Yes" section of the article. In his response he was obviously not worried about the dissolution of the political coalitions that were connected to HEW. Ryor insinuated that supporters of a separate department had differing interests from the Committee for Full Funding of Education programs:

> We wish to make it clear that our focus is on the individual student and how this nation can best provide equal educational opportunities for all its citizens. We are not interested in turf protection or convenience for Washington organizations or Washington bureaucrats. (p. 30)

In 1978, in this exchange, many readers would have seen Shanker's position as protecting the status quo, rather than a politically astute pursuit of the national goal of fighting poverty. For many, Ryor's response would have been seen as advocating for a departure from the past. The desire for this departure was constructed by an increasing lack of confidence in U.S. schools in general. The stemming of this erosion of confidence in the educational institutions was becoming a central educational issue, and in its shadow the eradication of poverty began to fade as a national priority.

Basic skills and new audience for the ESEA. In his remarks to the press while introducing the ESEA proposals on February 28, 1978, Vice President Mondale warned that education should be at the center of the nation's domestic policy. Specifically, Mondale (1978) linked education to the successful perpetuation of the United States as a superpower when he explained, "It is the centerpiece of our hopes for continued world leadership" (p. 1). Second, Mondale (1978) linked education to ideas of opportunity: "It is crucial to the aspirations of all Americans for freedom and justice and full opportunity for all of our children" (p. 1). In his conclusion Mondale (1978) offered a ranking for education among federal priorities: "I believe the Congress and the Administration are clearly united in this common goal, making 1978 the year in which we together bring education to the forefront of our Nation's domestic priorities" (p. 2).

In a press release on the same day, President Carter (1978a) also asserted that education was a priority onto itself. He claimed that creation of the Department of Education would allow the education policy to free itself from the budget constraints of its previous position within HEW. Such an approach would "let us channel Federal funds more efficiently and effectively" (Carter, 1978a, p. 1). Carter (1978a) summed up the legislative proposals by stating that they would

> focus our Nation's resources on helping our children master the basic skills—reading, writing, and arithmetic—which remain critical to their ability to function in a complex society. We must do a better job of teaching these basic skills to all our children. (p. 1)

Carter (1978a) ended his remarks by emphasizing that through this approach to education "all Americans will benefit" (p. 2). The federal government role was reframed from categorical help to a drive to help the general population learn basic skills.

Some have stated that this iteration of ESEA was not a significant departure in education policy (C. Cross, 2004). Cited are the ways in which, despite the rhetoric of a move to general support, the bill created and reauthorized over 20 categorical programs, including Environmental Education, Safe Schools programs, and Gifted and Talented programs. However, I would argue that an important shift occurred. The shift in the rhetoric signaled a break with the past and its coalitions. The education policy was pitched to a new group that was not worried about losing links to the New Deal and Great Society coalitions. Some of the new categorical programs, such as

gifted and talented education and educational proficiency standards, were advocated by this new audience.

How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship?

In early 1978, in the press and through announcements of the administration, federal education policy was further disconnected from existing antipoverty initiatives. Education policy in the announcement of the legislative objectives and in editorials no longer served as a policy lever used to achieve other goals, such as redistribution and increased of opportunity. Instead, it became a priority and an end in itself. Past connections to health and welfare policy were seen as unnecessary connections that made it impossible for national leadership in education. The policy groups were pitted against each other.

As education became a separate issue, the voting coalitions began to crack. The potential loss was acknowledged by some such as Shanker (1978). However, the new coalition that was forming around the new education issue brushed it to the side and asserted that their interests were focused on individual development. This was contrasted with the group politics or special-interest politics that were represented by the labor and civil rights groups.

The Administration's Vision of a New Department

The shape of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy could also be ferreted out in the ways in which the administration sought to construct the new department. In the same February 28, press briefing in which they announced the new ESEA proposals, the administration listed four reasons for the creation of the

Department of Education (Mondale, 1978): The new department would (a) let the administration focus on federal education policy, at the highest levels of government; (b) permit closer coordination of federal education programs and other related activities; (c) reduce federal regulations and reporting requirements and cut duplication; and (d) assist school districts, teachers, and parents to make better use of local resources. Linking an agenda of basic skills to the proposed creation of the Department of Education was meant to emphasize the administration's support for the improvement of education in general. The rhetoric was meant to grab the ear of an audience concerned with efficiency and with general improvement rather than strategic work on categorical reasons, such as poverty priorities. This emphasis was woven through the struggles regarding how the department should be developed.

Three options. As Thanksgiving of 1977 approached, President Carter had a decision to make. The Presidential Reorganization Project (PRP) study on the creation of the Department of Education had developed three options. Each option represented different mixtures of political constraints and rational policy development on what should be in the Department of Education.

1. The first option requested the development of a Department of Education and Human Development.

2. The second option was favored by Joseph Califano, the secretary of HEW, who was opposed to the creation of the Department of Education. This plan proposed a department would be based on the "defense type model, with undersecretaries for each of HEW's three core functions" (G. Davies, 2007, p. 232).

3. The final option was the creation of a narrow department that basically would represent taking the E out of HEW.

Carter's decision would signal what could be categorized as education policy and what could not. Each of the options was "evaluated against three standards: its ability to improve the federal government's capacity to develop and implement effective education policies; consistency with overall reorganization of government; and assessment of political feasibility and responsiveness to campaign positions" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 71).

The PRP group strongly favored the first option. They had come to the conclusion that the department should be broad and should focus on helping with the delivery of human development services, such as Head Start, Child Nutrition, Science Education, and Indian Education, at the local level. They hoped that this might help maximize the potential for coordination of services. However, they were clear that they wanted to exclude the large cash transfer programs in the social welfare and health care areas. Politically, they believed this would sufficiently "introduce a diverse array of actors into the policy environment of the department who would bring different and needed perspectives on the problems of education" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 71). The least attractive option was the narrow department. This option the PRP group felt would do little to develop "comprehensive approaches to the challenges associated with education" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 71). The final approach that advocated for the restructuring of HEW in general with a development

of an undersecretary of education did not represent responsiveness to the campaign positions as outlined in the criteria.

On November 28, 1977, President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Califano, members of the Domestic Policy staff and the Office of Management and Budget, and PRP officials met in the cabinet room. In the meeting the Domestic Policy staff advocated for the narrow department; they believed it would pass the easiest because it would not impinge on any bureaucratic "turf." The PRP launched into a presentation and the case for a broad department. Toward the end the PRP group also argued for an option to study the issue further. Califano advocated for further study. Given that he had originally been publicly against the creation of a new department, the others in the room suspected that he was attempting to stall the project, hoping it would not come to fruition (Radin & Hawley, 1988).

Unfortunately, the president's decision that day was not clear. As Radin and Hawley (1988) recounted, after about 90 minutes of discussion, the president abruptly announced that he was late for a meeting of the National Security Council and that he wanted "the broadest possible Department of Education we can get" (p. 74). Carter and Mondale then left the room but did not adjourn the meeting. Adding to the confusion, after Carter left the room, "Domestic Policy Chief Stuart Eizenstat stood up and said 'what the President said was that he wants the broadest department possible. What he means is ...' And then Eizenstat went on to describe a narrow department" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 75). This meant that the PRP, responsible for developing the details of the administration's position, needed to keep searching for

signals on what the president actually had meant. The only thing that was clear from the meeting was that "the establishment of a new department would be viewed as evidence of Carter's commitment to making education a high priority" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 74).

Testing the waters. In early January 1978 the decision on what should be in the department and what should not was still not clear. The president was committed to providing general support to the project but was not willing to offer specifics. The PRP looking for some signals listened to the president's second State of the Union address. In the address, Carter made it public that it was still his intention to pursue a separate department. On the evening of January 19 Carter stated,

> We've made a good start on turning the gobbledegook of federal regulation into plain English that people can understand. But we know that we still have a long way to go. We've brought together parts of 11 different government agencies to create a new Department of Energy. And now it's time to take another major step by creating a new Department of Education. (as quoted in Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 86)

This statement was general and did not focus on what should be included or what should not.

In order to test the waters and get a sense of the political feasibility of the different possible configurations of the department, PRP staff met with various legislators on implicated committees. The responses were often general and expressed worries about the creation of a narrow department that would support the special interest of the NEA. In a meeting with the president's reorganization team February 22, 1978, Congressman John Brademas argued that he did not want to see a narrow

department that focused solely on the concerns of kindergarten through Grade 12 (K–12) teachers; instead, he wanted to see a department whose focus was on the "comprehensive needs of children" and should include day care and Head Start" (Gwaltney, 1978b, p. 1).

On February 16, 1978, Wellford and Gwaltney met with Congressman Jeffords, the ranking minority member on the Select Committee on Education. Jeffords said that, while he had recently decided to support the creation of the department, he felt that other Republicans would be concerned that a department would "represent centralization of education at the Federal level" (as cited in Gwaltney, 1978b, p. 2).

The same group met with Senator Pell, a long-time supporter of the idea of a Department of Education, on February 21, 1978. Pell also wanted a department that was broader; however, instead of focusing on the welfare of children, he supported a department that would be titled Education and Culture (Gwaltney, 1978b, p.3). This variation would link education to the development of the arts and humanities. However, he also pointed out that many of his arts and humanities constituents would not support such an approach. Senator Ribicoff already had proposed legislation that would create a broad department and wanted to insure that the administration supported the same approach.

A broad department meant the possible transfer of programs out of their historical bureaucratic slots. Rumors of possible transfers lead to multiple appeals to the administration by many groups who desired to stay in their current locations in the

federal government. On March 22, 1978, the National Urban League sent a telegram to the Patricia Gwaltney, stating, “We strongly urge you to reject the inclusion of Head Start in the current reorganization proposal for a separate department of education” (p. 1). The telegram was signed by 11 individuals, including Berkeley Burrell, president of the National Business League; Richard G. Hatcher, mayor of Gary, Indiana; Jesse Jackson; Vernon E. Jordan; and Coretta Scott King.

The American Indian spokesmen also protested the transfer of their schools into the new department. Commenting on the relationship with the Department of the Interior, the Indian spokesman said, “They may be bastards, but they’re our bastards” (as cited in Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 66). The arts community voiced strong opposition to being included in the department and worried they would lose their ability to advocate for the support of the arts. The Department of Agriculture put together a Save School Lunch campaign. Groups including the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, National Milk Producers, United Egg Producers, and the American Academy of Pediatrics argued that school lunch quality was imperative and that only the Department of Agriculture had the expertise to regulate and research food quality (“Save School Lunch,” 1978). Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall (1978) also lobbied to make sure that the youth training and employment programs were not transferred out of his department. At the beginning of the memo, he summarized his position:

> Our employment and training programs, for youth and adults, have the primary purpose of providing jobs, whether through job creation, job training or the matching of workers and jobs. In contrast, education programs have the

> goals of teaching basic competency and some analytical skills. There are certain important interrelationships between these two types of programs. However these missions are separate and should remain so. (R. Marshall, 1978, p. 1)

Rather than propose a new bill, the administration planned to testify on the Ribicoff Senate Bill 991 that seemed to have large support, given its 58 cosponsors. The hearings were on the bill was scheduled for April 14. The PRP group prepared for testimony and waited for a clear decision from the president on what should be included.

A vision of a new department. It was not until the morning of the hearings that the PRP group received the decision. McIntyre and Gwaltney hurriedly rendered the decision memo into a testimony. To their surprise, given the pressures from various interest groups, the president had supported the broadest conception of the department of education (Heffernan 2001). Everything except the Labor Department youth services programs was advocated for transfer. Included for transfer were the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture nutrition education program, the Office of Civil Rights, Continuing Education Programs for Indians, Project Head Start, the Department of Defense dependents' schools, and the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978b).

The administration team was a half hour late and did not have enough copies of their testimony to distribute to all of the members of the committee but promised the copies would arrive shortly. Besides the members of the Senate committee, the room was packed with representatives from the various interest groups (Heffernan,

2001). Many in the room were anxious to hear the testimony, because although the PRP had consulted a great many interest groups, President Carter had not been clear on the details of his positions. After the testimony, Ribicoff was pleased and stated, "I want to take this opportunity to commend the President for the creation of a strong Department. I must confess that during the pulling and hauling I had considered doubt about the follow through, but it becomes apparent the President has opted for a strong Department of Education" (as quoted in Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 109). However, the Indian groups, the Head Start groups, Science and Arts supporters, and civil rights activists were disappointed and shocked (Radin & Hawley, 1988).

The administration's testimony represented a push for a Department of Education that was broad and could bring together multiple programs. Looking at the rationale behind the transfer of the various controversial programs, two main reasons were cited by the Carter Administration: (a) expansion of the concept of education to include things outside of the K–12 public school settings and (b) the coordination of more efficient delivery of services. For example, the decision memo noted that an advantage of transferring the National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities would "provide a bridge to expand the learning process beyond formal schooling through the support of non-academic institutions, e.g., libraries and museums" (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978b, p. 24). This expansion of the education issue was also noted in the rationale for the transfer of Head Start; the memo stated that the inclusion of Head Start would "broaden significantly the scope of the department" (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978b, p. 22).

How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship?

The vision of the new Department of Education advocated by the Carter Administration in the spring of 1978 represented an attempt to expand the use of cultural and human development as a policy lever for change. In almost every case the inclusion of a controversial program was meant to expand the definition of education outside the normal K–12 ideas. However, this expansion of education policy went in the direction of human development rather than an inclusion of other more redistributive polices such as health and welfare policy. This is evident from the out-of-hand rejection of the broadest configuration that created a domestic policy department, as advocated by Califano. The new department from the administration's perspective was supposed to signal a break with past approaches. It was meant to plug into new interests and coalitions that were being constructed around the policy levers that were part of the education project. The human development priority in education policy began to supersede the redistribution priorities. Education policy was cast as part of a new policy approach, while antipoverty measures were connected to discredited past approaches. The shift was clear to the department's supporters and just as clear to those opposed to the creation of the department. A recounting of the legislative fight over the transfer of Head Start brings this alignment and the discourses that structured them into sharp relief.

The Transfer of Head Start: Battle Lines Are Drawn

One of the strongest examples of the ways in which the fight for the Department of Education drew lines around what was education policy and what was

not can be found in the 1978 battle over the possible inclusion of Head Start into the new department. The argument turned on the assertion that the goals of the education community differed in such a distinct way from Head Start goals that its inclusion would kill the program. Here is a very clear recognition that the links between education and antipoverty policy were severed. Moreover, the social interactions around this issue reveal the momentary registering of the intersection of dominant social regularities. It is Head Start's hybridity that brings these logics into relief. It was partly educational and partly redistributive and therefore fit only partly with the new common sense that although White privilege could not be disturbed, other groups could invest in their identities. Also, since Head Start also functioned as an employment policy, in that it hired local community members as staff, it did not fit with neo-liberal logics. The fight over its placement represented the ways in which these new social regularities reconfigured the lines of domination

On Thursday April 27, 1978, Senator Heinz presided over a hearing of the Committee on Governmental Affairs in which they considered the details of Senate Bill 991. The first person to testify that day was Senator Edward Brooke. In his testimony, Brooke provided a clear explanation of the ways in which people were drawing lines around what was education policy and what was not. Although Senator Brooke was a long-time supporter of the creation of the Department of Education, he was deeply concerned about the inclusion of Head Start in the department. Brooke explained, "Head Start is not just, or even primarily, an education program. It is, as was intended by Congress, a comprehensive program of development and welfare

services for our poorest and most vulnerable children" (Heinz, 1978, p. 268). Brooke went on to offer a clear explanation of the ways in which the creation of the department would draw lines around what was education policy and what was not:

> If we ignore the many services which Head Start provides, completely distinct from its education programs, and classify Head Start primarily as an education program, which will be the result if we transfer it to the Department of Education, the inevitable dynamics will lead to Head Start increasingly being regarded primarily as just an early childhood education program. And these other equally needed services will be downgraded, if not in the end virtually discontinued, for placing Head Start in a Department of Education could well result in Head Start being absorbed into the established education system. This is not a premature or idle speculation, for important segments of the education system are already on record as desiring and rationalizing the absorption of early childhood programs such as Head Start. ... Yet at the same time education representatives seek to incorporate early childhood programs into the education system, many educators increasingly feel most strongly that the duty of the educational system is to teach and not to provide at school all the services necessary to make up for society's or for a family's neglect of children. (Heinz, 1978, p. 269)

He then listed the successes of Head Start due its approach. Brooke noted that Head Start had "provided not only education, but also health, nutrition, social and mental health services" (Heinz, 1978, p. 270). He also attributed the success of the coordination of this approach to the fact that the parent involvement requirement creates a sense of ownership. Brooke also pointed out that this parent involvement element was "regarded dubiously, at times with outright opposition by segments of the education system" (Heinz, 1978, p. 270).

Brooke's testimony provided a strong sense that the creation of the Department of Education would privilege a certain set of interests and priorities. He asserted that Head Start was not in line with these interests; instead, its interests were

aligned with another policy domain. It was clear to him that the interests of the proposed Department of Education often would be in opposition to the priorities implied by Head Start's structure.

Representative Chisholm from New York also testified (Heinz, 1978). She had been a day care director, educational consultant, public school teacher, and Head Start director. In her testimony, she focused on the ways in which she believed the inclusion of Head Start would disempower its constituents. Chisholm explained,

> Head Start is a very special program to minority groups. For about a decade many poor, black and minority communities have relied on this program for comprehensive quality services to needy children at reasonable costs. ... [In addition], Head Start has been a means of leadership development in many communities where poverty, racism and sexism have kept valuable human resources from being identified and nourished. (Heinz, 1978, p. 279)

Chisholm theorized,

> Perhaps it is this demonstrated potential for grass-roots community development that has made Head Start controversial in some circles and even threatening. But I say without hesitation that this potential is perhaps its most innovative asset. We cannot afford to undermine the program by subjecting it to the policy perspectives of those who have a vested interest in controlling the program through their own structures. (Heinz, 1978, p. 279).

When pressed by Senator Heinz to explain why a move to the Department of Education would bring about domination by the education groups, Chisholm responded,

> The powerless and the helpless do not have the clout and the political ability sometimes to make their needs really known and to be able to collect the kind of resources that are necessary when the battle lines are drawn. ... Since this Head Start program involves a multiplicity of different kinds of disciplines and caters primarily to the unique and very specific needs of those youngsters who come from the most helpless and the most powerless communities ... it is only to be ascertained on the basis of the politics of legislation that these

> groups will not be able to get the same kind of support as the very powerful educational groups in this Nation. (Heinz, 1978, pp. 281–282)

Chisholm testified that from the perspective of those who sought to protect Head Start, a hallmark of Great Society policy configurations and priorities, the creation of the Department of Education represented a shift in interests, priorities, and power. Both Brooke and Chisholm asserted that the Head Start approach would not survive if it were located in the new Department. They feared the institutional setting that was structured along discourses prevalent in the education community would work to assimilate Head Start and therefore change its priorities and focus on the interests of the poor.

The administration claimed, however, as evidenced by the decision memo, that the inclusion of Head Start would be a counterbalance to the education community, one that could expand the definition of education (McIntyre & Eizenstat 1978b). Later that day, when James Parham, the Assistant Secretary for Human Development Services, testified on behalf of the administration (Heinz, 1978), he mainly gave an overview of Head Start and did not explain the advantages or disadvantages to the transfer. Following the testimony, Senator Heinz asked directly, "Do you favor or oppose transferring this very important program to the Department of Education?" (p. 306). Given that he was the HEW administrator in charge of the program, Parham responded, "It sort of reminds me how I felt when a young man told me he wanted to marry my youngest daughter, take her away to another city" (Heinz, 1978, p. 306). Parham then added that the president would make "provisional

safeguards which will maintain and strengthen those characteristics of Head Start that are uniquely effective, we think, that we value" (Heinz, 1978, p. 306). Senator Heinz responded,

> Mr. Parham, I hope you won't think it amiss if I characterize what you have just said as about the most lukewarm, half-hearted statement in support of the administration proposal I have ever heard from someone who is part of administration. (p. 307)

Mr. Parham eventually did enumerate a few reasons for Head Start's inclusion, visibility, and increased access to students through connections to the public school systems.

It appeared from Parham's testimony that the administration itself recognized the ways in which the Department of Education worked to produce new national priorities and that these new priorities were separate from the interests of those who desired to protect Head Start. The administration was embarrassed by the lackluster testimony and asked for an explanation. Gwaltney (1978a), in a memo to the congressional liaison Les Francis, listed out the chain of events that led to the testimony and then added that Paraham claimed that he was not aware that he was to testify on the advantages of the transfer. Despite this lack of preparation, the metaphor used by Paraham was powerful: Head Start's genealogy, its family, was rooted in HEW. A new department represented moving to a new town where, as many were doing in the late 1970s, one would go and reinvent or lose one's self.

Later that day, Ms. Marian Wright Edelman, founder of the Children's defense fund testified and responded to the claim that Head Start could act as a

change agent within the education community if it were placed in the department. In her testimony (Heinz, 1978) she laid out not only the lines of battle, but also the resources on each side of the fight. Edelman explained to the committee,

> The administration says that it views Head Start as a model for the kind of comprehensive, family-centered, and community-oriented education that it wishes to encourage. This assumes that a $600 million program will create the bureaucratic leverage to reform a $17 billion department supporting a $90 billion public education system. (Heinz, 1978, p. 322)

She then employed a powerful metaphor and argued that Head Start changing the education community would be the equivalent of the tail wagging the dog. It appeared evident to her that a program the size of Head Start would have a hard time changing all of public education; instead, Head Start most likely would be homogenized by the larger public education forces in the Department of Education.

How Does This Help us Understand the Relationship?

The fight over the inclusion of Head Start into the Department of Education provides a clear picture of the ways in which the creation of the Department of Education represented a reconfiguration of national priorities. This new configuration interrupted and slowly replaced the past Great Society priorities. The fact that the supporters of Head Start fought so vigorously to keep it separate from education and the nonchalance with which the Carter Administration approached the transfer both give us insight into the ways in which the administration valued the redistributive aspects of Head Start. Education policy no longer needed antipoverty policy, and antipoverty legislation was in danger of losing its redistributive aspects if it was connected to education programs. The dominant social regularities of the time (e.g.,

the protection of Whiteness as property, the stabilization of the economy through a reconstruction of the individual) made education policy appear to be a logical priority, whereas antipoverty policy appeared fragile.

The fight over Head Start plus other transfers such as Indian education and child nutrition would weigh down the legislation in 1978. C. Cross (2004) offered a succinct description of the bill's demise in 1978:

> With the clock ticking and Congress faced with many more bills than they could handle before adjournment, the bill was scuttled. Carter did not list it as a high priority, and because Erlenborn and other opponents had filed more than 100 amendments, the leadership knew they that they could not afford the time the bill would take on the floor. (p. 62)

In 1979, with the battle lines clearly drawn, the administration again would launch a proposal to create the Department of Education. However, this time the vision would be narrowed and the administration would seek support only from those in the education community who were detached from the other forms of social policy.

1979: A Narrow Department

The bill that established the Department of Education was passed in 1979. While the previous year the administration had sought the broadest department, by early 1979 the administration had agreed with the domestic policy advisers that the key to creating the department centered on proposing a narrow department (A. Wise, personal communication, October 26, 2007). In addition, the administration's argument for the department also narrowed in scope. The passage of the bill establishing the new department crystallized the relationship between education and

antipoverty programs that had been developing over the previous 3 years. The result was a drive to create a narrow department that would appeal to a new coalition of voters who were not necessarily caught up in the Great Society policy configurations.

Narrowed Focus

As the Carter Administration began the legislative fight for the Department of Education, members were committed to a legislative victory. The passage of the bill "was of utmost importance. No further substantive analysis would take place. All resources would be devoted to negotiating and compromising" (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 129). The result was a narrow approach that would not incite any further "turf battles." G. Davies (2007) wrote,

> [The] Education Department that [Carter] was now prepared to endorse consisted of little more than the current Education Division. It looked, in other words, very much like the proposal that OMB [Office of Management and Budget] had criticized as the least desirable approach to reorganization. (p. 39)

The rationale also narrowed. On July 27, 1979, Abramowitz sent a memo to Eizenstat and Carp. Attached was the requested briefing paper that listed past federal education policy approaches and also enumerated Carter Administration priorities. The number one rationale for the creation of the department was that "education should be represented at the cabinet level." This was followed by a list of problems with the size of HEW and then the remedies of these problems: "The Department of Education will (a) reduce administrative cost, (b) reduce time spent in generating policies and regulations, (c) reduce unnecessary staff functions, and (d) simplify the operation of federal education programs" (Abramowitz, 1979, p. 4).

As compared to the rationales presented in 1977 and 1978, this explanation is narrow. Although the focus on efficiency remains, missing are the arguments regarding the importance of improving education in general. Also missing is a desire to expand the conceptualization of education outside of schooling. The goal by this point was the establishment of a symbol (A. Wise, personal communication, October 26, 2007). However, in that memo, almost as an aside, Abramowitz (1979) noted, "President Carter has often stated that he would like every child leaving the third grade to be able to read and write at grade level" (p. 3). This appeared just prior to the rationale for the new department and foreshadowed the ways in which the department would be poised to change education policy.

A Narrow Coalition With More Depth

The coalition began to formalize in 1979. As G. Davies (2007) pointed out, besides the administration's newfound attention, the other "new ingredient in the 1979 [Department of Education] battle was the work of the 100-member coalition of lobby groups, headed by Allan Cohen" (p. 240). These lobbyists represented groups that included Chief State School Officers, the National Parent–Teacher Association, the National School Boards Association, the Secondary School Principals, the Council for Exceptional Children, and the American Educational Research Association. Mostly, these groups were able to mobilize their members. During the important phases of the legislative process, according to G. Davies (2007), "members encountered hundreds of educators wearing red, white, and blue buttons that bore the slogan: "A DEPRARTMENT OF EDUCATION/YES!" (p. 240).

As the vote approached the coalition organized their efforts. G. Davies (2007) recollected,

> Anyone at the White House who had any contact with the Hill was required to make calls. Meetings were scheduled for the president with members of Congress. Commitments were exchanged. Tickets to see the Pope or to ride on Air Force I were given away. When asked what they had had to promise certain members to get their votes, the White House lobbyist replied: "Don't ask because you really don't want to know!" (p. 243)

The coalition was devoted to the passage of the bill and recognized it was an important part of shifting the domestic policy.

A Symbol of a Break With the Past

On September 27, 1979, the bill passed by a narrow margin. Commenting on the legislative victory, Carter said that it was "a significant milestone in my effort to make federal government more effective. We will now have a single cabinet department which can provide the coherence and sense of direction needed for federal education programs" (as cited in Houston, 1979, p. B1). The administration claimed that the new department would save the taxpayers $100 million in the 1st year due its removal of the bureaucratic underbrush within HEW. On October 17, 1979, the White House hosted a celebration the signing of Senate Bill 210. In the inside of the invitation to the celebration was a quote from the day the bill signed. In the quote Carter recalled,

> When I came to Washington, I was convinced that the Federal Government had failed to deliver adequately on its limited, but important, role in American education. Billions of dollars were being spent, but education programs continued to be denied the full-time attention from a Cabinet Secretary that would make these programs perform effectively.

The creation of the department was symbolic. It might have been a symbol of a commitment to improving education, but more importantly it was a symbolic break with past approaches to education.

Shape of the Relationship as Judged From the Creation of the Department of Education

The drive to create the Department of Education offered new articulation of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy. Over the course of 3 years the administration repeatedly emphasized the ways in which a new department could elevate the general improvement of education as a national priority. In the quest for the elevation of education policy other national priorities, such as the War on Poverty, needed to be downgraded. Past linkages to health and welfare policy were seen as unnecessary connections that made national leadership in education difficult.

In addition to the shift in national priorities, there was a change in coalitions at the federal level. The courting of the NEA and others was an attempt to cobble together a new coalition of voters who were not necessarily supportive of past New Deal or Great Society policy configurations. In the struggle for electoral survival, the Carter Administration, through the choice of issues and theory of governance, enacted discourses that focused on self-development and the building of human capital. As the discourses associated with this new coalition were given center stage, past policy approaches were pushed to the wings.

The disunity of the education and antipoverty policies was the product of knowledge-production procedures of the time. Common sense of the time dictated

that the stability of economy was dependent on the accumulation of capital at the top. If groups were allowed to press for redistributive measures through a welfare state, inflation and unemployment would result. Therefore, the common conclusion was ceasing to invest in the development of groups such as union power. Instead, the focus should be on developing the individual's ability to compete in the market. White privilege was protected, and minorities were told that their only recourse to equality was through the investment in their own identities and their ability to compete in the market. The dire need for the creation of the Department of Education as a symbol appeared to represent a need to sanctify this new common sense where human capital development was the goal. It was a signal that government was reorganizing to fit these new dominant social regularities.

It could be argued that the creation of the Department of Education, by definition, would appear to sever the links between education and antipoverty projects. The arguments for reorganization necessarily should show attempts pit the policy streams against each other, and the arguments and divisions should be exaggerated by the natural turf battles that are part of the bureaucracy. However, in this case, the separation of antipoverty and education policy was also evident in other policy events.

Urban Policy: Schools Left Out of the new Partnership

Another important place to look for the ways in which education policy was reterritorialized in the late 1970s is in the Carter Administration's development of a

"comprehensive" urban policy (Carter, 1978a, p. 120). The development of the urban policy framework reveals the administration's estimation of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy by exposing the degree to which education was central to the antipoverty efforts. Tracing the creation of urban policy also offers a place from which to observe actors of the late 1970s attempting to rearticulate the issues that were claimed as an impetus for the Great Society.

Many of the issues that had prompted the War on Poverty were still present in cities in the late 1970s and often were worse. However, during the 1970s, poverty did not need to be rediscovered; the city centers were growing centers of concentrated poverty. According to one newspaper reporter in Philadelphia (Guthman, 1978), despite President Nixon's declaration in 1973 that cities were "past the crisis moment," by 1975, "New York City was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy while other cities, including Philadelphia, were finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the complex problems of poverty, joblessness, bad housing, fleeing industry, declining tax base" (p. A8).

During Carter's campaign, he began to describe new approaches to these problems. On April 1, 1976, Carter delivered a speech in New York, where he addressed the issues of the city. In the speech he promised a break with the past in the form of a "comprehensive" urban policy. On the campaign trail in what is known as his "Great Cities speech," Carter stated,

> Our country has no urban policy or defined urban goals, and so we have floundered from one ineffective and uncoordinated program to another. Hopes

> have been raised only to be dashed on the rocks of despair when promise after promise has been forgotten. (Carter, 1978a, p. 120)

A comprehensive policy would deal with problems such as "urban decay, declining tax base, crime, unemployment, lack of urban parks and open spaces" (Carter, 1978a, p. 120). His promise was to deal with the human problems rather taking than the brick-and-mortar approaches that had been pursued in the past, and he was dedicated to "the provision of a job for each person capable of holding gainful employment" (Carter, 1978a, p. 121). However, he would achieve this full employment through a partnership with private industry rather than spending on public works as in the New Deal era. Carter (1978a) promised to assist "local governments with urban economic planning and development to help them encourage private industry to invest in their cities" (p. 127).

Carter was attempting to distance himself from past approaches of dealing with urban issues. According to Sugrue (1998),

> Carter never wholly repudiated liberalism, as many of his detractors charged, but by directing attention to what he viewed as the deficiencies of federal urban policy, Carter served as a bridge between expansive liberalism of the 1960s and the anti-statism of the 1980s. (p. 140)

In this section, I assert that in the construction of this bridge a new articulation of the relationship between education and antipoverty education was formed. My analysis demonstrates that education policy was basically ignored in the development of Carter's "comprehensive" urban policy. The sidelining of education policy contributed to the development of federal education policy as detached from the pursuit of antipoverty goals.

I begin my discussion of Carter's urban policy with an examination of the general goals of the project as it developed in 1977. I then explain the possibilities of education's possible roles in the development of the proposals. Finally, I explain the final policy package that was presented in March 1978 and show the small role that was attributed to education.

This section is notably shorter than the previous one that dealt with the Department of Education. One reason is that all of my interviews, except for two, were with people who specialized in education policy at the time. Les Francis and Patricia Gwaltney were involved in the wider governmental projects (P. Gwaltney McGinnis, personal communication, December 11, 2007); all others were focused solely on education and could not speak to the urban policy initiative. Their focus on education is also indicative of the separation.

Urban Policy Goals

According to Sugrue (1998), the thrust of Carter's domestic policy included interlocking goals:

> To reduce the size and complexity of the federal government; to eliminate costly federal programs, particularly those that existed solely for the benefit of special interests; and to take power from the federal government and redirect it toward states and localities. (p. 141)

These goals shaped the administration's approach to urban policy. According to Carter, past attempts at urban policy failed because the urban issues had fallen under the purview of a number of federal agencies with "jurisdictional uncertainty, duplication of effort and lack of coordination" (as cited in Sugrue, 1998, p. 141).

A week after Carter was elected, the mayors of the major cities met to discuss their potential problems and list their grievances. In response to these grievances in March 1977, the president created the Urban Policy Research Group (UPRG). The UPRG brought together a wide range of actors from multiple departments and different disciplines. The groups worked slowly as they orientated themselves to each other's perspectives. However, by July 1977 Carter attended the National Urban League convention, where Vernon E. Jordan accused him of ignoring Black America. Stung by this criticism, Carter came back to the UPRG, set a December deadline, and encouraged the group to increase their outreach (Sugrue, 1998).

The UPRG's focus was addressing job and population loss and physical deterioration as well as political fragmentation. Using the language from UPRG memos, Sugrue (1998) showed that within the UPRG was a strong argument that "neighborhood and voluntary associations" and "indigenous neighborhoods redevelopment programs" should be at the center of urban reform, for they alone could "alleviate the alienating effects of big government, big industry and big institutions" (pp. 143-144). However, UPRG members were quick to point out their approach was different from the community action programs created during the 1960s. They criticized the community action programs because they felt that these programs focused on the poor and the minorities and thus resulted in a White backlash. Instead, the UPRG argued for a framework that was "inclusive" of White middle class and not "exclusive" (as cited in Sugrue, 1998, p. 144). Carter agreed and

believed that self-help was the answer to the blight that the federal money in the 1960s had not stemmed.

Although they were not named as a central goal of urban policy, the education groups worked to become part of the conversation. One group, the Council of Great City Schools, scheduled a meeting with Bertram Carp, who was member of the UPRG and on Carter's Domestic Policy staff. However, Carp could not make the meeting, and the Council of Great City Schools representatives met with Elizabeth Abramowitz. Following the meeting, to insure that they reiterated their message, the council sent Carp a letter on September 28, 1977, that stated their ideas on urban policy. Larry Harris of the Minneapolis School District laid out the importance of considering schools as part of the urban policy. He reminded the Carp the role the educator plays in the community:

> Urban educators are not the traditional American educators. They have had to become urban generalists. Desegregation, chemical dependency, urban renewal, unemployment, mobility, model cities, truancy, special education, refugees and other factors have forced the urban educator to become painfully aware of the range of negative factors at work in the inner city. (L. Harris, 1977, p. 1)

L. Harris (1977) then urged the UPRG to involve urban educators as "active and ongoing partners—in planning, in implementation and in ongoing modification of programs" (p. 1).

Besides wanting to be a part of the policy discussions, the Council of Great City Schools also had policy suggestions ready. At the implementation level, L. Harris (1977) argued there must also be involvement of the schools. To insure

coordination at the local level, he proposed that the UPRG consider an "Urban Action Agreement, which would link the county, the city and the city school system together as a team to implement policy" (L. Harris, 1977, p. 1)

L. Harris (1977) also suggested an Urban Impact Aid program. This program would address the growing concentration of the poor in urban centers by increasing funding to these areas. He pointed out that this type of aid could help address the issues that were related to White flight that the federal government had supported through out the 1960s and 1970s

L. Harris (1977) went on to note that the growing discourses around the teaching of the fundamentals did not provide much help in the complex environment of urban education. He wrote, "One must recognize that the old days of simply teaching reading, writing and arithmetic have passed" (L. Harris, 1977, p. 2). He then listed the multiple things that the urban school did:

> We now feed many inner city children two meals a day, we are involved with student health needs, we have added staff to get students to school and staff to keep negative elements in the community out of the school, to protect students and staff, we are teaching parenting and providing services to the young woman who is a parent and a student, we are attacking the problem of chemical dependency, we do face the basic and costly burden of desegregation which is a result of housing patterns of long standing, we are providing work training and support through work education programs for youth and adults, and we have implemented Community Education programs, including evening and weekend opportunities for children and adults alike. (L. Harris, 1977, p. 1)

L. Harris (1977) asserted that the education proposals that were good for the rest of the country might not help the urban schools succeed. Instead, they needed an approach that could address the many factors that resulted from being in the city. He

then reiterated the implications of the work urban schools do for the UPRG: "As federal government looks at urban renewal and attempts to make the inner city more livable, school personnel must be involved from the beginning. ... We stand ready to come to Washington" (L. Harris, 1977, p. 2).

What Shape Did the Policy Eventually Take?

Despite this offer to help and a request to become part of the center of the discussion of urban issues, the education group was not included. The UPRG's goal was to articulate an urban policy that was different than the Great Society programs. The thrust for difference is evident in an early 1978 memo that addressed the politics of the urban policy.

On January 5, 1978, Les Francis wrote a memo to the Domestic Policy staff. In it he outlined the political strategy for the urban policy. He maintained that the best approach to urban policy from a political point of view was to frame it as an urban investment strategy. He pointed out that how the administration dealt with the urban issue generally would be one of the key ways in which voters would judge the administration at the midterm elections.

Francis (1978) stated that the administration would be judged not only by the amount of programs they pushed through Congress, but also by the kinds of programs they pushed. Francis reminded the Domestic Policy staff,

> We cannot afford to forget that which was essential part of Jimmy Carter's campaign of the Presidency—especially the pre-nomination phase of that campaign—namely the "no more programs, no more fast fix-it solutions, no more all wisdom resides in Washington" appeal. To a great extent, candidate

> Jimmy Carter won the Democratic nomination and the Presidency precisely because he was *not* a traditional Democrat, he was not an advocate of past programs and was not an apologist for past failures. (p. 2)

Using this argument as the general backdrop, Francis advocated for framing the urban policy as an "investment strategy" (p. 2). This approach would leave much of the responsibility for change to those who were working and volunteering at the local level. Francis cited a Gallup survey that described that most urban residents by 1978 did not want to move out of the city and were "personally enlisting in the battle against urban decline" (p. 2).

Francis (1978) also argued that ultimately the President's goal in urban policy should not be a greater amount of financial assistance but instead a greater partnership with local government. Francis abstracted from a memo from Senator Muskie's subcommittee staff, "Any new federal urban policy must ... seek ... to restore cities to a position of greater control over their own fiscal and economic well-being" (p. 3). This approach was contrasted with the December URPG report that, according to Francis, "relied solely on the old ideas which have not brought us results" (p. 3).

President Carter had read the Muskie memo and made comments off to the side. Next to a statement that read, "The federal government currently spends at least $70 billion annually on the state and local sector. We ought to be able to construct a reasonable and effective urban policy without adding significantly to that amount," Carter wrote, "I agree" (as cited in Francis, 1978, p. 3). Francis noted that such a strong endorsement of local control would be considered by those in the Democratic

Party as too "radical." Specifically, Francis noted that if the new approach does not include new money some in the "urban lobby" identify the investment strategy as a "cover-up for neglect, a cop-out" (p. 5). Despite these possible negatives, he maintained the reinvestment approach fit better with the president's style and the electoral politics.

The focus of Francis's (1978) memo was on the politics of the situation; however, there was an implied policy argument. Francis claimed that the focus should not be on spending more money; instead, money already spent should be invested more wisely. It seems evident that the goal was no longer about redistributing money from the wealthy suburbs to the impoverished city center; instead, it was framed as a wise investment.

The Final Decision

A decision memo presented to Carter on March 21, 1978 (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a), determined the final shape of the policy. It seems that Carter took to heart that urban policy should not represent any new spending. In the decision memo, McIntyre and Eizenstat (1978a) suggested a theme for the urban policy that is similar to the one Francis had been advocating for in his January memo. They suggested the theme "A New Partnership to Conserve America's Communities." McIntyre and Eizenstat (1978a) argued,

> This theme dramatizes the real commitments of the administration to urban conservation, but also recognizes that successful policy must be a partnership—involving all levels of government, the private sector and neighborhood and voluntary groups. It is the same theme which you stressed in your urban policy speeches during the campaign. (p. 13)

Education issues are dealt with in Part IV of the decision memo in a section titled Community and Human development. One of the stated goals of this section was to "maintain a decent standard of living and adequate health and education services in existing communities" (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 141). However, the only two education programs listed were the Cities in Schools program and Title I funding.

The Cities in Schools program was designed to assist families and students to achieve more productive lives and to assist troubled schools to better serve their students and act as a catalyst for integration of human services in local communities (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 143). In 1978 the program was only in three cities. According to the decision memo the President agreed to expand the program to four additional cities. This is one of the few times that the president approved additional funds throughout the entire memo (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a); however, this was most likely because the program was so small. Its budget was only 1.5 million in 1970, and the proposal was to expand it to 3 million in 1979. While this was a nod to the importance of the connections between the schools and the communities, it was a small program that impacted only a few places.

The other proposal for the inclusion of the education community in urban policy was through Title I. "The policy staff recommends that due to the increase in funding found in the reenactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act that no additional funding for education be provided in the urban policy" (McIntyre &

Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 149). The memo also offered no ideas on the use of that money for the coordination of human services at the local level.

These two pieces represent the whole of the involvement of education in the development of urban policy. This is a far cry from the desires voiced in the letter from Minneapolis (L. Harris, 1977). Despite, the recognition by urban educators that their job consisted of a great deal more than the focus on the fundamentals, the administration saw their expansion of the "Basic Skills Programs" as a rational for not providing additional funds and support structures (McIntyre & Eizenstat, 1978a, p. 149).

The Public Announcement

Education issues were not central to the formal remarks that accompanied the proposal to Congress. In his statement to Congress on March 29, 1978, President Carter outlined his comprehensive urban policy. In general the policy would "involve all levels of government, the private sector, and neighborhood and voluntary organizations in a major effort to make America's cities more attractive places in which to live and more viable place in which to do business" (Carter, 1978a, p. 1). He then listed out the seven goals that the major proposals would achieve. In these goals education was not mentioned. In the first goal, the overall focus was not the improvement of bureaucracy, but to "improve the effectiveness of existing Federal programs by coordinating these programs, simplifying planning requirements, reorienting resources, reducing paperwork, and making Federal actions more supportive of the urban policy effort" (Carter, 1978a, p. 1).

Carter (1978a) concluded his list of major goals with the need to "improve the physical environment and cultural facilities in urban areas by providing additional assistance for housing rehabilitation, mass transit, that arts and recreation facilities" (p. 2). In this goal, one would expect to find a mention of education; however, there was none.

The response to the urban policy was mixed. Most noted that it was reconfiguration; however, they also noted that that the plan, overall, was modest. In the *Chicago Tribune*, Neikirk (1978) summarized the urban policy in these few words: "He took existing programs, infused a little more money into them, and aimed then at the cities" (p. 1-8). According to Neikirk, the plan deserved a "temperate and conditional approval, and best wishes that the plan will do more good than harm" (p. 1-8).

Most newspaper editors approved of the step to recognize the ways in which all federal policy affected cities. The *Washington Post* noted that the most valuable part of the urban policy was the "painstaking government wide review of all the programs anyone could think of that may have an effect on the nation's cities and subsequent decision to change many of those programs that have been working to the detriment of urban social and economic health" (("What's in an Urban Policy," 1978, p. A16).

Only in the editorial of the *Akron Beacon Journal* (Fitzpatrick, 1978) was there mention of the lack of education proposals in the urban policy. Fitzpatrick commented that the urban policy was not completely comprehensive:

> For example, two of the chief concerns of those who have fled the cities for suburbs and rural communities in recent years have been crime and the decline of public schools. ... Yet those topics draw almost no mention in the proposed urban policy. (p. A6)

How Was the Relationship Reconstructed Through Urban Policy?

The development of Carter's urban policy reflected the administration's desire to break with past policy approaches. They attempted to resonate with common sense of the age that devalued redistribution and favored capital accumulation. Also, it might be inferred that the refusal to include the education groups in the discussion was an assertion that the education project should be thought of as a general issue rather than as a categorical issue.

Repeatedly, the administration went out of their ways to argue that their approach to urban policy was separate from Great Society approaches. The new goals in urban policy argued for a greater involvement of city government, a reduction in categorical help, and a reduction in spending. In this environment, education was included only through the small Cities in Schools program and the acknowledgement that a significant amount of Title I funding went to the schools. The urban schools coalition's arguments were mostly ignored.

The president's urban policy approach seems to have been an enactment of the social regularities of the day. In the assertion that the policy approach must be inclusive of White interests while investing in the needs of the cities reflects an assumption that White expectation of privilege could not be disturbed. At the same time, the social regularities made the economic solvency of the city the most visible

problem. The common sense of the age also asserted that the solution to this problem was to free up the market forces. The urban policy supported enacted this by authorizing the federal government to play a major role in the encouragement of private investment.

Conclusion

In this chapter I answered the following question: How did people during the Carter Administration explain the relationship between education and antipoverty policy? I doing so I provided insight into the ways in which the Great Society priorities and domestic policy configurations, ones that linked poverty and education, were let go, superseded, or forgotten. Specifically, I showed how during the policy events of the creation of the Department of Education and the creation of urban policy, education policy was distanced from its previous links to antipoverty goals and priorities. As a result, the issue of education became a national priority unto itself. The change in the relationship between education and antipoverty policies allowed for the development of new coalition of voters who were animated by interests in the development of the individual.

In the battle to create the Department of Education, the administration and the press continually pitted antipoverty and education priorities against each other and argued for an elevation of education issues as national priorities. In the past, federal education policy had been dependent on the pursuit of antipoverty goals. By the late 1970s, in the quest for the elevation of education policy, antipoverty programs were

continually characterized as drags on the system. Past linkages to health and welfare policy were seen as unnecessary connections that made national leadership in education difficult.

In addition to this reconfiguration of policy priorities, there was a change in the political coalitions at the federal level that supported education policy. The courting of the NEA and others was an attempt to cobble together a new coalition of voters who were not necessarily supportive of past New Deal or Great Society policy configurations. In the struggle for electoral survival, the Carter Administration, through the choice to create the Department of Education, enacted discourses that focused on self-development and the building of human capital. As the Carter Administration enacted these discourses, past policy approaches became less appropriate or viable.

The administration's attempt to create comprehensive urban policy also signaled that the relationship between education and antipoverty policy had changed. For the most part, education policy was minimized from Carter's urban policy. The rationale provided at the time was that the administration was dealing with urban education through a specific education policy focus in the creation of the Department of Education. But this logic contributed to the separation of antipoverty and education policy. The reconfiguration of education policy would take place in separate policy discussions from one of the main targets of antipoverty policy, the urban center. At the same time, education policy was independently being generalized, and its categorical aspects were being challenged. Carter's desire to separate policy streams

and to develop rational, comprehensive policy approaches allowed for the realignment of national priorities.

The redevelopment of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy took place at a historical moment in which people across the United States were attempting to construct new ways of living. These changes engendered an uneasy mood that was a combination of a shifting common sense and people's ability to make sense of their world. This mood helped construct what was considered possible in American social policy.

As people became dismayed by the persistence of equality issues, despite equal protection under the law, they looked for other ways to work toward equality. The elevation of education as a national priority became a visible strategy at the time because it did not require a necessary redistribution of privilege and it would allow a concomitant strategy to invest in other identities. At the same time, as people searched for greater personal freedom through education, it became clear that this strategy had to be disconnected from the antipoverty policies that were supported by suspect interest groups, whose demands for conformity were seen as standing in the way of social well-being.

Thus, in the late 1970s we see the separation of education and antipoverty policy at the federal level, not only bureaucratically, but also in the rhetoric of national priorities. As a result, education policy became more greatly aligned with human capital development and further detached from more redistributive policy

frameworks. The rearticulation in the social regularities regarding race, property, individualism, and domestic stability remade the possible in domestic social policy.

CHAPTER 7: THE POLICY DEBATE TODAY

In chapter 1, I reviewed research that showed that segregation along racial and socioeconomic lines has been a hallmark of U.S. life, especially in the urban centers in the second half of the 20th century. Currently, children who live in poverty, when compared to wealthier children, suffer more illness with less access to health care, live in lower quality and less stable housing, and walk through more dangerous and less hopeful neighborhoods (Berliner, 2005). These differences in income, health care, housing, and communities greatly contribute to the success students enjoy at school. Schools serving privileged students are 89 times more likely than nonprivileged schools to be consistently high performing (D. Harris, 2007). The quality of the schools these students attend has a powerful influence; however, the out-of-school factors associated with poverty also play a limiting role (Berliner, 2005).

This is true for a large number of students. Researchers have estimated that 20% of American children live in poverty (Blank, 1997; Iceland, 2003). The United States has the second highest percentage of children in poverty among the 26 wealthiest countries (Berliner, 2005). In the southern United States, over half of the students in public schools come from poor families (Viadero, 2007).

Despite the growing number of students who experience these impediments, many claim that equality of educational opportunity is not dependent on other social conditions (S. Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). They claim that any

attempt to recognize the powerful influence of poverty is just a strategy for making excuses for schools. This framework has become a powerful discourse that limits how we think about education policy.

It has become common sense that the achievement gap is the fault of the failing schools. At the same time, people believe that the dominant way in which we define our problems in education (e.g., poor teaching, low standards) as well as the policy levers that are posed as solutions (e.g., standardization, mass testing, and aggregate accountability measures) are rooted in a response to human nature and are therefore are indispensable. There is a sense that the naturalness of the current policy regime is predicated on proof that past policy levers, such as those that linked education and antipoverty policy, failed.

When I was teaching in high-poverty schools I was disturbed by the dissonance between this common sense and my own experiences. This research represents my attempt to come to grips with that dissonance. I was prompted to this work by the question, "What counts as education policy?" (Anyon 2005b). I was struck by this question because it asks us to reconsider the possibilities for improving the well-being of children. In this study, I historicize the common sense that limits our understandings of the possibilities for ensuring that kids have healthy neighborhoods and healthy schools. In doing so, I tried to shake this false self-evidence of our current common sense and point to the historical contingency of our policy approaches.

Purpose of Chapter

In this chapter my goal is to offer an answer to the question: What lessons can be taken from a historical deconstructive analysis of this policy issue for contemporary educational policy? In doing so, I assert that denaturalizing our current understandings of education policy opens up our future possibilities for critical engagement. Specifically, I argue that historical deconstruction presented in the previous chapters offers insight into and prompts us to ask questions about two elements of the current policy debate around what counts as education policy. First, the historical narrative presented in this study helps us understand the ways in which the social regularities of the day, from which we construct our possibilities, are in flux. I assert then that to understand the current policy debate, we must look at how the social regularities we enact construct our view of the possibilities. Second, this study has shown that the development of policy frameworks through an enactment of these dominant social regularities also produces valorization of some interests and discrediting of others. Therefore, we must work continually to insure that we create process structures that bring as many people into the policy discussion as possible.

I begin by first explaining how my theoretical and methodological approach has helped bring the importance of these two elements into focus. I then review how my approach helped me historicize the present common sense. Finally, I tentatively apply these lessons to the emerging issues around poverty and education of the present.

The Helpfulness of Critical Policy Analysis

In order to understand what we can learn from the historical narrative in chapters 4, 5, and 6, we first must be clear about what my methodology makes visible and how this information can help us in policy discussions. In this study I have heeded the advice that policy research should not be understood solely as an attempt to find answers to some research questions on a policy issue or social problem. Instead, it should be considered "interpretational forays into the dynamic complexities of high modern society" (Ball, 2005, p. 1). In doing so, I have directed my attention to the ways in which social problems are socially and historically contingent at the ontological and epistemological level (Scheurich, 1997). This liquidity of problem and solution definition thus forced me to understand the policy documents as open, awkward, incomplete, and unstable texts that may be read an infinite number of ways (Ball, 2005).

Thus, given that the meanings of policies are always being made and remade, the critical policy analyst must become attuned to the "theoretical constitution of facticity" (Fischer, 2003, p. 14). In other words, the goal of the analyst no longer becomes the triangulation of truth in order to make the best policy decision. Instead, the best decision is reached through a deliberative dialogue. The analyst facilitates the dialogue through descriptions of how different actors in the policy discussions construct their arguments (Fischer, 2003).

This theoretical orientation has some practical implications. The deliberation must be more than an intellectual exercise; it must help us make a decision about how

we will allocate resources. In order to facilitate this decision, Fraser (1989) pointed out, “In late capitalist welfare state societies, talk about people’s needs is an important species of political discourse” (p. 161). In this assertion Fraser pointed to the ways in which people make political claims based on an argument of “exactly what various groups of people really do need and who should have the last word in such matters” (p. 161). She asked us to pay attention to the ways in which needs are socially constructed and what kinds of “needs talk” are more powerful than others. In doing so, a critical policy analysis can reveal the power relations that make one definition of a problem more likely than others.

Given that this approach recognizes no real fundamental categories from which we can make a final appeal, these problem definitions or needs claims must be judged in two pragmatic ways. First, in order to judge which interpretation of people’s needs is better than another, we must pay attention to the differences in how one interpretation comes to the forefront over another. In other words, we should look at the ways in which the social construction of knowledge is tied to the exercise of power. at how common sense replicates the power structure. Second, we must look at who took part in this needs definition. As Fraser (1989) pointed out, “In general, procedural considerations dictate that, all other things being equal, the best need interpretations are those reached by means of communicative processes that most closely approximate ideals of democracy, equality and fairness” (p. 182). Thus, we should look first at how people at the table construct their knowledge and second at who is at the table.

The historical narrative presented in this study helps on both counts. Specifically, it contributes to our understanding of how, in the late 1970s, a common sense was constructed that separated education and antipoverty policies. Second, this narrative helps show the ways in which this time defined who got a seat at the table as the government attempted to define educational needs.

Lessons From my Historical Analysis

A goal of this study was to paint a large enough picture to show not only what people in the late 1970s identified as the policy issues and policy solutions, but also what problems and solutions became unthinkable or discredited (Scheurich, 1997). I assert that my portrayal of the time in chapters 4, 5, and 6 helps us first by offering an interpretation of some of the ways in which it became common sense to separate education and antipoverty policy at the federal level. Second, I argue that the narrative gives us insight into some of the ways in which we decide who should be at the table in our current education policy discussions.

Lessons About Common-Sense Production

The move to separate education and antipoverty policy coincided with a complex set of changes that occurred throughout U.S. society. This move was partially the result of the development of a common sense and a mood that was attached to the ways in which people regularized interactions around race, property,

individuals, and domestic stability. Seeing these policies as separate was part of a redevelopment of national priorities in the federal government.

Common Sense is a Coconstruction of the Context

In chapter 4, I described the social and historical context in which the Carter Administration attempted to rearticulate new national priorities. Carter's choice of symbols was strikingly different from those employed by the Johnson Administration. However, placed amongst the multiple and complex changes that were unfolding over the course of the 1970s, it is clear that with his speech, Carter was trying to resonate with these changing modes of life.

Over the course of a little over a decade there were changes in what people expected from the economy, their home life, their gender roles, the shape and location of their communities, and the ways in which they entertained themselves. The expectation that the economy would continue to grow at a record pace was soon replaced by a sense that the economy could not be counted on to deliver. At the same time, gender roles were being reorganized. Women and men sought to try new identities and argued for the validity of these identities. These identities were often modeled on images from mass media that were becoming more prominent in the lives of people; however, due to technological changes, most people were beginning to experience these media privately and along slimmer demographic lines. Many people who had grown up in the Northeast found themselves moving away from their extended family and to the Sunbelt. Many people moved to suburban homes that were built around the use of the automobile. In addition, the political coalitions that had

been developed throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s began to dissolve, and many southern Democrats began to change their party affiliation to Republican.

When situated amongst these changing expectations, the rhetoric of the Great Society claiming that we should use our growing wealth to invest in a stronger public seemed defunct. Carter, therefore, tried to push for a new set of priorities that would focus on rational and efficient government. However, in his push for a rational approach he privileged a certain rationality.

Common Sense Represents an Intersection of Bundles of Social Regularities

This rationality is actually better understood as a mood. In chapter 5 I defined this mood as a combination of the common sense and emotions that fomented in the reconstruction of daily life in the 1970s. In the chapter I explained a few of the many scattered practices and discourses, or social regularities, that allowed the performance of knowledge or common sense of the late 1970s. In doing so I have offered an interpretation of how certain explanations and practices around education and antipoverty policy became intelligible, valorized, or deemed as natural, while others became discounted, impossible, or unimaginable (Britzman, 2003, p. 244).

Specifically, I explained that the common sense that developed partially represented an intersection of the bundles of social regularities around Whiteness and property with the bundles of social regularities around individualism and domestic stability. In the late 1970s it became common sense that the property right that had been invested in Whiteness could not be undone. Thus, many felt the only recourse was an investment in other identities. When color blindness was coopted to hide

White privilege, the integration ideals and the redistributive elements of the Great Society programs became suspect. At the same time, it also became common sense that a new definition of the individual was required in order to maintain domestic stability. Neo-liberal arguments offered a domestic stability that was built on economic stability. According to these logics, economic stability was the result of capital accumulation (including human capital) and robust entrepreneurship. It became common sense that past more communitarian constructions of the individual should be shed for a new construction that focused on entrepreneurship. This resonated with the desire of many individuals to find stability through a focus on the self. Looking inward, it was felt, would allow people to transcend the trappings of the daily grind and promote a communion with a transcendent force. It was common sense, therefore, to focus on one's personal interests in the name of the invisible hand that would ensure increased stability.

This common sense validated feelings of dismay, dissatisfaction, anger, and suspicion. The combination of these represented the general malaise of the era. It also prompted a reconfiguration of policy priorities. As seen in chapter 6, the elevation of education as a national priority resonated with the mood. The desires for policy goals that would focus on the individual and allow for the investment in identities found validation in the mood of the time. At the same time, antipoverty policies that pushed for redistribution became suspect. The solidarity that was required to push for redistribution did not fit with the growing investment in individualism.

This study helps us understand that the possibilities in our fight to improve the well-being of children are structured by the enactment of social regularities of the day. A careful investigation of these social regularities can be offered as a resource from which people in the policy discussions judge the politics and philosophy of others as well as their own—an important activity in our continuing community struggle for betterment and fairness.

It is important to remember that these social regularities operate together and are coconstructed by each other. At the same time, they are not perpetually interlocked; if I have shown anything, I hope it is that social conditions are always in flux and thus open for critique. Therefore, we should resist the temptation to see such research as a diagnosis of the social order as a whole. We also should resist the temptation to isolate one social regularity, such as individualism, and make it the target of attack. Instead, we should work on multiple fronts and recognize, as much as possible, the relationships between our practices and discourses.

Lessons About who is Sitting at the Table

If there is no final truth for us to base our allocation decisions on, then it is imperative that we work toward getting as many voices as possible into the discussion. Striving for this ideal is difficult work in the complicated and specialized world that is federal governance. Carter desired this as one of his key goals of his administration. However, ultimately, his desire for comprehensive, rational plans that were focused on one issue at a time limited who was at different policy discussions.

These limits were evident in both the fight to create the Department of Education and the creation of the president's urban policy.

The Creation of Policy Communities in the Creation of the Department of Education

In the creation of the Department of Education the administration sought to compartmentalize and symbolically elevate education policy at the national level. In doing so, past coalitions between labor, antipoverty groups, health care lobbies, and education interests were broken apart. This can be seen in the both the fight to keep the Head Start program out of the new Department of Education and the disregard for arguments such as those made by Shanker (1978), the president of the American Federation of Teachers. Shanker argued that the new department would remove the possibility of coordination and lead to a defunding of HEW. He believed this would result if the past coalitions could not lobby as a block. However, those who favored the creation of the department did not seem to fear this, because they believed that their interests were not necessarily related to those of labor, health care, or antipoverty groups. Instead, their focus would be the improvement of schools to insure each individual student could learn. As they claimed independence from other interests, they narrowed the scope of education policy discussions to focus on the child as a student only. This approach reshaped who was included in the education policy community.

A mirror of this dynamic can be seen in the Head Start fight related in chapter 6. During this policy struggle, it became clear that those whose interests were not in line with the dominant education community did not want to be included in the

Department of Education. They feared that inclusion of Head Start into a department that was focused on the development of the student, rather than on the community, would lead to a refashioning of the program. Due to this fear of homogenization, Head Start supporters asserted that they were not part of the education community as the department would define it. Both of these examples show the ways in which the education policy community was narrowed during the late 1970s.

The Creation of Policy Communities in the Creation of Urban Policy

The creation of the urban policy was involved a sorting of policy communities. The lack of inclusion of urban school groups into the discussions of the development of urban policy in effect disinvited them from future policy discussions. Their overture for inclusion was denied, mainly based on the assumption that education was being dealt with elsewhere, which signaled that schools operated separately from their communities. This meant that the issues of the urban schools would need to be addressed in the education community rather than by the policy communities that dealt with urban development. This sorting of policy communities in the late 1970s partially contributed to the ways in which the linking of the policy discussions today is almost unthinkable.

A Tentative Application of the Emerging Issues

Cavanaugh (2007) reported,

> Not only did many industrialized countries outperform the United States in science on a recent international exam, but American students' academic

> achievement was also more likely to be affected by their wealth or poverty and family background than was their peers' in higher-scoring nations. (p. 1)

The report that was issued on the results of the test concluded, "Socioeconomic factors appeared to be less of a factor in higher-scoring nations is no accident" (Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 1). The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, who administered the tests, concluded, "Quality and equity need not be considered as competing policy objectives" (as quoted in Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 1).

In this study I have historicized the Paris group's conclusion. I have shown how in the United States these policy objectives came to be competitively pitted against each other rather than reciprocally connected. I also have shown that if we are to think carefully about how we can develop an approach that recognizes the connections between education and poverty, we must engage in a deliberative policy discussion that brings as many groups to the table as possible. In the policy discussions, studies like this one must serve to facilitate a better understanding of how we construct our common sense, so that we may judge the ways in which we are defining the needs of people. Also, we must look at the ways our common-sense notions and our bureaucratic structures, existing or proposed, narrow or expand our policy communities.

Briefly, I offer a few remarks about these two issues in today's discussion of poverty and education. First, I discuss the construction of common sense in today's

context. Second, I discuss the ways in which policy communities are being developed.

Today's Common Sense

As I mentioned above, if I have shown anything, I hope I have shown that our social regularities are open and in flux. They are continually reshaped through our interactions with our context and each other. They intersect and are bundled in multiple ways across multiple places. The longevity of their replication is variable and dependent on an almost infinite number of possibilities. For example, some of the elements of the commonsense that developed in the late 1970s persist, whereas others have faded or been recombined.

In particular, ideas around neo-liberalism and capital accumulation are still prevalent in our policy discussions (Duggan, 2003; Harvey, 2007) During George W. Bush's presidency the rich have received multiple tax cuts in the name of economic security for all. The idea of the individual as the entrepreneur and as human capital still pervades many U.S. policy discussions (L. Davies, 2002; Spring, 1997) At the same time, critical theorists still point to the protection of the property right in Whiteness as a major logic in affirmative action and integration cases (Delgado & Stefancic, 2000).

However, people who are beginning to feel a dissonance between this common sense and their own experiences are pragmatically questioning the individualist suspicions of redistribution efforts. Some in education are questioning

the reliance solely on education to achieve a fairer society. For example, a teacher named Juliet Luther in a letter to the editor of *Education Week* concisely conveyed the power of the current common sense and her desire to resist it. Luther (2007) wrote,

> It was gratifying to read William A. Proefriedt's Commentary "Outsider in the Locker Room" (Dec 6, 2006) after so many years of suppression of the opinions, views, and, indeed, even the research findings of all those educators who attempt to discuss socioeconomic-status factors in student achievement, only to be ruthlessly shouted down. Teachers who are willing to speak of these issues are told in a variety of ways that they are not confident in the abilities of students who have historically done poorly in school, or have left without graduating. Worse, it might be implied that these teachers are racists who hold negative views about the children of ethnic minorities. All to support the notion that simply upholding standards, planning lessons "aligned" with standards, and measuring outcomes according to the standards is enough. Mention children who lack sufficient food, sleep, or a place to call home, who have no books or access to books, or suffer the effects of poverty in other ways, and you may find yourself accused of espousing a deficit view of them. I concur with others who believe that the nation's children would be far better served by investment in initiatives to address poverty than in more standards programs or standardized testing in schools. (p. 29)

Luther's assessment calls for a reassessment of the grid of social regularities that link race, individualism, and redistribution.

At the same time, the symbols of the past are continually recombined and thus blur the arguments that established the commonsense of the late 1970s. For example, although Carter's goal of creating a Department of Education was an attempt to set himself apart from past Great Society approaches, recently the Department of Education building was named for Lyndon B. Johnson (Hoff, 2007). Representative Green, who spoke to support the bill, noted that the naming of the building set federal priorities on a new course: "Before, educational opportunity in America was not a

national priority, as it continues to be today for both our parties, including current President George W. Bush" (as quoted in Hoff, 2007, p. 24). Depending on the ways in which this new symbol is accepted or rejected, it has the power to hide from view or remind people of Johnson's approach to social issues. It can either hide from us or remind us of the ways in which education and antipoverty priorities shifted places during this time span.

Therefore, as we engage in education and antipoverty policy discussions today, we must be aware of the ways in which priorities have changed over time. We must strive to be aware that our new priorities will be built out of a common sense that is emerging and is the product of experiences and memories. We ourselves are trying to resonate with the feelings of rejection, pride, and distrust that past politics and common sense have come together to produce.

Today's Policy Communities

In the current policy debates around the relationship between education and antipoverty policy we suffer from a silo effect that was partially constructed during the Carter era. These silos are consistent through the policy-making community, the universities, and the bureaucratic structures. Our attempts to consider education and poverty issues in tandem require that we reach across buildings, disciplines, and organizations. Doing so will take a conscious effort that can transcend budgets and scarce allocations.

For example, in August 2007, federal officials announced that they planned to save HHS $3.6 billion by cutting reimbursement to public schools for identifying and treating students through Medicaid (Samuels, 2007). The schools long have been the place where students who were eligible for aid have been identified. The elimination of this funding would remove this responsibility from the school. The funds are mostly used to pay for school nurses and school psychologists. These employees are often required to provide handicapped students with needed services that the schools are required by federal law to provide. The HHS officials noted, "Medicaid is an extremely costly program, and we have to make dollars stretch as far as possible" (as quoted in Samuels, 2007, p. 17). In response, the school officials claimed, according to Samuels, that "Medicaid is shifting its responsibility to pay for poor students onto cash-strapped school districts" (p. 17). Here the issue is not priorities but money. Given that the schools and HHS are competing for the same shrinking domestic funds, their ability to work together to help the neediest students is reduced to finger pointing.

However, these divisions are not insurmountable, especially at the local level. For example, in Portland, Oregon, the city and the school system teamed up to launch a program to "help families with housing costs so they can afford to rent or buy homes and—city officials hope—send their children to city schools" (Gewertz, 2007, p. 8). August 1, 2007, the city council passed a measure that would set aside $1.6 million to keep families with children in inner Portland and to boost school enrollment. Specifically, the measure

> sets aside $950,000 for grants to school or community groups to promote neighborhood schools. It also establishes a $450,000 pot of rental-assistance money for families whose children attend some of the city's most underenrolled schools, and a $200,000 cash reserve to provide about 40 below-market-rate supplementary mortgages to help families buy homes. (Gewertz, 2007, p. 8)

A 20% drop in enrollment in the school district over the past decade spurred the collaboration between the schools and the cities. This drop in enrollment also resulted in a "loss of more than $58 million in state funding" (Gewertz, 2007, p. 8). School and city officials recognized that if housing costs could not be controlled, school funding would continue to drop.

In this example we see a way in which funding issues brought people together to address connected issues. In addition to the immediate need to stem the loss of state funding, there is a sense that school quality can be improved only by improvements in neighborhoods. For example, Portland has developed the Rosa Parks Elementary School, opened in 2006 and part of a "new development that replaced a school and a housing project with homes for a mix of low- and middle-income families" (Gewertz, 2007, p. 8). City money, school district money, and nonprofit money was used to develop a community campus, which includes space that is shared by the Boys and Girls Clubs and the school. A Portland official said, "It makes so much sense not to have these be separate silos. We want to end the attitude that says, 'There is nothing we can do—it's a demographic trend'" (as quoted in Gewertz, 2007, p. 8).

There is nothing stable or inevitable about the alliances that have worked to isolate education and antipoverty policy communities. The barriers between these disciplines and departments were the products of the concerns and the times in which they formed. Our times and coalitions are constantly being reformed.

Conclusion

In this study I have shown that in the late 1970s, as people explained the relationship between education and antipoverty policy, they claimed that the two needed to be separated in order to elevate education policy to a national priority. A review of the context and the mood of the time showed this change in the relationship coincided with a shift in modes of living and peoples' common-sense explanations of race, entitlement, individualism, and domestic stability. This historical treatment of the relationship between education and antipoverty policy reveals that in our efforts to better our society and live up to our ideals of fairness, we should pay careful attention to how we construct our arguments and how we include or exclude voices from the community.

APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF TERMS

Actor: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that allows people to speak as a member and carrier of a role in a specific time and place. For example, the social regularities that establish a person's student role in a specific family generate the person's ability to act as a student in that institution.

Agent: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that allows people to speak as a member and carrier of a social stratum. For example, the social regularities that establish a person's class generate the person's ability to act as a member of that class. (This is the more stable part of personhood and is contradictory to the common idea of the agency.)

Antipoverty policy: This is a general term that refers to federal policies aimed at relieving the conditions of poverty. At the federal level, these include housing policies, the past Aid to Families With Dependent Children (now Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), and other in-kind programs such as Food Stamps. Each of these programs has its own details and troubles, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Other general terms, such as *welfare* or *social policy*, are equally acceptable.

Education policy: This is a general term that refers to the range of federal policies that support education. While the main focus in on the ESEA (1965) and its iterations, I am also interested in prekindergarten and higher education programs and their relationship to antipoverty programs.

High-poverty neighborhoods: Neighborhoods in which >40% of residents fall below the poverty line.

Historical figure: This term is meant to represent a person in the past. This word encapsulates all aspects of personhood: agent, actor, and subject.

Historicize: the process by which we make the contingency of social life apparent.

Poststructural: A set of theoretical concepts that recognize that all meaning is generated through social interaction. The meaning of concepts or objects only exists in relationship to other meanings. This implies that there is no foundational place from which to judge "truth." Thus, all life is social and historically contingent. This has large implications about the stability of our knowledge as well as our ability to represent our knowledge.

Social regularities: According to Scheurich (1997), social regularities can be understood in the following way: In any moment in history, multiple historical processes (such as the fiscal policies; accountability regimes; or discourses on the individual, race, opportunity, and equity, among others) become the emergent rules by which social interactions are made regular.

Subject: the capacity generated by social regularities in our interactions that allows people to speak as a narrator of their own experience. This capacity is a voice that is aware of its own vocality. While not all configurations of social regularities allow for the constitution of this capacity in historical figures, it is nevertheless always a possibility. This leads to an ambiguity that is resolvable.

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